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1. Introduction
Over the last decades, a number of factors have led to an increased impor-
tance of employing fiscal policy measures in times of economic crisis. First of all,
the foundation of the Monetary Union in Europe prevented a country-specific
stabilizing role of monetary policy. While the determination of monetary policy
in a currency union may help to provide the basis for stable economic conditions
and could even play an economy stabilizing role in case of union-wide shocks,
the monetary authority – most likely – cannot involve in dampening the effects
of idiosyncratic shocks affecting single countries. This is a task which must be
taken by the national governments. Second, the recent financial crisis resulted
in nominal interest rates being almost at the zero lower bound. In this situa-
tion, regardless of monetary policy being exploit on a national or a union-wide
level, the monetary authority does not have much room for policy interventions
counteracting economic fluctuations. Finally, the recent economic developments
stated a situation featuring the pressing need for economy stabilizing measures.
Starting with the foundation of the monetary union and related economic ad-
justment processes, peaking in the financial crisis in 2008, and resulting in se-
rious government solvency concerns, exploring fiscal policy measures being able
to soften negative crisis impacts as well as investigating how to prevent future
crises seems to be an urgent task.
In this thesis, I explore three issues of (optimal) fiscal policy related to recent
economic developments. First, I refer to the case of a monetary union featuring
intra-union trade balance imbalances. As became apparent during the recent
years, being member of a monetary union may state serious problems related
to trade and trade imbalances as nominal exchange rates are no longer able
to adjust. Second, I turn to the event of a financial shock via a private debt
deleveraging process as could be observed following the financial crisis since 2009
in the Euro area as well as in the US. And finally, I explore national distributive
effects of these fiscal policy measures by regarding heterogeneous agents within a
single country and raising the question of an appropriate social welfare measure.
The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, refers to the situation of countries
forming a monetary union featuring intra-union trade balance imbalances. It
is explored if and how a unilateral fiscal devaluation by means of a budget-
neutral tax shift from direct to indirect taxation may decrease these imbalances.
Methodologically, a two-country DSGE model is used where both countries be-
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long to a monetary union. Within this framework, a devaluation is implemented
as a decrease in the social security contributions and an increase in the value
added tax.
In the first part of the chapter, different ways of implementing a fiscal de-
valuation and their respective effectiveness in eliminating trade balance deficits
are examined. Regarding the revenue generating side, the effects of increasing
the value added tax on tradables is compared to the effects of an increase in
the tax on non-tradables. It is shown that increasing the tax on tradables is a
more effective measure in raising the trade balance – a result which is at odds
with propositions frequently found in literature to abolish reduced rates of VAT.
Regarding the social security contributions, a decrease in the employers’ share
versus the employees’ share is investigated and it is shown that the common
view of assuming a decrease in the employers’ share to be more effective does
not hold to be true. In the second part of the chapter, I use these insights to
simulate a fiscal devaluation implemented in Euro area countries featuring trade
balance deficits in 2015 by using a more elaborate New-Keynesian 2-country
model and find that a fiscal devaluation may lead to a substantial trade balance
improvement if conducted as an increase in the standard rate of value added tax
and a decrease in the employees’ share of social security contributions.
Chapter 3 refers to the occurrence of a financial crisis and the role of fiscal
policy in this context. A closed-economy DSGE model is used to simulate a pri-
vate debt deleveraging shock in a situation where monetary policy is constrained
by the zero lower bound. In a first step, it is shown that monetary policy being
constrained by the zero lower bound implies huge welfare losses. Building on
this insight, the possibility of fiscal policy taking over the economy-stabilizing
role is explored by investigating fiscal measures implemented to counteract the
negative deleveraging effects. And here, the essay differs methodologically from
the first essay. Constrained-optimal policy reactions to a deleveraging shock
are investigated while in the first essay the policy reaction consists in an ex-
ogenously given one-time tax adjustment. In the second essay, in contrast, the
Ramsey-optimal policy reaction is computed, meaning a Ramsey planner max-
imizes economy-wide welfare but is subject to the private sector’s behavior.
Consequently, on the one hand, fiscal measures are no longer exogenously given
but set constrained-optimal, and, on the other hand, fiscal instruments may be
adjusted in each period instead of consisting in a one-time shift. Furthermore,
while the Ramsey-optimal policy regarded in this chapter is defined to maximize
economy-wide welfare, the devaluation scenario regarded in the first essay does
2
not necessarily imply a welfare gain but is set to reduce trade balance deficits.
The results obtained in the second essay indicate that applying a constrained-
optimal fiscal policy in a period of zero nominal interest rates may be highly
effective by eliminating roughly one quarter of the total welfare loss of monetary
policy being constrained by the zero lower bound. Interestingly, following the
optimal fiscal policy implies a prolonged stay at the zero lower bound. Moreover,
the essay explores the effectiveness of different fiscal instruments and it is found
that the relative effectiveness of consumption versus wage taxes depends on
the presence of government spending as well as on the specific monetary policy
conducted. Furthermore, welfare gains of having government spending as an
additional instrument are small compared to the total welfare gains of applying
a Ramsey-optimal instead of an exogenous policy. Finally, it is shown that
if fiscal policy is set optimally, conducting a simple inflation-targeting policy
instead of an optimal monetary policy need not necessarily imply welfare losses.
Chapter 4 focuses on the agent-specific effects of optimal fiscal policy. While
methodologically similar to Chapter 3, the distributive effects of constrained-
optimal fiscal policy measures are central to the essay. The essay builds on a
closed-economy DSGE model populated by two types of households: patient and
impatient households. Within this framework, a financial shock is simulated
via an interest spread shock. As in Chapter 3, Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy
reactions to this spread shock are computed. While in the main part of the
paper the Ramsey planner is modeled in a utilitarian fashion by maximizing
economy-wide welfare defined as the sum of individual utilities, this does not
coincide with maximizing the individual welfare of a patient or an impatient
household. Consequently, the results are compared to the case of a Ramsey
planner maximizing a social welfare function in the spirit of Rawls where the
weight the planner sets on a group of agents increases with a decreasing utility
level of the respective group.
The analysis is twofold: For one thing, the role of taxing different sources
of income in mitigating the spread shock implied welfare losses is investigated.
Here, two different kinds of income taxes – namely wage taxes and interest
taxes – are regarded and their relative effectiveness as well as the gain from
being able to levy different tax rates on the two different sources of income
are analyzed. It is found that, first, taxing interest income is a more effective
measure in reducing the welfare losses of an interest spread shock than using
wage taxes. And second, applying only one general income tax instead of using
different rates for both kinds of income implies huge welfare losses. For another
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thing, distributional issues are investigated. As a central point, it is found that
maximizing economy-wide welfare may involve enlarging the disparity between
agents if using a utilitarian definition of a social welfare function. This result
depends on the tax base used as well as on the relation between the degrees of
price and wage rigidity. In case of using wage taxes as an instrument, a larger
degree of wage stickiness than of price stickiness involves decreasing the disparity
between groups while prices being sufficiently more sticky than wages means that
conducting a Ramsey-optimal policy enlarges the wedge between savers and
borrowers. Using a social welfare function in the spirit of Rawls – meaning the
weight the planner sets on the utility of one of the two groups of agents adjusts
endogenously and is decreasing in the utility level of the respective group – can
completely offset the disparity between groups but implies a significant decrease
in the savers’ welfare as well as sizable output fluctuations.
To summarize, this thesis shows that conducting a purposefully set fiscal
policy in times of economic imbalances or in the aftermath of economic shocks
is an important issue and, at the same time, may be quite effective in reducing
imbalances and mitigating welfare losses. On an agent-specific level, however,
distributive effects of these policy measures should receive attention.
4
2. Fiscal Devaluation in the Euro
Area: The Role of Rigidities,
Non-Tradables, and Social
Security Contributions3
2.1 Introduction
The lasting divergence in intra-EU trade balances between member states
of the European Union gives rise to a continuous policy debate as to whether
European governments should aim at reducing their external deficits. Jaumotte
and Sodsriwiboon (2010) and Eichengreen (2010) argue that external deficits
could reflect domestic distortions (as e.g. asset price bubbles due to transi-
tory booms or a too optimistic view of future growth rates). In this case, the
accumulated high levels of foreign debt could not be paid back through high
productivity growth but could resolve in serious liquidity problems. Related to
this, high deficits may pose a potential danger as the occurrence of a sudden
stop of foreign financial inflows would force the deficit countries to implement
strong austerity measures. Furthermore, external imbalances could reflect com-
petitiveness problems which would require a painful period of diminished growth
to allow a gradual adjustment. Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) find that the
deficits in southern European Union countries are too large to be explained by
fundamentals and that these deficits tend to remain high in the medium-run.
Holinski et al. (2010) and Holinski et al. (2012) confirm this view by stressing
that the increasing imbalances in the Euro zone could be seen as an indica-
tor of economic divergence and Arghyrou and Chortareas (2006) find the real
exchange rate to be a prominent determinant of current account imbalances indi-
cating that underlying the external imbalances could be competitiveness losses.
Based on these insights of recent studies, policy actions seem to be in place at
3A slightly different version of the chapter has been published in the “Journal of International
Money and Finance” Vol. 87 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.05.004
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least for some Euro zone countries to reduce their substantial external deficits.
This paper builds on the huge strand of literature examining the possible
trade-balance-improving effects of a fiscal devaluation, meaning a budget-neutral
tax shift from direct to indirect taxation. In a first step, the study focuses on
a stylized monetary union model with two symmetric countries. The analysis
differs from existing devaluation literature in three ways: First, the role of the
employees’ share in social security contributions (SSC) is explored and compared
to the effects of a decrease in the employers’ share. Second, the model does not
only include non-tradable goods but allows for a different taxation of tradable
and non-tradable consumption goods and explores their effects on the trade
balance. Third, the paper explicitly explores the role of nominal rigidities for
the effectiveness of a fiscal devaluation in raising the trade balance. In a second
step, these insights are used to simulate a fiscal devaluation in a more elaborate
2-country model calibrated to Euro Area 2015 data.
There is a large body of studies exploring the effects of a fiscal devaluation
on trade-balance- or current-account-deficits. While almost all studies4 find a
positive short-run effect on the trade balance or the current account, the long-
run effect is more controversial. The European Commission (2011a) uses a 3-
country QUEST model to investigate the effects of a fiscal devaluation shifting
revenues equal to 1% of GDP from employers’ SSC to VAT and finds that
the trade balance improves, but only in the short-run. Engler et al. (2014)
perform the same simulation in a 2-country New-Keynesian model where the
countries are calibrated to represent central-northern and southern European
countries and find a short-run improvement in the trade balance of 0.2 percentage
points of GDP. Gomes et al. (2016) simulate the tax shift using the EAGLE
model and find that it results in an improvement in the Spanish trade balance
by 0.5 percentage points of GDP after two years while there is no long-run
effect. Studies finding a long-run effect contain e.g. the European Commission
(2014) who use the QUEST model for Spain to simulate a fiscal devaluation
implemented as a reduction in income taxation and an increase in the VAT and
obtain a long-run improvement in the trade balance by 0.5 percentage points of
GDP. Furthermore, the results of the Bank of Portugal (2011) indicate a positive
long-run effect on the Portugese trade balance by using the PESSOA model.
This paper is related to various issues of devaluation literature: First, it is
4Studies finding a small worsening of the trade balance are the European Commission (2008)
simulating a 4-regions QUEST model and the CPB et al. (2013) by using the NiGEM-model
for different countries.
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common sentiment that the effectiveness of a devaluation requires some degree
of rigidity in nominal wages (e.g. International Monetary Fund (2011), Calm-
fors (1998), De Mooij and Keen (2012)). It is typically argued that flexible
wages would impede a devaluation by offsetting the imposed competitiveness-
enhancing effect as workers would aim at increasing their nominal wages both
due to the reduction in the employers’ SSC and due to the increase in the VAT.
The reduction in the employers’ share reduces labor costs and, consequently,
offers a good bargaining position for workers while the increase in the VAT in-
creases consumer prices and, hence, reduces real wages such that in both cases
workers would aim at being compensated by higher nominal wages. This could
result in a real producer wage being the same as before the tax-shift which would
render the devaluation ineffective in affecting real variables. There are only very
few studies explicitly exploring the effect of the degree of nominal rigidity on
the effectiveness of a devaluation: Engler et al. (2014) simulate a fiscal deval-
uation in a New-Keynesian 2-country model and find that the trade balance
effect decreases with decreasing wage rigidity. The CPB et al. (2013) explore
the sensitivity of trade balance effects of a fiscal devaluation to the degree of
wage rigidity and find that the effect varies over time as well as between models.
Both focus, however, on the employers’ share in SSC and do not regard the effect
of price rigidity.
Second, related to the assumption of the effectiveness of a fiscal devaluation
requiring some degree of rigidity, literature frequently assumes a decrease in
the employers’ share in SSC to be a more effective measure in raising the trade
balance than a reduction in the employees’ share (see e.g. European Commission
(2006)). As far as I know, there is no paper explicitly exploring the differences
between the effects of reducing the employers’ share in SSC versus the employees’
share. A paper at least regarding a decrease in the employees’ share is Langot
et al. (2012) who use a small open economy model with labor market search
frictions and find that a reduction in the employees’ share in SSC mainly induces
the same effects as a decrease in the employers’ share.
Finally, there is a small strand of literature exploring the practical imple-
mentation of the VAT increase, meaning which rate to increase. The VAT, after
all, is not only the VAT rate but consists of at least two or three different rates
applied to different categories of goods and services. In the European Union,
the application of value added taxes is restricted by the VAT directive given
by the council of the European Union defining that each country may raise a
standard rate of VAT as well as one or two reduced rates. In the Euro zone,
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currently all countries make use of at least one reduced rate.5 Concerning a fiscal
devaluation, this should not matter at all if the reduced rates were distributed
equally between sectors. This, however, is not the case. In fact, tradable goods
are taxed more heavily than non-tradable goods as the majority of categories on
which reduced rates may be applied can be classified as non-tradables.6 Conse-
quently, if considering an increase in the VAT, it should be contemplated which
rate or rates of VAT should be increased.
There is a quite small range of literature discussing briefly the different rates
of VAT in the light of a fiscal devaluation. Most of them propose to rise or
eliminate reduced rates of VAT as e.g. Franco (2013), International Monetary
Fund (2011), and International Monetary Fund (2012). De Mooij and Keen
(2012) propose that a higher standard rate may limit the positive trade balance
effects of a devaluation depending on the labor share of tradables and non-
tradables. On the contrary, Koske (2013) argues that as reduced rates apply
mostly to non-tradable goods, an abolition of reduced rates may lead to a sub-
stitution of tradables for non-tradables which would limit the effectiveness of
a fiscal devaluation. None of these studies, however, theoretically explores the
effect of non-tradables or, as a consequence thereof, the importance of consider-
ing different VAT rates. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one paper
differentiating between VAT rates on tradables and non-tradables: Petroulakis
(2017) explores the role of trade costs and the VAT on tradables in a small
open economy model calibrated to Greece if the country is hit by a negative
debt shock and finds that hikes in the VAT rate on tradables limit the tendency
for an increase in exports. While this is the paper most closely related to the
current paper insofar as it explicitly distinguishes between a VAT rate applied
on tradables and a VAT rate applied on non-tradables, the current paper differs
in several aspects. First, Petroulakis (2017) does not regard a fiscal devalua-
tion but limits his exploration on the export-effects of increases in VAT rates
while he completely abstracts from wage taxes or social security contributions.
Second, he models a small open economy thus assuming that the home country
is to small to affect the rest of the world. The current paper, on the contrary,
explicitly allows for and analyzes spill-over effects to the foreign country. Fur-
thermore, Petroulakis (2017) focuses on the case of Greece while the current
5See European Commission (2017): VAT rates applied in the member states of the European
Union.
6Using the calculations by IAS et al. (2013b) of average VAT rates for each COICOP category
and following the definition of goods and services as tradable or non-tradable of Piton (2017).
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paper regards the overall intra-EU dynamics. Finally, while Petroulakis (2017)
does regard the role of nominal rigidities, he explores both effects (an increase
in the VAT rate and a reduction in nominal rigidity) separately. The current
paper, in contrast, examines the influence of nominal rigidities on VAT increases
and SSC decreases, respectively.
This paper contrasts with previous devaluation literature in three ways:
First, a decrease in the employees’ share of SSC is found to be a more effec-
tive measure in raising the trade balance than a reduction in the employers’
share due to different effects on the tax base. Second, despite the proposition to
abolish reduced rates of VAT often found in literature, the results indicate that
an increase in the standard rate of VAT implies a larger trade balance improve-
ment than an abolition of reduced rates as the latter implies a substitution of
tradables for non-tradables. And third, it is found that a fiscal devaluation can
have substantial effects on the trade balance even if wages and prices are fully
flexible. The simulation of a devaluation implemented in EU-member states fea-
turing trade balance deficits gives incidence that such a tax shift may lead to a
substantial trade balance improvement of the respective countries if conducted
as a reduction in the employees’ share of SSC and an increase in the standard
rate of VAT. A reduction in the employers’ share in SSC financed by an aboli-
tion of reduced rates, on the contrary, is all but effectless in raising the trade
balance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a
simple model and explores the basic mechanisms of a fiscal devaluation. In
Section 2.3, this simple model is extended and used to trace the different effects
of a decrease in the employers’ versus the employees’ share in SSC, the effects
of an increase in non-tradable VAT versus tradable VAT, and the influence of
nominal rigidities. Section 2.4 presents a more elaborated model for the Euro
area calibrated to 2015 data and includes the simulation of two different fiscal
devaluation scenarios. Section 2.5 contains a robustness analysis while Section
2.6 concludes.
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2.2 A Simple Model
2.2.1 The Model
In this section, I consider a very simple two-country model to trace the ef-
fects of a fiscal devaluation and explore the different mechanisms of various
policy measures. Both countries are symmetric and belong to a monetary union
whose population size is normalized to one. In each country, households derive
utility from consumption and leisure, supply homogenous labor, and participate
in complete asset markets. Governments in each country levy social security
contributions for employers’ and employees’ and a value added tax. The as-
sociated revenues are rebated to the economy via lump-sum transfers. In the
following, only the home economy is described in detail since the equations for
the foreign country can be derived analogously.7
Households
In the home country (H), there exists a continuum of identical households of
size n, each seeking to maximize its intertemporal utility which is given by
U =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pi(st)βt
{
C1−ρt
1− ρ −
L1+ηt
1 + η
}
, (2.1)
where pi(st) is the probability of the event history st. Ct denotes the per capita
consumption bundle and Lt is the quantity of labor supplied by an individual
household. η > 0 denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
and ρ > 0 holds. Each household has access to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu
securities such that the per capita budget constraint is given by
(1 + τCt )PtCt +
∑
st+1
Q(st, st+1)B(s
t, st+1)
≤(1− τEEt )WtLt +B(st−1, st) + Tt (2.2)
with Q(st, st+1) the price in state s
t of an Arrow-Debreu security B(st, st+1)
that pays one unit of the numeraire in state st+1. τEEt denotes social security
contributions paid by employees (denoted EESSC in the following) and τ ct is a
consumption tax. Tt denotes per capita lump-sum transfers and Wt is nomi-
nal wage. Maximizing (2.1) subject to (2.2) delivers the following first order
7An overview about the equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix A.
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conditions:
C−ρt = λt(1 + τ
c
t )Pt
λtQ(s
t, st+1) = βpi(s
t+1)λt+1
and the labor supply equation:
Lηt =
1
(1 + τCt )Pt
C−ρt Wt(1− τEEt ).
Countries are assumed to be ex-ante symmetric such that the assumption of
complete asset markets implies λt = λ
∗
t which delivers the following risk-sharing
condition: (
Ct
C∗t
)−ρ
=
Pt
P ∗t
1 + τ ct
1 + τ c∗t
.
Defining
RSt =
P ∗t
Pt
this can be written as
RSt =
(
C∗t
Ct
)−ρ
(1 + τCt )
(1 + τC∗t )
.
Total consumption consists of consumption of home-produced and foreign-
produced goods, which are combined according to
Ct =
[
ν
1
φC
φ−1
φ
Ht + (1− ν)
1
φC
φ−1
φ
Ft
] φ
φ−1
,
where φ > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods and ν gives the home bias with 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. The corresponding expenditure
minimization problem is
PtCt ≡ min (PHtCHt + PFtCFt) ,
where the law of one price is assumed to hold for goods produced in both coun-
tries. Minimization delivers the demand relationships for home- and foreign
produced goods
CHt = ν
(
PHt
Pt
)−φ
Ct
CFt = (1− ν)
(
PFt
Pt
)−φ
Ct
11
as well as the home price index
Pt =
[
νP 1−φHt + (1− ν)P 1−φFt
] 1
1−φ
.
Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms indexed by j whose size is normalized
to one operating under perfect competition and producing output using labor
supplied by households subject to the production function
Yt(j) = Lt(j).
Each firm chooses its output and labor demand to maximize its profits which
gives
PHt = Wt(1 + τ
ER
t ),
where τERt denotes the employers’ share in SSC (denoted ERSSC).
Governments
Governments raise social security contributions paid by employers and em-
ployees and a value added tax on consumption goods. I abstract from gov-
ernment spending to hold the model simple and instead assume that the tax
revenues are redistributed to households via lump-sum transfers such that the
government budget simply arises as
(τERt + τ
EE
t )WtLt + τ
C
t PtCt = Tt.
Market clearing
Market clearing requires
Yt = CHt +
1− n
n
C∗Ht
and
Y ∗t = C
∗
Ft +
n
1− nCFt.
Parameter choice
I assume that both countries are symmetric and of equal size (n = 0.5). The
chosen parameter values can be seen in Table 2.1. Furthermore, I set the initial
tax rates to match the GDP-weighted Euro area average of 2015 which gives
a rate of SCC for employers of 26% (τER0 = 0.26) and for employees of 14%
(τEE0 = 0.14) as well as a VAT rate of 21% (τ
C
0 = 0.21).
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n 0.5 Size of home country
η 2 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
ρ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ν 0.5 Home bias in consumption
φ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
β 0.99 Discount factor
Table 2.1: Parameter values for the simple model
2.2.2 Tracing the Mechanisms of a Fiscal Devaluation
In a first step, I trace the mechanisms of a fiscal devaluation by considering
a devaluation consisting of a decrease in the employers’ share of SSC and an
increase in the VAT rate as this is the scenario mostly found in literature. I
consider a devaluation in the home country while the foreign fiscal policy is
assumed to be constant. As is common, I calibrate the devaluation to induce
a revenue-neutral change from direct to indirect taxes shifting revenues in the
amount of 1% of initial steady-state GDP. As regards the revenue generating
side, this means that the VAT rate has to be increased by one percentage point.
ERSSC, on the other hand, must be decreased by 1.26 percentage points. Since
the simple model described above does not feature any rigidities, all real variables
adjust instantaneously. Table 2.2 gives the reaction of main variables to three
different policy measures: the first column shows the effects of the decrease in
the ERSSC, the second column gives the effects of the increase in the VAT, and
the last column shows the combined devaluation effect meaning a shift from
ERSSC to VAT.
Starting with the decrease in the ERSSC, this induces marginal labor costs
to decline such that prices of home produced goods drop relative to foreign
prices as can be seen in the first column. This raises the demand of home-
produced relative to foreign goods such that home production increases while
foreign production declines. This, in turn, causes labor demand to rise in the
home country and to fall abroad. Ultimately, the trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio
raises due to the shift from foreign-produced goods to home-produced goods.
As regards the increase in the VAT rate, this induces the home after-tax price
to incline. The second column shows that, consequently, consumption declines.
Furthermore, labor supply decreases as a consequence of the substitution of
13
Decrease in ERSSC Increase in VAT Devaluation
Home country
Y 0.3145 -0.1027 0.2115
C 0.1257 -0.3083 -0.1829
CH 0.3145 -0.3083 0.0053
CF -0.0628 -0.3083 -0.3709
W 0.8833 0.00 0.8833
L 0.3145 -0.1027 0.2115
Loss -0.0525 -0.2512 -0.3032
∆τSSC -1.26 0.00 -1.26
∆τC 0.00 1.00 1.00
Foreign country
Y ∗ -0.0628 -0.1027 -0.1655
C∗ 0.1257 0.1028 0.2287
C∗H 0.3145 0.1028 0.4177
C∗F -0.0628 0.1028 0.0399
W ∗ 0.1257 0.00 0.1257
L∗ -0.0628 -0.1027 -0.1655
Loss∗ 0.1609 0.1605 0.3211
International
PH -0.1255 0.00 -0.1255
PF 0.1257 0.00 0.1257
TB/Y 0.1881 0.2058 0.3935
Table 2.2: Fiscal devaluation in the simple model. For all variables percentage devia-
tions from the initial steady state are given with the exception of the trade-balance-
to-GDP ratio and the tax rates where the change is given in percentage points. Prices
and wages are measured relative to the aggregate consumer price index. ‘Loss’ denotes
the consumption-equivalent utility loss in percent of initial consumption.
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consumption for leisure outweighing the negative income effect. Since the VAT
rate is applied to home-produced goods as well as on imports, both measures
decrease to the same extent – due to the absence of any degree of home bias in
both countries – meaning that relative prices remain constant. The risk-sharing
condition implies a spill-over effect on the foreign country such that foreign
consumption increases due to the fact that the foreign VAT rate stays constant.
This increase is distributed equally between home- and foreign-produced goods
since relative prices stay constant in each country. Furthermore, the decrease in
home imports outweighs the increase in foreign consumption of foreign-produced
goods such that foreign output decreases. Overall, the decrease in home imports
as well as the increase in foreign imports induces the trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio
to incline by about 0.21 percentage points.
If both measures are applied jointly – meaning a revenue-neutral fiscal deval-
uation is implemented – home output as well as the trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio
increase as can be seen in the last column. Households in the home country,
however, experience a utility loss in the amount of about 0.30% of initial steady-
state consumption while the foreign country gains in the amount of 0.32%.
It should be noted that the result of a tax shift from direct to indirect taxation
influencing real variables even in the long-run stems from the mechanisms of
open economies. In a closed economy, nominal wages and prices would adjust
in consequence of a tax shift such that real wages would remain constant ruling
out any long-run effects on real variables. Even in a small open economy where
foreign variables are fixed from the perspective of the home country, this insight
does not hold to be true: while the price of home-produced goods may adjust,
prices of foreign-produced goods are constant such that the real-exchange rate
changes in response to a tax shift (at least under the assumption of the law
of one price). Since imports as well as exports depend on the real exchange
rate, this affects real variables even in the long-run. In the simple two-country
model considered in the current paper, home as well as foreign prices may adjust.
Since the law of one price is assumed to hold for pre-tax prices, however, there
is no possibility of a perfect adjustment of (after-tax) consumer prices in both
countries to hold real after-tax wages constant. Consequently, imports or export
or both must adjust such inducing long-run real effects.
As the results show that a devaluation may quite effectively increase the
trade balance, the next sections explore which factors determine this result.
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2.3 Determinants of a Fiscal Devaluation
2.3.1 The Role of the Employees’ Share in SSC
To explore the role of the group of tax payers which is subject to the de-
crease in SSC, the results obtained above are compared to the case of decreasing
the employees’ share in SSC instead of the employers’ share. Again, I compute
the decrease to reduce government revenues in the amount of 1% of the initial
steady-state GDP. This means that the EESSC rate permanently decreases by
1.28 percentage points. Table 2.3 compares the effects of this measure with the
case described above of decreasing the employers’ share in SSC. Surprisingly,
while a decrease in the ERSSC intuitively seems to be the more direct instru-
ment to reduce marginal labor costs (which, ultimately, raises the trade balance
by boosting exports), the results indicate that home marginal labor costs (mea-
sured as Wt(1 + τ
ER
t )) decrease more in case of a reduction in the EESSC. The
underlying mechanism is the following: By regarding the labor supply equation
Lηt = C
−ρ
t
Wt
Pt
1− τEEt
1 + τ ct
it can be seen that a reduction in the employees’ share of SSC means that labor
or consumption must rise or real wages decrease or both. Table 2.3 shows that
all three effects arise. In contrast, the price setting equation
PHt = Wt(1 + τ
ER
t )
shows that a decrease in the ERSSC implies that wages have to increase or
prices to decrease or both. Again, it can be seen that both holds true. While
the decrease in prices leads to an increase in labor and consumption, the wage
increase limits the effect of the tax decrease on marginal labor costs. Due to these
diverging wage responses, marginal labor costs decrease more in the EESSC-
scenario than in case of a ERSSC-reduction. Going one step further, this means
that the price of home-produced goods decreases more in the EESSC-case such
that the consumption shift from foreign-produced to home-produced goods is
more pronounced in the EESSC-case. Additionally, total consumption increases
more by decreasing the EESSC as a consequence of a stronger income effect
evoked by the larger increase in net wages. Both effects ultimately imply a
stronger response of all real variables and, as a consequence thereof, a larger
increase in the home trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio in the EESSC-case.
While these simulation scenarios illustrate the different mechanisms of the
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Decrease in EESSC Decrease in ERSSC
1% of GDP 1% of GDP 1.4% of GDP
Home country
Y 0.4555 0.3145 0.4555
C 0.1821 0.1257 0.1821
CH 0.4555 0.3145 0.4555
CF -0.0909 -0.0628 -0.0909
W -0.1816 0.8833 1.2809
W (1− τEE) 1.2809 0.8833 1.2809
W (1 + τER) -0.1816 -0.1255 -0.1816
L 0.4555 0.3145 0.4555
Loss -0.0766 -0.0525 -0.0766
∆τSSC -1.2600 -1.2600 -1.8200
Foreign country
Y ∗ -0.0909 -0.0628 -0.0909
C∗ 0.1821 0.1257 0.1821
C∗H 0.4555 0.3145 0.4555
C∗F -0.0909 -0.0628 -0.0909
W ∗ 0.1821 0.1257 0.1821
L∗ -0.0909 -0.0628 -0.0909
Loss∗ 0.2328 0.1609 0.2328
International
PH -0.1816 -0.1255 -0.1816
PF 0.1821 0.1257 0.1821
TB/Y 0.2720 0.1881 0.2720
Table 2.3: Fiscal devaluation in the simple model: EESSC versus ERSSC. For all
variables percentage deviations from the initial steady state are given with the excep-
tion of the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio and the tax rates where the change is given in
percentage points.
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two possible SSC decreases, it should be regarded that equivalence between these
two scenarios could be obtained by considering a larger decrease in the ERSSC
rate as can be seen in the last column of Table 2.3. In this case, the ERSSC rate
has to be decreased by 1.82 percentage points which means government revenues
are decreased by 1.4% of GDP. This way, the effects on real wages differ while
the effects on net wages received by workers as well as on labor costs paid by
employers are the same in both scenarios. Consequently, both measures have
the same effects on prices and, hence, real variables.
These results show that the assumption of a decrease in the ERSSC being
more effective than a decline in the EESSC cannot be confirmed. On the con-
trary, a decrease in the EESSC is found to be more effective in raising the trade
balance and affecting real variables than a decrease in the ERSSC. This result
differs with the assumption frequently found in literature of the distribution be-
tween the employers’ and the employees’ share in SSC being irrelevant for the
real allocation (invariance of incidence proposition). The reason is that the cur-
rent paper implicitly regards the financing side of the cut in the SSC rates: The
decrease in the ERSSC is computed to give rise to the same reduction in tax rev-
enues as the decrease in the EESSC. The decrease in the ERSSC induces wages
to decline while the decrease in the EESSC increases wages. Both measures
have different effects on the tax base. As a result, the EESSC can be lowered
to a larger extent than the ERSSC. This can be seen as a short-cut to modeling
a government having no access to lump-sum taxes but being forced to finance
the SSC-cut by increasing another distortionary tax measure. More precisely,
if a government may raise lump-sum taxes or issue bonds unboundedly under
Ricardian equivalence to obtain the additional revenues to compensate the cut
in SSC, the invariance of incidence proposition is retrieved. A fiscal devalua-
tion, however, is defined as a revenue-neutral tax shift meaning the effect of the
SSC-cut on the tax base matters since it determines the extent to which VAT
rates must be increased. The results show that in the case of a revenue-neutral
tax shift, the choice of the agent being subject to the SSC-cut (employers or
employees) does make quite a difference in affecting real variables.
2.3.2 The Role of Non-Tradables
After considering the revenue loss generating side, in this section, I explore
two possibilities of increasing the VAT to offset these losses. The VAT, after
all, is not levied equally on tradables and non-tradables but is composed of a
standard and a reduced rate which are applied to different groups of goods and
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services such that, in fact, tradable goods are taxed more heavily than non-
tradable goods. For this reason, I allow for a different taxation of tradables and
non-tradables. Consequently, the simple model is extended to include a non-
tradable sector.
Households
Utility is now given by
U =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pi(st)βt
{
C1−ρt
1− ρ −
∑
j
(Ljt)
1+η
1 + η
}
,
with j = {H,N}. Households supply labor to both sectors, tradable and non-
tradable, and receive wages paid in the respective sector such that the labor
supply equations are now given by
LηHt =
1
(1 + τCt )Pt
C−ρt WHt(1− τEEt )
LηNt =
1
(1 + τCt )Pt
C−ρt WNt(1− τEEt ),
where the consumption tax index τCt is the composite of the VAT rates applied
to tradables and to non-tradables. Furthermore, total consumption is now a
composite of tradable and non-tradable consumption defined by the following
CES aggregator:
Ct =
[
ω
1
C
−1

Tt + (1− ω)
1
C
−1

Nt
] 
−1
,
where the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is
set to be the same as between home and foreign tradable goods ( = 1.5) and the
two sectors are assumed to be of equal size (ω = 0.5). Since tradables and non-
tradables are taxed differently, households incorporate the different taxation into
their decision making by minimizing their after-tax consumption expenditures,
which are defined by
(1 + τCt )PtCt ≡ min
(
(1 + τCTt )PTtCTt + (1 + τ
CN
t )PNtCNt
)
.
Minimization yields the following demand relationships for tradable and non-
tradable goods:
CNt = (1− ω)
(
PNt(1 + τ
CN
t )
Pt(1 + τCt )
)−
Ct
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CTt = ω
(
PTt(1 + τ
CT
t )
Pt(1 + τCt )
)−
Ct
and the corresponding aggregate after-tax consumption price index is given by
(1 + τCt )Pt =
[
ω
((
1 + τCT
)
PTt
)1−
+ (1− ω) ((1 + τCNt )PNt)1−] 11− .
As before, consumption of tradables includes consumption of home-produced
and foreign-produced tradable goods which are combined according to
CTt =
[
ν
1
φC
φ−1
φ
Ht + (1− ν)
1
φC
φ−1
φ
Ft
] φ
φ−1
.
Since the same VAT rate is levied on imports and on home-produced tradable
goods, the VAT does not affect the consumption decision regarding home and
foreign tradable goods such that the corresponding expenditure minimization
problem is given by
PTtCTt ≡ minPHtCHt + PFtCFt,
where the law of one price is assumed to hold for tradable goods produced in
both countries. Minimization delivers the demand relationships as well as the
corresponding price index for tradable goods as
CHt = ν
(
PHt
PTt
)−φ
CTt
CFt = (1− ν)
(
PFt
PTt
)−φ
CTt
PTt =
[
νP 1−φHt + (1− ν)P 1−φFt
] 1
1−φ
.
Firms
The production side is extended by a non-tradable sector where firms in the
two sectors produce goods subject to the production functions
YHt(j) = LHt(j)
YNt(j) = LNt(j)
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which gives the following labor demand equations
PHt = WHt(1 + τ
ER)
PNt = WNt(1 + τ
ER).
Finally, market clearing requires8
YHt = CHt +
1− n
n
C∗Ht
Y ∗Ft = C
∗
Ft +
n
1− nCFt
YNt = CNt
Y ∗Nt = C
∗
Nt.
Simulation
Using this extended version of the simple model, I simulate a permanent
increase in the VAT on non-tradables and tradables, respectively, generating ad-
ditional government revenues in the amount of 1% of initial steady-state GDP.9
Table 2.4 gives the changes in home real variables and prices for both mea-
sures. Starting with the effects of an increase in the VAT on tradables given
in the first column, the higher tax rate induces a substitution effect such that
total consumption declines. The allocation of this consumption drop between
home tradable, foreign tradable, and home non-tradable goods depends on the
effect on prices. Here, the home after-tax price of tradables increases due to the
higher tax rate which means that the relative price of non-tradables declines.
Consequently, the home demand for home-produced and foreign-produced goods
decreases while non-tradable consumption increases.10 As a consequence, output
of non-tradables increases somewhat while output of home-produced tradables
decreases.
As regards the spill-over effects for the foreign country given in Table 2.5,
the foreign price of home-produced goods decreases due to the decrease in wages
while the foreign tax rate remains constant. Furthermore, the price of foreign
tradable goods decreases due to diminished demand of home imports and, con-
sequently, decreasing output and labor demand in the foreign tradable sector.
8An overview about the equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix B.
9Starting from an initial VAT rate on both tradables and non-tradables in the amount of 21%.
10In this model, the effects on home and foreign tradable goods as well as on the respective
prices are of equal size due to the assumption of no home bias.
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VAT on tradables VAT on non-tradables
YH -0.2551 0.0512
YN 0.1882 -0.5280
C -0.3753 -0.1705
CH -0.9366 0.1878
CF -0.9366 0.1878
CN 0.1882 -0.5280
WH -1.2548 -0.2386
WN -0.3753 -1.3905
PH -1.2548 -0.2386
PF -1.2548 -0.2386
PN -0.3753 -1.3905
PH(1 + τ
CH ) 0.3774 -0.2386
PF (1 + τ
CF ) 0.3774 -0.2386
PN(1 + τ
CN ) -0.3753 0.2395
Loss 0.2999 -0.3643
∆τCT 2.0000 0.0000
∆τCN 0.0000 2.0000
TB/Y 0.3409 -0.0685
RS -1.0866 -0.2727
Table 2.4: Effects of a fiscal devaluation in the simple model with non-tradables on the
home country. For all variables percentage deviations from the initial steady state are
given with the exception of the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio and the tax rates where
the change is given in percentage points. Prices are measured relative to the aggregate
after-tax consumer price index of the home country.
Overall, the real exchange rate decreases, which induces a positive wealth ef-
fect abroad such that total foreign consumption increases. Due to the rise in
the relative price of non-tradables, the demand for non-tradables declines while
the demand for tradable goods increases. As a consequence, the trade balance
increases.
A quite different picture emerges if considering an increase in the VAT on
non-tradables as can be seen in the second column of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. As
before, this induces a negative wealth effect such that total home consump-
tion decreases. Considering the allocation between tradable and non-tradable
consumption, however, it becomes apparent that here consumption of tradable
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VAT on tradables VAT on non-tradables
Y ∗F -0.2551 0.0512
Y ∗N -0.0851 0.0171
C∗ 0.1704 -0.0341
C∗H 0.4265 -0.0853
C∗F 0.4265 -0.0853
C∗N -0.0851 0.0171
W ∗F -0.1700 0.0342
W ∗N 0.1704 -0.0341
P ∗H -0.1700 0.0342
P ∗F -0.1700 0.0342
P ∗N 0.1704 -0.0341
Loss∗ -0.5514 -0.1113
Table 2.5: Effects of a fiscal devaluation in the simple model with non-tradables on
the foreign country. For all variables percentage deviations from the initial steady
state are given. Prices are measured relative to the aggregate consumer price index
of the foreign country.
goods increases while consumption of non-tradables decreases. This is due to
the increase in the tax rate on non-tradables making non-tradables relatively
more expensive than tradables. This means that the tradable sector increases
while non-tradable output drops. There are only minor effects on the foreign
country since the increase in the tax on non-tradables exclusively affects the
home non-tradable sector. Foreign non-tradable consumption increases slightly
due to the smaller relative price of non-tradables while the consumption of trad-
able goods decreases. Both the increase in home imports and the decrease in
foreign imports induces the trade balance to decline.
Overall, it can be stated that an increase in the tax on non-tradables triggers
a substitution of non-tradables for tradables which limits the tendency of an
improved trade balance. In this sense, an increase in the VAT on tradables is
more effective in reducing external imbalances than an increase in the VAT on
non-tradables. And – as a practical issue – this means that if a fiscal devaluation
is aimed at reducing external imbalances, it should rather contain an increase in
the standard rate of VAT than an abolition of reduced rates as the latter affects
non-tradables more than tradables.
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2.3.3 The Role of Nominal Rigidities
While it is frequently stated (see e.g. Engler et al. (2014)) that the effec-
tiveness of a fiscal devaluation requires some degree of nominal stickiness, the
results presented in the last two sections indicated that a devaluation may also
be effective in a model with flexible prices and wages. To explore the relevance
of nominal rigidities further, the simple model described in Section 2.2.1 is ex-
tended by nominal price and wage staggering a la Calvo.11
Production Sector
To introduce staggered price setting, the production sector is extended in
the following way: There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive inter-
mediate goods producers indexed by j whose size is normalized to one and a
representative final goods producer operating under perfect competition. Each
intermediate firm chooses its labor input to minimize its costs which gives
MCt = Wt(1 + τ
ER
t ).
The final goods producer combines differentiated intermediate goods yt(j) pur-
chased from firms to a homogenous aggregate good Yt subject to the technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(j)
σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
, (2.3)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods. The
associated cost minimization problem is given by
min
yt(j)
PHtYt ≡
∫ 1
0
pHt(j)yt(j)dj
subject to the technology (2.3) such that the per capita demand for an individual
good of firm j is
yt(j) =
(
pHt(j)
PHt
)−σ
Yt. (2.4)
Consequently, the zero profit condition gives the aggregate price index as
PHt =
[∫ 1
0
pHt(j)
1−σdj
] 1
1−σ
.
11An overview about the equilibrium conditions can be seen in Appendix C.
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With staggered price setting this implies
PHt =
[
ξpP
1−σ
Ht−1 + (1− ξp)p˜1−σHt (j)dj
] 1
1−σ ,
where (1-ξp) denotes the fraction of firms which is able to reset its price in each
period. This can be transformed to give
p˜Ht
PHt
=
1− ξp
(
PHt−1
PHt
)1−σ
1− ξp

1
1−σ
.
If a firm is able to reset its price, it faces the optimal price setting problem
max
p˜Ht(j)
Et
∞∑
s=0
ξspQt,t+s [p˜Ht(j)−MCt+s] yt,t+s(j)
subject to the demand for the specific good (2.4), where the discount factor
Qt,t+s is defined by
Qt,t+s = β
s
(
Ct+s
Ct
)−ρ
Pt(1 + τ
C
t )
Pt+s(1 + τCt+s)
.
After some manipulations, the first order condition can be written as
1 =
σ
σ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0(ξpβ)
sC−ρt+s
MCt+s
Pt+s(1+τCt+s)
Yt+sP
σ
Ht+s(p˜Ht(j))
−σ−1
Et
∑∞
s=0(ξpβ)
sC−ρt+s
1
Pt+s(1+τCt+s)
Yt+sP σHt+s(p˜Ht(j))
−σ .
Using a recursive formulation, the price Philips curve can be expressed as1− ξp
(
PHt−1
PHt
)1−σ
1− ξp
 = f1t
f2t
f1t =
σ
σ − 1C
−ρ
t
MCt
Pt(1 + τCt )
Yt + βξpEt
{(
PHt+1
PHt
)σ
f1t+1
}
f2t = C
−ρ
t
1
1 + τCt
Yt
PHt
Pt
+ βξpEt
{(
PHt+1
PHt
)σ−1
f2t+1
}
.
Due to price dispersion, the aggregate production function is now given by
Yt∆t = Lt
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where
∆t =
∫ n
0
1
n
(
pHt(j)
PHt
)−σ
dj.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), this index of price dispersion can be
rewritten as
∆t = (1− ξp)
(
p˜Ht(j)
PHt
)−σ
+ ξp
(
PHt
PHt−1
)σ
∆t−1.
Households
To introduce some degree of wage rigidity, the labor market is assumed to
be monopolistically competitive where labor services are imperfect substitutes
implying that each household has some market power in setting its nominal
wage. A representative labor agency buys differentiated labor from households
by paying individual wages and produces a homogenous labor aggregate subject
to the technology
Lt =
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Lt(i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
,
where Lt(i) denotes differentiated labor supply of household i. The cost mini-
mization problem can be expressed as
min
Lt(i)
WtLt ≡
∫ n
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di,
where Wt(i) denotes the wage set by household i for its labor supply Lt(i) and
Wt denotes the aggregate wage index. Minimization gives the following demand
for differentiated labor supplied by household i
Lt(i) =
1
n
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−σ
Lt (2.5)
and the assumption of zero profits implies that the aggregate wage index is given
by
Wt =
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Wt(i)
1−σdi
] 1
1−σ
.
With staggered wage setting this gives
W˜t
Wt
=
1− ξw
(
Wt−1
Wt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1
1−σ
,
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where (1-ξw) denotes the fraction of households which is able to reset their wages.
In case of adjustment, household i sets its wage W˜t(i) to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βξw)
s
[
(1− τEEt+s )W˜t(i)Lt+s(i)
C−ρt+s(i)
Pt+s(1 + τ ct+s)
− (Lt+s(i))
1+η
1 + η
]
subject to the demand for differentiated labor (2.5). After some manipulations,
the first order condition can be expressed as
(
W˜t(i)
Wt
)1+ση
=
σ
σ−1Et
∑∞
s=0(βξw)
s
(
1
n
Lt+s
)1+η (Wt+s
Wt
)σ(1+η)
Et
∑∞
s=0(1− τEEt+s )(βξw)sLt+s 1n
C−ρt+s
1+τct+s
Wt+s
Pt+s
(
Wt+s
Wt
)σ−1 .
Using a recursive formulation, the wage Philips curve can be expressed as
1− ξw
(
Wt−1
Wt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
=
g1t
g2t
g1t =
σ
σ − 1
1
n
L1+ηt + βξwEt
{(
Wt+1
Wt
)σ(1+η)
g1t+1
}
g2t = C
−ρ
t
1− τEEt
1 + τCt
Wt
Pt
1
n
Lt + βξwEt
{(
Wt+1
Wt
)σ−1
g2t+1
}
.
Furthermore, the Euler equation is now given by
C−ρt = βC
−ρ
t+1(1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
where it is defined as
1 + it =
pi(st+1)
Q(st, st+1)
.
Monetary Policy
There is a common central bank following a monetary policy rule responding
to the aggregate union-wide consumer-price inflation:
1 + it =
(
Put
Put−1
)µ
(1 + i¯),
where i¯ = 1/β−1 denotes the steady-state nominal interest rate, µ ≥ 1 is a scal-
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ing parameter determining the responsiveness of the interest rate on inflation,12
and Put is given by
Put ≡ sctPt(1 + τCt ) + (1− sct)P ∗t (1 + τC∗t )
with
sct ≡ nPt(1 + τ
C
t )Ct
nPt(1 + τCt )Ct + (1− n)P ∗t (1 + τC∗t )C∗t
.
Simulation
Using this extended version of the simple model, I simulate a permanent
decrease in the employers’ share of SSC, a decrease in the employees’ share of
SSC, and an increase in the VAT, respectively, each implemented in the home
country for varying values of the degrees of price and wage stickiness.
As regards the increase in the VAT, all transition effects as well as long-
run effects are independent of both the degree of price and the degree of wage
stickiness. As was shown in Table 2.2, an increase in the VAT rate does neither
influence pre-tax prices nor wages. Consequently, nominal rigidities are of no
relevance in raising the trade balance through VAT increases.
This is different in case of a decrease in the SSC. Starting with the degree of
wage rigidity, Figure 2.1 shows the effects of a decrease in the EESSC versus the
ERSSC on the trade balance for different degrees of wage stickiness in the range
from ξw = 0 to ξw = 0.9 while the degree of price rigidity is held constant at ξp =
0.6. It can be seen that in case of a decrease in the ERSSC the results confirm the
propositions frequently found in literature: A higher degree of wage stickiness
induces a larger trade balance increase. Regarding a decrease in the EESSC,
however, the results indicate just the opposite. This can be explained through
the following mechanism: The decrease in the ERSSC raises labor demand and,
consequently, tends to increase nominal wages which would limit the intended
decrease in producer costs. Some degree of wage stickiness decelerates the wage
adjustment and, as a consequence, induces a larger decrease in marginal costs
which results in the fiscal devaluation being more effective in increasing the
trade balance. A decrease in the EESSC, on the contrary, decreases net wages
such that nominal wages tend to decline which, ultimately, lowers marginal
costs. A high degree of wage stickiness, however, means that wages decrease
only sluggishly which diminishes the intended effect on marginal costs.
Turning to the importance of the degree of price stickiness, Figure 2.2 shows
12For simulation exercises, µ is chosen to be 2.
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Figure 2.1: Trade balance effects to a decrease in ERSSC vs. the EESSC for different
degrees of wage rigidity. The change in the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio is given in
percentage points. The price rigidity is held constant at ξp = 0.6. Black solid line:
ξw = 0. Green dashed line: ξw = 0.3. Red dash-dotted line: ξw = 0.6. Blue
dotted line: ξw = 0.9
the trade balance effects of a decrease in the EESSC vs. the ERSSC as before
but for varying degrees of price rigidity while the degree of wage rigidity is fixed
at ξw = 0.6. It can be seen that with an increasing degree of price rigidity both
a decrease in the ERSSC and a decrease in the EESSC become less effective
in raising the trade balance. This is due to the fact that the decrease in SSC
induces home marginal costs to decrease which means that the relative price of
home-produced goods drops. This, ultimately, evokes a substitution of home-
produced for foreign-produced goods which raises the trade balance. If prices
adjust only sluggishly, however, the drop in marginal costs will only partly be
reflected in a price decrease which results in smaller trade balance effects.
Figure 2.2: Trade balance effects to a decrease in ERSSC vs. the EESSC for different
degrees of price rigidity. The change in the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio is given in
percentage points. The wage rigidity is held constant at ξw = 0.6. Black solid line:
ξp = 0. Green dashed line: ξp = 0.3. Red dash-dotted line: ξp = 0.6. Blue
dotted line: ξp = 0.9
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2.4 Fiscal Devaluation in the Euro Area
2.4.1 The Model
After exploring the particular mechanisms of the components of a fiscal deval-
uation in the last section, I apply these insights to simulate a fiscal devaluation
constructed to reduce external deficits as effectively as possible in a more com-
plex model calibrated to match Euro area data. For this purpose, I extend the
simple model by both non-tradables and nominal rigidities as described above as
well as by capital accumulation. Since the model is based on the simple model,
I will only describe the changes evoked by these extensions.13
Intertemporal allocation
Households own the capital stock Kt, buy investment goods It at price P
I
t
subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs, and rent capital to firms at renting
rate Rct . Moreover, households receive dividends from firms in each sector Divkt
and pay lump-sum taxes Tt such that the per capita budget constraint is given
by
(1 + τCt )PtCt +
∑
st+1
Q(st, st+1)B(s
t, st+1) + P
I
t It +
κ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
KtP
I
t
=(1− τEEt )WktLkt +
1
n
∫ nsk
0
Divkt(j)dj +B(s
t−1, st) +RctKt + Tt
for k ∈ {H,N} and j denoting an individual firm. Here, κ > 1 is a scaling
parameter of capital adjustment costs. Dividends in each sector are given as
Divkt = PktYkt − (1 + τERt )WktLkt −RctKkt
and the capital stock evolves as
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital. Utility maximization and
defining
Rt =
pi(st+1)
Q(st, st+1)
13The equilibrium conditions of the complete model can be seen in Appendix D.
30
delivers the following Euler equations for bond holdings and capital, respectively:
Rt =
1
β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)−ρ 1 + τCt+1
1 + τCt
Pt+1
Pt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)−ρ Pt+1(1 + τ ct+1)
Pt(1 + τ ct )
P It
P It+1
1
β
(
1 + κ
(
It
Kt
− δ
))
− R
c
t+1
P It+1
=
(
1 + κ
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
))
(1− δ)− κ
2
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)2
+ κ
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)
It+1
Kt+1
.
Investment decision
The allocation of total investment between tradable and non-tradable invest-
ment goods as well as the allocation of tradable investment between home and
foreign investment goods take place analogously to the allocation of consumption
goods. The exception is the assumption that there are no VAT on investment
goods since VAT – while in practice paid and rebated at each production level –
ultimately are only levied on final consumption. The share of tradables in total
investment and the share of home-produced goods in tradable investment as well
as the corresponding elasticities are assumed to be the same as for consumption
goods.
Labor supply
As in the last section, the labor market is monopolistically competitive but
now there is a representative labor agency in each sector. Consequently, in each
sector, the labor agency buys differentiated labor from households by paying
individual wages and produces a sector-specific homogenous labor aggregate
subject to the technology
Lkt =
1
n
[(
1
nsk
) 1
σw
k
∫ nsk
0
Lkt(i)
σwk −1
σw
k di
] σwk
σw
k
−1
,
where Lkt(i) denotes differentiated labor supply of household i in sector k and
Lkt is per capita aggregate labor supplied in sector k. σ
w
k > 0 is the elasticity
of labor-production between differentiated labor inputs in sector k. Cost mini-
mization and the labor choice take place just as in the last section such that the
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wage Philips curves can be expressed as
g1kt
g2kt
=
1− ξwk
(
Wkt
Wkt−1
)σwk −1
1− ξwk

1+ησwk
1−σw
k
g1kt =
σwk
σwk − 1
(Lkt)
1+η n−η + βξwk Et
{(
Wkt+1
Wkt
)σwk
g1kt+1
}
g2kt = (1− τEEt )C−ρt
Wkt
Pt
Lkt + βξ
w
k Et
{(
Wkt+1
Wkt
)σwk −1
g2kt+1
}
.
Production and aggregation
Intermediate goods firms now produce output using capital services and labor
supplied by households subject to the production function
Ykt(j) = Lkt(j)
αkKkt(j)
1−αk ,
where 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1 is the labor share in sector k. Each firm chooses its capital
and labor inputs to solve the cost minimization problem
min
Lkt,Kkt
(1 + τERt )WktLkt(j) +R
c
tKkt(j)
subject to the production function. Minimization leads to the first order condi-
tions
Lkt
Kkt
=
αk
1− αk
Rct
(1 + τERt )Wkt
and
MCkt =
(1 + τERt )Wkt
αk
(
Lkt
Kkt
)1−αk
,
where MCkt denotes marginal costs of production in sector k. Price setting
takes place as before such that the price Philips curves can be expressed as
f1kt
f2kt
=
1− ξpk
(
Pkt−1
Pkt
)1−σpk
1− ξpk

1
1−σp
k
f1kt =
σpk
σpk − 1
C−ρt Ykt
MCkt
Pt
1
1 + τ ct
+ βξpkEt
{(
Pkt+1
Pkt
)σpk
f1kt+1
}
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f2kt = C
−ρ
t Ykt
Pkt
Pt
1
1 + τ ct
+ βξpkEt
{(
Pkt+1
Pkt
)σpk−1
f2kt+1
}
.
Aggregation now gives
YHt = CHt +
1− n
n
C∗Ht + IHt +
1− n
n
I∗Ht
YNt = CNt + INt
Kt = KHt +KNt
Ykt∆kt = L
αk
ktK
1−αk
kt ,
where
∆kt = (1− ξpk)
1− ξpk
(
Pkt−1
Pkt
)1−σpk
1− ξpk

σ
p
k
σ
p
k
−1
+ ξpk
(
Pkt
Pkt−1
)σpk
∆kt−1.
2.4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match 2015 Euro area characteristics where only
countries are regarded which are members of the Euro zone at least since 2002
(EA-12 countries).14 Table 2.6 shows the intra-EA-12 trade-balance-to-GDP ra-
tios for each country for the period from 2008 to 2015.15 It can be seen that there
are 4 countries featuring trade balance surpluses throughout the whole period
from 2008 to 2015, namely Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
All other countries had permanent trade balance deficits.16 Such being the case,
I define the home country as the group of the eight deficit countries, namely
Austria, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal while
the foreign country consists of Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Given this baseline classification, the share of the home countries’ GDP in the
total EA-12 GDP was about 57% in 2015 such that the size of the home country,
n, is set to be 0.57. The average trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio was -2.61% in 2015
in the home country-group and 4.00% in the foreign country-group.17 Since the
14A detailed description of the data sources and construction can be found in Appendix E.
15Data source: Eurostat. As the model describes a monetary union consisting of two countries
but abstracts from any non-monetary-union member states, extra-EA-12 trade was excluded
from the calculation of trade-balance-to-GDP ratios.
16With the single exception of Spain in 2013.
17While calibrating the trade balances based on 2015 data implies assuming 2015 to be a
steady-state situation which may be questionable, the data shows that the intra-EA12 trade
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AT -6.37 -5.66 -5.81 -6.64 -6.48 -6.18 -5.73 -5.97
BE 4.26 3.80 3.22 3.04 0.71 2.44 3.03 5.97
FI -1.14 -1.28 -2.00 -2.26 -2.66 -2.42 -2.25 -2.17
FR -3.55 -3.32 -3.59 -4.03 -4.27 -4.15 -4.00 -4.09
DE 2.10 1.51 1.24 0.71 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.23
GR -9.13 -7.66 -6.73 -5.93 -5.62 -5.41 -5.86 -5.22
IE 10.64 14.11 13.24 12.59 12.26 9.80 7.83 6.89
IT -0.58 -0.71 -1.18 -1.03 -0.48 -0.47 -0.26 -0.60
LU -7.89 -5.27 -12.52 -14.58 -13.96 -11.41 -9.96 -6.96
NL 19.29 16.41 20.70 22.83 23.99 22.26 21.47 19.35
PT -10.42 -9.26 -9.10 -6.94 -5.54 -5.40 -6.57 -6.30
ES -3.22 -1.41 -1.03 -0.96 -0.32 0.04 -0.41 -0.93
Table 2.6: Intra-EA-12 trade-balance-to-GDP-ratios from 2008 to 2015 (in percent)
initial wealth distribution determines the initial steady-state trade-balance-to-
GDP-ratio of the home country, I use u to obtain a trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio
of -2.61%. Furthermore, the relation between the home and foreign degree of
openness, ν
ν∗ , is set to obtain a foreign trade-balance-to-GDP ratio of 4.00%
where ν is adjusted to guarantee that the degree of trade openness lies in the
range between 0 and 1 for both countries. Here, I choose ν = 0.9 which implies
that there is some degree of home bias in consumption.18
The definition of goods and services as tradables or non-tradables follows
Allington et al. (2006). Based on this definition, the weight of tradables in total
consumption, ω, and the degree of price stickiness, ξp, can be computed for the
two sectors separately.
Starting with the weight of tradables in total consumption, the cross-country
expenditure-weighted average share of final consumption expenditures of house-
balance surpluses and -deficits were quite stable at least between 2001 and 2015. The
average intra-EA12 trade-balance-to-GDP-ratio for the chosen home country-group is -2.66%
between 2001 and 2015 and amounts to 4.92% for the foreign country group. 10 of the 12
countries regarded featured either intra-EA12 trade balance surpluses or deficits during the
whole period from 2001 to 2015. This shows that the situation in 2015 was no one-time
event but represented a stable economic situation at least for a given period thus making
the calibration based on the data reasonable.
18While the specific value of ν is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, I check the robustness of the
results to variations in this parameter as can be seen in the next section.
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holds on tradables in total final consumption expenditures was 0.52 in the home
country group and 0.51 in the foreign country group in 2015.19 This way, ω is
set to be 0.22 and ω∗ to be 0.39.
To calibrate the degree of price stickiness, I use seven OECD studies, each
estimating the frequency of price changes for each COICOP category in an
individual country, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Nether-
lands, and Portugal.20 I use these estimates to compute the cross-country
expenditure-weighted aggregates for the tradable and non-tradable sector, re-
spectively. This gives the following degrees of price stickiness in each sector:
ξH = 0.83, ξN = 0.76, ξ
∗
F = 0.74, and ξ
∗
N = 0.75.
Regarding the production side, I use the definition proposed by Piton (2017).
Given this definition, the size of the tradable sector, sk, is calibrated as the GDP-
weighted cross-country average of the share of GDP originated in the tradable
sectors to total GDP.21 Accordingly, sH is set to be 0.59 and s
∗
F to be 0.62.
The elasticity of substitution in each sector is calibrated by considering the
steady-state expression for the aggregate price index which gives the price as
mark-up over marginal costs and enables to pin down σpk by calibrating the
price mark-up in each sector. The calibration is based on Christopoulou and
Vermeulen (2008). The corresponding calibrated elasticities are σpH = 5.43,
σpN = 4.69, σ
p∗
F = 7.05, and σ
p∗
N = 5.42 which shows that mark-ups are larger in
the home than in the foreign country-group as well as larger in the non-tradable
than in the tradable sectors.
The elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor inputs is assumed
to be the same as the elasticity of substitution between differentiated interme-
diate goods, meaning σwH = 5.43, σ
w
N = 4.69, σ
w∗
F = 7.05, and σ
w∗
N = 5.42.
The labor share in production is computed as the weighted sum of the
country-specific shares of labor compensation in total (labor plus capital) com-
pensation for both sectors.22 This gives αT = 0.68, αNT = 0.77, α
∗
T = 0.64, and
α∗NT = 0.77.
I assume the degree of wage rigidity to be the same across sectors and rely on
the estimates of Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) such that computing the GDP-
weighted cross-country averages gives ξwH = ξ
w
N = 0.35 and ξ
w∗
F = ξ
w∗
N = 0.29.
The remaining parameters are relatively standard. The discount factor is
19Data Source: Eurostat: Final consumption expenditures of households in 2015.
20Baumgartner et al. (2005), Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004), Vilmunen and Laakkonen (2004),
Beaudry et al. (2004), Veronese and et al. (2005), Jonker et al. (2004), and Dias et al. (2004).
21Data Source: EU KLEMS, Release September 2017.
22Source: EU KLEMS, September 2017 release.
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set to be β = 0.995 to match a nominal interest rate of 2%. The inverse of
the labor supply elasticity, η, is calibrated to be 2 for both countries following
Farhi et al. (2014), who simulate a fiscal devaluation in a model calibrated to
Spain, and Eggertsson et al. (2014), who calibrate a two-country model with
a tradable and a non-tradable sector to match characteristics of the European
Monetary Union. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ρ,
is set to be 2, which lies in the range of values used in related literature (e.g.
Eggertsson et al. (2014) calibrate ρ = 0.5, Franco (2013), who simulates a fiscal
devaluation in a model calibrated to Portugal, uses ρ = 1, and Farhi et al. (2014)
set ρ = 5.). Following Franco (2013) and Eggertsson et al. (2014), the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods in both countries is
calibrated to φ = 1.5. The same elasticity between tradable and non-tradable
goods is assumed as between home and foreign goods such that  is set to be
1.5 in both countries. As regards the monetary policy rule, I follow Lipinska
and von Thadden (2013) and set the response parameter of monetary policy
to union-wide inflation, µ, to be 2. The depreciation rate of capital is set to
δ = 0.025 and the adjustment cost parameter is defined to be κ = 10.
First, the model is solved for a given set of tax instruments which are cal-
ibrated to match 2015 Euro zone data. This is used as starting point for the
devaluation simulation. As the calibration is meant to capture structural differ-
ences between the home and foreign country-group explaining the differences in
the trade balances, it should be excluded that the EA-12 countries already im-
plemented fiscal devaluations such shifting the economical conditions. As there
is some evidence of a fiscal devaluation between 2012 and 2015 in France, Greece,
Finland, and the Netherlands whose share in total EA-12 GDP amounts to at
least 32%, I will check the robustness of the results to calibrating the model to
2012 data as a sensitivity analysis but otherwise include all 12 countries into the
analysis. The SSC rates are set to match the GDP-weighted cross-country aver-
age of SSC rates on the average wage,23 which gives τER0 = 0.3156, τ
EE
0 = 0.1139,
τER∗0 = 0.1841, and τ
EE∗
0 = 0.1776.
Regarding the VAT rates, the VAT Directive (2006) allows the application of
reduced tax rates in EU member states on certain goods and services while all
remaining goods and services have to be taxed with the standard rate applied in
the individual country. To calibrate the respective VAT rates on tradable and
non-tradable goods, I build on the IAS et al. (2013b) who calculate an average
23Data source: OECD Tax Statistics.
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VAT rate for each of the COICOP categories of goods and services in each of
the EU member states. This gives τCT = 0.1397, τCN = 0.0708, τ
C∗T
0 = 0.1458,
and τ
C∗N
0 = 0.0839 which shows that tradables are taxed much more heavily than
non-tradables.
2.4.3 Simulation
Regarding the specific form of a fiscal devaluation, literature mostly suggests
an abolishing of reduced rates combined with a decrease in the ERSSC. Franco
(2013) and the International Monetary Fund (2011) both argue that reduced
VAT rates should – at least partly – be abolished to obtain the additional gov-
ernment revenues necessary to compensate the decrease in SSC. Beyond that,
the European Commission (2011b) proposes to abolish at least those reduced
rates applied on goods and services for which other EU policies try to reduce
their consumption. With regard to the COICOP classification, the IAS et al.
(2013a) outlines that this was the case for Water, Energy products, Street clean-
ing, Refuse collection, and Waste treatment and Housing. Interestingly, all of
these categories can be classified as non-tradable consumption. Results obtained
in this paper, in contrast, indicate that raising the VAT on non-tradables may
in fact worsen the trade balance while an incline in the VAT on tradables tends
to increase the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio.
In this section, I compare the effects of both scenarios considered, imple-
mented in the Euro Area model: In the first scenario (named NER in the fol-
lowing), I take up the proposal of the IAS et al. (2013a) by simulating a fiscal
devaluation in the home country where the revenue-generating side consists in
an abolition of reduced rates in the categories outlined above. In the model, this
means that the home VAT on non-tradables increases in the amount of 2.39 per-
centage points which implies additional tax revenues in the amount of 1.39% of
GDP. I assume that the additional tax revenues are used to reduce the ERSSC.
This implies a reduction in the ERSSC of 3.13 percentage points on impact. In
the second scenario (named NTEE), I build on the results obtained in this paper
and simulate an increase in the standard rate of VAT. I compute the increase in
the standard rate to generate the same amount of government revenues as in the
first scenario.24 Consequently, the VAT rate on non-tradables inclines by 1.39
percentage points while the VAT rate on tradables increases by 2.50 percentage
points. The additional government revenues are assumed to be compensated by
24A detailed description can be found in Appendix E.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses of the trade balance to both scenarios of a fiscal deval-
uation. Given are changes in the trade-balance-to-GDP ratios in percentage points.
Blue solid line: NER-scenario. Red dashed line: NTEE-scenario.
a decrease in the EESSC which amounts to 3.18 percentage points on impact.
Figure 2.3 shows impulse responses of the trade balances for both scenarios. It
can be seen that in the NTEE-scenario the home trade-balance-to-GDP ratio
increases by 0.2 percentage points in the long-run and, thus, shows that this
measure may be highly effective in reducing trade balance imbalances. In con-
trast, it can be seen that a devaluation implemented as the NER-scenario in
fact decreases the home trade balance on impact while being almost ineffective
in the long-run. The foreign country features a long-run trade balance decrease
in both scenarios but this being much more pronounced in the NTEE-scenario.
The difference between the trade balance effects in the NER- versus the
NTEE-scenario can be divided into effects evoked by the decrease in EESSC
versus ERSSC and the effects evoked by the increase in tradable versus non-
tradable VAT. The SSC-effect works through marginal labor costs and influences
the foreign demand for imports. The VAT-effect regards home after-tax prices
and determines the home demand for imports.
Starting with the SSC-effect on marginal costs, Figure 2.4 shows that gross
wages decrease only slightly (or even increase) in the NER-case whereas they
decrease to a large extent in the NTEE-case. As described in Section 2.3.1,
lower EESSC rates tend to decrease wages due to higher net wages. In contrast,
the decrease in the ERSSC implies increasing wages. Here, however, the wage
increase is mitigated through the decrease in ERSSC. In the NTEE-case, on the
contrary, the change in gross labor costs is the same as in gross wages. As an
overall effect it can be seen that, in the non-tradable sector, gross labor costs
decrease more in the NER-scenario than in the NTEE-scenario. In the tradable
sector the opposite holds true. Gross labor costs, however, are the crucial factor
determining prices and, thus, (foreign) demand.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses of prices and wages to both scenarios of a fiscal de-
valuation. For all variables percentage changes are given. All prices and wages are
measured relative to the after-tax consumer price index of the respective country.
Blue solid line: NER-scenario. Red dashed line: NTEE-scenario.
Regarding the VAT-effects on home after-tax prices, in the NER-case, the
VAT on non-tradables and, consequently, their after-tax price inclines. This
means a substitution of non-tradables for tradables takes place as can be seen in
Figure 2.5: Consumption of non-tradables decreases while the import demand
increases which limits the effectiveness of a fiscal devaluation. In contrast, in the
NTEE-case, the after-tax price for tradable goods increases due to higher VAT
rates while the relative after-tax price of non-tradables declines. Consequently,
a shift from tradable to non-tradable consumption takes place.
Taking both effects together, a fiscal devaluation conducted as a reduction
in the EESSC and an increase in the VAT on tradables is found to be much
more effective in reducing trade balance differences than the case of a reduction
in the ERSSC and an abolition of reduced rates.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses of real variables to both scenarios of a fiscal devaluation.
For all variables percentage changes are given with the exception of the trade balance
where the change in the trade-balance-to-GDP ratio in percentage points is plotted.
Blue solid line: NER-scenario. Red dashed line: NTEE-scenario.
2.5 Robustness
I check the robustness of the results regarding three categories: First, a
sensitivity analysis is conducted by varying the values of the parameters which
could not be calibrated but were chosen somewhat arbitrarily, namely ν, η, ρ,
, and φ. Second, the model is calibrated to 2012 data as there is evidence that
mainly Greece and France could have implemented a fiscal devaluation in 2012.
And finally, the effect of the country size is explored by simulating a devaluation
conducted by France only.
First, choosing different values of ν or setting ρ to smaller values does not
change the results. Setting η to smaller values implies larger trade balance ef-
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fects. With η=0.5, a shift from EESSC to tradable VAT can eliminate almost
14% of the initial trade balance differences (foreign minus home trade-balance-
to-GDP ratio). On the contrary, choosing smaller values for  implies trade bal-
ance effects being somewhat smaller than under the baseline calibration: =0.5
implies that about 6% of the initial trade balance differences can be eliminated.
Similarly, choosing a smaller value of φ limits the effectiveness of a fiscal deval-
uation. By setting φ to 0.5, only 1.3% of the initial trade balance differences
can be eliminated whereas by setting φ to 2 the trade balance effect amounts to
almost 10%. The results regarding the most effective form of a fiscal devaluation
are robust to each of these variations.
Second, the results are robust to calibrating the model to 2012 data. Here,
the home country features a trade-balance-to-GDP ratio of -2.59% while the
foreign trade-balance-to-GDP ratio amounts to 4.07%. An abolition of reduced
rates in the categories outlined before induces a revenue shift in the amount of
1.51% of GDP which eliminates 8.9% of the total initial trade balance differences
in the NTEE-scenario whereas it amounts to 1.7% only in the NER-case.
Finally, I check the robustness of the results to varying the size of the home
country by simulating a fiscal devaluation implemented in France while all other
countries are defined to be foreign countries. Here, the size of the home country is
0.21 featuring a trade-balance-to-GDP ratio of -4.09% while the trade-balance-
to-GDP ratio of the foreign country amounts to 1.4%. The results are even
more pronounced. While in the NER-scenario the home trade balance even
decreases and the foreign trade balance increases, in the NTEE-scenario 15%
of the total initial trade balance differences can be eliminated where the home
trade-balance-to-GDP ratio is improved by 0.62 percentage points.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper breaks with conventional wisdom concerning fiscal devaluations
in three ways: First, while a decrease in the employers’ share in SSC usually is
assumed to be a more effective measure than a decrease in the employees’ share,
I use a simple two-country model to show that this view does not hold to be
true.
Second, in contrast to the common assumption of the effectiveness of a fiscal
devaluation in raising the trade balance requiring some degree of wage rigidity,
I show that a devaluation implemented in a simple model with flexible prices
and wages has noticeable real effects. Furthermore, I explicitly explore the role
of the degree of wage and price rigidity and find that while the effectiveness
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of the VAT increase is independent of both the degree of wage and of price
stickiness, rigidities do matter with respect to the decrease in the SSC. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, however, the degree of wage stickiness is negatively
related with the effectiveness of a decrease in the employees’ share in SSC. A
decrease in the employers’ share is more effective the more rigid the wages.
Regarding price stickiness, a higher degree of rigidity induces a smaller effect on
the trade balance.
And third, contrary to propositions found in literature to abolish reduced
rates of VAT to generate the additional government revenues necessary to im-
plement a revenue neutral devaluation, I show that increasing the VAT in a way
which affects tradables more than non-tradables – like increasing the standard
rate of VAT – is a more effective measure in eliminating trade balance differences
as this induces a substitution of tradables for non-tradables.
I use these insights to simulate a fiscal devaluation implemented in Euro
area countries featuring trade balance deficits in 2015 for two different scenarios
and find that while a shift from EESSC to tradable VAT is highly effective in
eliminating trade balance differences, a shift from ERSSC to non-tradable VAT
is all but effectless in raising the trade balance.
While this paper gives some indication of the crucial choice of tax instruments
to be used in the context of a fiscal devaluation and shows that it may be effective
in reducing external imbalances, it refrains from regarding counteracting reforms
undertaken by the remaining countries. It would be interesting in future research
to go beyond a unilateral devaluation and further develop a framework allowing
for optimal policy reactions.
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2.7 Appendices
2.7.A Equilibrium Conditions for the Simple Model
Prices are expressed relative to the consumer price level (e.g. pHt ≡ PHt/Pt).
Real wages are defined as W rt ≡ Wt/Pt. Pt = P ∗t holds implying that the real
exchange rate is one (RSt = 1).
International risk sharing:
(Ct)
−ρ = (C∗t )
−ρ 1 + τ
c
t
1 + τ c∗t
Labor supply:
Lηt = C
−ρ
t W
r
t
1− τEEt
1 + τCt
(L∗t )
η = (C∗t )
−ρW r∗t
1− τEE∗t
1 + τC∗t
Consumption demand relationships:
CHt = νp
−φ
HtCt
CFt = (1− ν)p−φFt Ct
C∗Ht = νp
−φ
HtC
∗
t
C∗Ft = (1− ν)p−φFt C∗t
Price setting:
W rt = pHt
1
1 + τER
W r∗t = pFt
1
1 + τER∗
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1 = νp1−φHt + (1− ν)p1−φFt
Production functions:
Yt = Lt
Y ∗t = L
∗
t
Resource constraints:
Yt = CHt +
1− n
n
C∗Ht
Y ∗t = C
∗
Ft +
n
1− nCFt
2.7.B Equilibrium Conditions with Non-tradables
All prices are expressed relative to the after-tax consumer price level of the
respective country (e.g. pHt ≡ PHt/((1 + τCt )Pt) and pFt ≡ PFt/((1 + τC∗t )P ∗t )).
Real wages are defined as W rt ≡ Wt/((1 + τCt )Pt) and W r∗t ≡ W ∗t /((1 + τC∗t )P ∗t ).
The real exchange-rate is defined as RSt ≡ P ∗t (1 + τC∗t )/(Pt(1 + τCt )).
Complete asset markets:
RSt = u
(
C∗t
Ct
)−ρ
Labor supply:
LηHt = C
−ρ
t W
r
Ht(1− τEEt )
LηNt = C
−ρ
t W
r
Nt(1− τEEt )
(L∗Ft)
η = (C∗t )
−ρW r∗Ft(1− τEE∗t )
(L∗Nt)
η = (C∗t )
−ρW r∗Nt(1− τEE∗t )
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Consumption demand relationships:
CHt = ν
(
pHt
pTt
)−φ
CTt
CFt = (1− ν)
(
pFt
pTt
RSt
)−φ
CTt
C∗Ht = ν
(
pHt
p∗Tt
1
RSt
)−φ
C∗Tt
C∗Ft = (1− ν)
(
pFt
p∗Tt
)−φ
C∗Tt
CNt = (1− ω)
(
pNt
(
1 + τCNt
))−
Ct
C∗Nt = (1− ω)
(
p∗Nt
(
1 + τ
C∗N
t
))−
C∗t
CTt = ω
(
pTt
(
1 + τCTt
))−
Ct
C∗Tt = ω
(
p∗Tt
(
1 + τ
C∗T
t
))−
C∗t
Price indexes:
1 = ω
(
pTt
(
1 + τCTt
))1−
+ (1− ω) (pNt (1 + τCNt ))1−
1 = ω
(
p∗Tt
(
1 + τ
C∗T
t
))1−
+ (1− ω)
(
p∗Nt
(
1 + τ
C∗N
t
))1−
pTt =
[
νp1−φHt + (1− ν)(pFtRSt)1−φ
] 1
1−φ
p∗Tt =
[
ν
(
pHt
RSt
)1−φ
+ (1− ν)p1−φFt
] 1
1−φ
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Production functions:
YHt = L
1−α
Ht
YNt = L
1−α
Nt
Y ∗Ft = (L
∗
Ft)
1−α
Y ∗Nt = (L
∗
Nt)
1−α
Price setting:
W rHt = (1− α)pHtL−αHt
1
1 + τER
W rNt = (1− α)pNtL−αNt
1
1 + τER
W r∗Ft = (1− α)pFt(L∗Ft)−α
1
1 + τER∗
W r∗Nt = (1− α)p∗Nt(L∗Nt)−α
1
1 + τER∗
Resource constraints:
YHt = CHt +
1− n
n
C∗Ht
Y ∗Ft = C
∗
Ft +
n
1− nCFt
YNt = CNt
Y ∗Nt = C
∗
Nt
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2.7.C Equilibrium Conditions with Rigidities
Prices are expressed relative to the consumer price level (e.g. pHt ≡ PHt/Pt).
Real wages are defined as W rt ≡ Wt/Pt and Πt = Pt/Pt−1 holds. The real
interest rate on bond holdings is defined as Rrt ≡ RtPt/Pt+1. Since Pt = P ∗t
holds, the same transformation is applied to foreign prices and wages. The real
exchange rate is one (RSt = 1).
Euler equation:
C−ρt = βC
−ρ
t+1R
r
t
1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
Complete asset markets:
(Ct)
−ρ = (C∗t )
−ρ 1 + τ
c
t
1 + τ c∗t
Wage Phillips curves:
1− ξw
(
W rt−1
W rt
1
Πt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
=
g1t
g2t
g1t =
σ
σ − 1
1
n
L1+ηt + βξwEt
[(
W rt+1
W rt
Πt+1
)σ(1+η)
g1t+1
]
g2t = C
−ρ
t
1− τEEt
1 + τCt
W rt
1
n
Lt + βξwEt
[(
W rt+1
W rt
Πt+1
)σ−1
g2t+1
]
1− ξw
(
W r∗t−1
W r∗t
1
Πt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
=
g∗1t
g∗2t
g∗1t =
σ
σ − 1
1
1− n(L
∗
t )
1+η + βξwEt
[(
W r∗t+1
W r∗t
Πt+1
)σ(1+η)
g∗1t+1
]
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g∗2t = (C
∗
t )
−ρ1− τEE∗t
1 + τ c∗t
W r∗t L
∗
t
1− n + βξwEt
[(
W r∗t+1
W r∗t
Πt+1
)σ−1
g∗2t+1
]
Consumption demand relationships:
CHt = νp
−φ
HtCt
CFt = (1− ν)p−φFt Ct
C∗Ht = νp
−φ
HtC
∗
t
C∗Ft = (1− ν)p−φFt C∗t
Consumer price index:
1 = νp1−φHt + (1− ν)p1−φFt
Production functions:
Yt∆t = L
1−α
t
Y ∗t ∆
∗
t = (L
∗
t )
1−α
Real marginal costs:
MCrt =
1
1− αW
r
t L
α
t (1 + τ
ER
t )
MCr∗t =
1
1− αW
r∗
t L
∗
t
α(1 + τER∗t )
Evolution of price dispersion:
∆t = (1− ξp)
1− ξp
(
pHt−1
pHt
1
Πt
)1−σ
1− ξp

σ
σ−1
+ ξp
(
pHt
pHt−1
Πt
)σ
∆t−1
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∆∗t = (1− ξp)
1− ξp
(
pFt−1
pFt
1
Πt
)1−σ
1− ξp

σ
σ−1
+ ξp
(
pFt
pFt−1
Πt
)σ
∆∗t−1
Price Phillips curves: 1− ξp
(
pHt−1
pHt
1
Πt
)1−σ
1− ξp
 = f1t
f2t
f1t =
σ
σ − 1C
−ρ
t
MCrt
(1 + τCt )
Yt + βξpEt
[(
pHt+1
pHt
Πt+1
)σ
f1t+1
]
f2t = C
−ρ
t
1
1 + τCt
YtpHt + βξpEt
[(
pHt+1
pHt
Πt+1
)σ−1
f2t+1
]
1− ξp
(
pFt−1
pFt
1
Πt
)1−σ
1− ξp
 = f ∗1t
f ∗2t
f ∗1t =
σ
σ − 1
MCr∗t
(1 + τC
∗
t )
Y ∗t
(C∗t )
ρ + βξpEt
[(
pFt+1
pFt
Πt+1
)σ
f ∗1t+1
]
f ∗2t =
1
1 + τC
∗
t
Y ∗t
(C∗t )
ρpFt + βξpEt
[(
pFt+1
pFt
Πt+1
)σ−1
f ∗2t+1
]
Monetary policy rule:
Rrt = Π
µ
tR
1
Π1+1
Resource constraints:
Yt = CHt +
1− n
n
C∗Ht
Y ∗t = C
∗
Ft +
n
1− nCFt
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2.7.D Equilibrium Conditions of the Complete Model
Prices are expressed relative to the after-tax consumer price level of the respec-
tive country (e.g. pHt ≡ PHt/(Pt(1 + τCt ))) and the union-wide price index is
expressed as put ≡ Put/((1 + τ ct )Pt). Real marginal costs and real wages are
defined as MCrkt ≡ MCkt/(Pt(1 + τCt )) and W rkt ≡ Wkt/(Pt(1 + τCt )). The real
interest factor on bond holdings and the real renting rate of capital are defined
as Rrt ≡ RtPt(1 + τCt )/(Pt+1(1 + τCt+1)) and Rcrt ≡ Rct/(Pt(1 + τCt )). The respec-
tive variables for the foreign country are defined analogously. The real after-tax
exchange rate is defined as RSt ≡ P ∗t (1 + τC∗t )/(Pt(1 + τCt ) and the after-tax
home consumer price inflation reads Πt ≡ Pt(1 + τCt )/(Pt−1(1 + τCt−1)).
Demand for consumption goods:
CHt = ν
(
pHt
pTt
)−φ
CTt
CFt = (1− ν)
(
pFt
pTt
RSt
)−φ
CTt
C∗Ht = ν
∗
(
pHt
p∗Tt
1
RSt
)−φ
C∗Tt
C∗Ft = (1− ν∗)
(
pFt
p∗Tt
)−φ
C∗Tt
CNt = (1− ω)
(
pNt
(
1 + τCNt
))−
Ct
C∗Nt = (1− ω∗)
(
p∗Nt
(
1 + τ
C∗N
t
))−
C∗t
CTt = ω
(
pTt
(
1 + τCTt
))−
Ct
C∗Tt = ω
∗
(
p∗Tt
(
1 + τ
C∗T
t
))−
C∗t
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Demand for investment goods:
IHt = ν
(
pHt
pTt
)−φ
ITt
IFt = (1− ν)
(
pFt
pTt
RSt
)−φ
ITt
I∗Ht = ν
∗
(
pHt
p∗Tt
1
RSt
)−φ
I∗Tt
I∗Ft = (1− ν∗)
(
pFt
p∗Tt
)−φ
I∗Tt
INt = (1− ω)
(
pNt
pIt
)−
It
I∗Nt = (1− ω∗)
(
p∗Nt
pI∗t
)−
I∗t
ITt = ω
(
pTt
pIt
)−
It
I∗Tt = ω
∗
(
p∗Tt
pI∗t
)−
I∗t
Price index for investment goods:
pIt =
[
ωp1−T t + (1− ω)p1−Nt
] 1
1−
pI∗t =
[
ω∗(p∗Tt)
1− + (1− ω∗)(p∗Nt)1−
] 1
1−
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Euler equation for consumption:
Rrt =
1
β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)−ρ
Euler equations for capital:(
Ct
Ct+1
)−ρ
pIt
pIt+1
1
β
(
1 + κ
(
It
Kt
− δ
))
− R
cr
t+1
pIt+1
=
(
1 + κ
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
))
(1− δ)− κ
2
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)2
+ κ
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)
It+1
Kt+1
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)−ρ
pI∗t
pI∗t+1
1
β
(
1 + κ
(
I∗t
K∗t
− δ
))
− R
cr∗
t+1
pI∗t+1
=
(
1 + κ
(
I∗t+1
K∗t+1
− δ
))
(1− δ)− κ
2
(
I∗t+1
K∗t+1
− δ
)2
+ κ
(
I∗t+1
K∗t+1
− δ
)
I∗t+1
K∗t+1
Perfect risk sharing:
RSt = u
(
C∗t
Ct
)−ρ
Wage Phillips curves:
g1Ht
g2Ht
=
1− ξwH
(
W rHt
W rHt−1
Πt
)σwH−1
1− ξwH

1+ησwH
1−σw
H
g1Ht =
σwH
σwH − 1
(LHt)
1+η
nη
+ βξwHEt
[(
W rHt+1
W rHt
Πt+1
)σwH
g1Ht+1
]
g2Ht = (1− τEEt )
W rHtLHt
Cρt
+ βξwHEt
[(
W rHt+1
W rHt
Πt+1
)σwH−1
g2Ht+1
]
g1Nt
g2Nt
=
1− ξwN
(
WNt
WNt−1
Πt
)σwN−1
1− ξwN

1+ησwN
1−σw
N
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g1Nt =
σwN
σwN − 1
(LNt)
1+η
nη
+ βξwNEt
[(
W rNt+1
W rNt
Πt+1
)σwN
g1Nt+1
]
g2Nt = (1− τEEt )
W rNtLNt
Cρt
+ βξwNEt
[(
W rNt+1
W rNt
Πt+1
)σwN−1
g2Nt+1
]
g1∗Ft
g2∗Ft
=
1− ξw∗F
(
W ∗Ft
W ∗Ft−1
RSt−1
RSt
1
Πt
)σw∗F −1
1− ξw∗F

1+ησw∗F
1−σw∗
F
g1∗Ft =
σw∗F
σw∗F − 1
(L∗Ft)
1+η
(1− n)η + βξ
w∗
F Et
[(
W r∗Ft+1
W r∗Ft
RSt
RSt+1
1
Πt+1
)σw∗F
g1∗Ft+1
]
g2∗Ft = (1− τEE∗t )
W r∗FtL
∗
Ft
(C∗t )ρ
+ βξw∗F Et
[(
W r∗Ft+1
W r∗Ft
RSt
RSt+1
1
Πt+1
)σw∗F −1
g2∗Ft+1
]
g1∗Nt
g2∗Nt
=
1− ξw∗N
(
W ∗Nt
W ∗Nt−1
RSt−1
RSt
1
Πt
)σw∗N −1
1− ξw∗N

1+ησw∗N
1−σw∗
N
g1∗Nt =
σw∗N
σw∗N − 1
(L∗Nt)
1+η
(1− n)η + βξ
w∗
N Et
[(
W r∗Nt+1
W r∗Nt
RSt
RSt+1
1
Πt+1
)σw∗N
g1∗Nt+1
]
g2∗Nt = (1− τEE∗t )
W r∗NtL
∗
Nt
(C∗t )ρ
+ βξw∗N Et
[(
W r∗Nt+1
W r∗Nt
RSt
RSt+1
1
Πt+1
)σw∗N −1
g2∗Nt+1
]
Consumer price indexes:
1 = ω
(
pTt
(
1 + τCTt
))1−
+ (1− ω) (pNt (1 + τCNt ))1−
1 = ω∗
(
p∗Tt
(
1 + τ
C∗T
t
))1−
+ (1− ω∗)
(
p∗Nt
(
1 + τ
C∗N
t
))1−
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Price index of tradable goods:
pTt =
[
νp1−φHt + (1− ν)(pFtRSt)1−φ
] 1
1−φ
p∗Tt =
[
ν∗
(
pHt
RSt
)1−φ
+ (1− ν∗)p1−φFt
] 1
1−φ
Real marginal costs:
MCrHt = W
r
Ht
1 + τERt
αT
(
LHt
KHt
)1−αT
MCrNt = W
r
Nt
1 + τERt
αNT
(
LNt
KNt
)1−αNT
MCr∗Nt = W
r∗
Nt
1 + τER∗t
αNT
(
L∗Nt
K∗Nt
)1−αNT
MCr∗Ft = W
r∗
Ft
1 + τER∗t
αT
(
L∗Ft
K∗Ft
)1−αT
Labor cost minimization:
LHt
KHt
=
αT
1− αT
Rcrt
(1 + τERt )W
r
Ht
LNt
KNt
=
αNT
1− αNT
Rcrt
(1 + τERt )W
r
Nt
L∗Nt
K∗Nt
=
αNT
1− αNT
Rcr∗t
(1 + τER∗t )W r∗Nt
L∗Ft
K∗Ft
=
αT
1− αT
Rcr∗t
(1 + τER∗t )W r∗Ft
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Aggregate production function:
YHt∆Ht = L
αT
HtK
1−αT
Ht
YNt∆Nt = L
αNT
Nt K
1−αNT
Nt
Y ∗Ft∆
∗
Ft = L
αT
Ft (K
∗
Ft)
1−αT
Y ∗Nt∆
∗
Nt = L
αNT
Nt (K
∗
Nt)
1−αNT
Evolution of price dispersion:
∆Ht = (1− ξpH)
1− ξpH
(
pHt−1
pHt
1
Πt
)1−σpH
1− ξpH

σ
p
H
σ
p
H
−1
+ ξpH
(
pHt
pHt−1
Πt
)σpH
∆Ht−1
∆Nt = (1− ξpN)
1− ξpN
(
pNt−1
pNt
1
Πt
)1−σpN
1− ξpN

σ
p
N
σ
p
N
−1
+ ξpN
(
pNt
pNt−1
Πt
)σpN
∆Nt−1
∆∗Ft = (1− ξp∗F )
1− ξp∗F
(
p∗Ft−1
p∗Ft
RSt−1
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Price Phillips curves:
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Monetary policy:
1 + it =
(
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Resource constraints:
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Kt = KHt +KNt
K∗t = K
∗
Ft +K
∗
Nt
Law of motion for capital:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
K∗t+1 = (1− δ)K∗t + I∗t
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2.7.D.1 Calibrated Parameters
n 0.57 Size of home country
β 0.995 Discount factor of home country
η 2 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
ρ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
φ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables
 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables
θ 0.95 Smoothing parameter of nominal interest rate
µ 2 Response parameter of monetary policy to union-wide inflation
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
κ 10 Capital adjustment cost parameter
ν 0.9 Weight of home-produced goods in home tradable consumption
ν∗ 0.48 Weight of foreign-produced goods in foreign tradable cons.
u 0.46 Initial wealth distribution
ω 0.22 Weight of tradables in total consumption in home country
ω∗ 0.39 Weight of tradables in total consumption in foreign country
sH 0.59 Size of tradable sector in home country
sF 0.62 Size of tradable sector in foreign country
σpH 5.43 Elasticity of substitution between home tradable goods
σpN 4.69 Elasticity of substitution between home non-tradable goods
σp∗F 7.05 Elasticity of substitution between foreign tradable goods
σp∗N 5.42 Elasticity of substitution between foreign non-tradable goods
σwH 5.43 Elasticity of substitution in labor: home tradable sector
σwN 4.69 Elasticity of substitution in labor: home non-tradable sector
σw∗F 7.05 Elasticity of substitution in labor: foreign tradable sector
σw∗N 5.42 Elasticity of substitution in labor: foreign non-tradable sector
Table 2.7: Calibrated parameters for the Euro area model (Part 1)
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αT 0.68 Labor share in tradable sector home country
αNT 0.77 Labor share in non-tradable sector home country
α∗T 0.64 Labor share in tradable sector foreign country
α∗NT 0.77 Labor share in non-tradable sector foreign country
ξwH 0.35 Degree of wage stickiness in home tradable sector
ξwN 0.35 Degree of wage stickiness in home non-tradable sector
ξw∗F 0.29 Degree of wage stickiness in foreign tradable sector
ξw∗N 0.29 Degree of wage stickiness in foreign non-tradable sector
ξpH 0.83 Degree of price stickiness in home tradable sector
ξpN 0.76 Degree of price stickiness in home non-tradable sector
ξp∗F 0.74 Degree of price stickiness in foreign tradable sector
ξp∗N 0.75 Degree of price stickiness in foreign non-tradable sector
Table 2.8: Calibrated parameters for the Euro area model (Part 2)
τEE 0.1139 SSC paid by employees in home country
τEE∗ 0.1776 SSC paid by employees in foreign country
τER 0.3156 SSC paid by employers in home country
τER∗ 0.1841 SSC paid by employers in foreign country
τCT 0.1397 VAT on tradable goods in home country
τCN 0.0708 VAT on non-tradable goods in home country
τC
∗
T 0.1458 VAT on tradable goods in foreign country
τC
∗
N 0.0839 VAT on non-tradable goods in foreign country
Table 2.9: Baseline tax instruments for the Euro area model
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2.7.E Data Sources and Construction
Intra-EU trade balance
For each country, the trade-balance-to-GDP ratios with respect to each of the
remaining eleven countries are computed. This means the ratio of the difference
between exports and imports between the two countries and the gross domestic
product of the country under consideration is calculated. The intra-EA-12-
trade-balance of an individual country is then defined as the sum of its trade-
balance-to-GDP-ratios with each of the countries.
Tradable and non-tradable consumption
In defining goods and services as tradable or non-tradable, I build on Alling-
ton et al. (2006) who classify each COICOP (3 digit) category of goods and
services as tradable or non-tradable. However, I exclude “Accommodation and
food service activities” since the definition as tradable or non-tradable seems
to be controversial: Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) classify this sector as
tradable while Allington et al. (2006) define it to be non-tradable. Furthermore,
“Education” is excluded as there is no fiscal sector modeled in the present pa-
per. Finally, “Miscellaneous goods and services” are excluded as, on the one
hand, averagely 56% of this category consist of financial services which are not
modeled here and, on the other hand, it is a relatively broad definition while
the share in total GDP is less then 3% on average. This way, the categories
considered amount to 79% of total consumption on country-average. Table 2.10
shows the resulting classification.
Tradable and non-tradable production
I follow Piton (2017) in defining the GDP components as tradable or non-
tradable. Piton (2017) computes degrees of tradability using data of 24 Eu-
ropean countries for the period from 1995 to 2014 for 19 production sectors of
the NACE classification. “Financial and insurance activities” is excluded since
the model does not feature a financial sector as well as “Real Estate, Renting,
Business Activities”. Furthermore, “Community social and personal services”
is excluded since Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) claim the absence of
true markets to be problematic for estimating the respective mark-ups for these
sectors and “Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities” are ex-
cluded since this is a relatively broad definition while their share in total GDP
is averagely 2.6% only. Finally, “Accommodation and food service activities”
is excluded since the definition as tradable or non-tradable seems to be contro-
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COICOP Definition Class.
011 Food T
012 Non-alcoholic beverages T
021 Alcoholic beverages T
022 Tobacco T
023 Narcotics T
031 Clothing T
032 Footwear T
041 Actual rentals for housing NT
042 Imputed rentals for housing NT
043 Maintenance and repair of the dwelling NT
044 Water supply and miscellaneous services NT
045 Electricity, gas and other fuels NT
051 Furniture, furnishings, carpets, other floor coverings T
052 Household textiles T
053 Household appliances T
054 Glassware, tableware and household utensils T
055 Tools and equipment for house and garden T
056 Goods and services for routine household maintenance NT
061 Medical products, appliances and equipment T
062 Out-patient services NT
063 Hospital services NT
071 Purchase of vehicles T
072 Operation of personal transport equipment T
073 Transport services NT
081 Postal services NT
082 Telephone and telefax equipment T
083 Telephone and telefax services NT
091 Audio-visual, photographic, information equipment T
092 Other major durables for recreation and culture T
093 Other recreational items, equipment, gardens, pets T
094 Recreational and cultural services NT
095 Newspapers, books and stationery NT
096 Package holidays NT
Table 2.10: Classification of tradable and non-tradable consumption
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Definition Class.
Agriculture, forestry and fishing T
Mining and quarrying T
Manufacturing T
Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply NT
Water supply and waste management NT
Construction NT
Wholesale and retail trade NT
Transportation and storage T
Accommodation and food service activities —
Information and communication T
Financial and insurance activities —
Real estate and social work activities —
Professional, scientific and technical activities T
Community social and personal services —
Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities —
Table 2.11: Classification of tradable and non-tradable production
versial as is explained above. This way, the sectors regarded amount to 85% of
total GDP on average. Table 2.11 shows the respective classification of tradable
and non-tradable production sectors.
Elasticity of substitution
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) estimate price mark-ups for 50 categories
of goods and services for eight EU-member countries using data from 1981 to
2004. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) do not find a systematic change
in mark-ups between the periods from 1981 to 1992 and 1993 to 2004 and,
hence, give rise to the assumption that mark-ups do not change much over time.
Consequently, it seems to be justifiable to use 2004 estimates to calibrate the
model which is otherwise calibrated to 2015 data. For both country-groups, I
construct the mark-up in the tradable and non-tradable sector, respectively, as
a GDP-weighted cross-country average of these estimated mark-ups. Here, I use
data from 2004 as in Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) since they used the
NACE1 classification of industries to compute the respective mark-ups while the
KLEMS data base uses the NACE1 classification only up to the 2009 release and
switches to the NACE2 classification from the 2011 release on. Consequently, the
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mark-ups given by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) could not be matched
with 2015 production data. Furthermore, “Agriculture, hunting, forestry and
fishing” as well as “Mining and Quarrying” are excluded since Christopoulou
and Vermeulen (2008) do not calculate mark-ups for these categories. Data
Source: EU KLEMS 2009 Release, updated March 2011.
Degree of wage rigidity
There is only few evidence on the degree of wage rigidity. Lunnemann and Wintr
(2010) find that while there are large differences in wage rigidities between coun-
tries, there are only insignificant differences between sectors and Druant and
Fabiani (2009) confirm this by stating that sectoral differences in wage rigidities
are relatively small compared to prices but that there are large differences be-
tween countries. Hence, I assume the degree of wage stickiness to be the same
across sectors for an individual country. Behr and Po¨tter (2010) and Knoppik
and Beissinger (2009) both estimate the degree of wage rigidity in EU coun-
tries. While their results differ quantitatively, they obtain the same order of
wage rigidities for the countries regarded in both studies (with the exception of
Belgium), meaning that e.g. in both studies Spain has the lowest degree of wage
rigidity. Here, I rely on the estimates of Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) since
they regard 10 Euro zone countries while Behr and Po¨tter (2010) regard 7 only.
Social security contributions in the EA-12 countries
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 give the SSC rates for employers and employees, respec-
tively, for the EA-12 countries from 2008 to 2016.25 Regarding the employees’
share in SSC, it can be seen that exclusively the Netherlands implemented a
significant cut in the EESCC rate in 2014 amounting to 3.8 percentage points.
In Ireland and Luxembourg the EESSC rate was increased by 0.8 percentage
points in 2013 and 0.5 percentage points in 2015, respectively, while in Finland
and France the EESSC has inclined steadily from 2008 to 2012 by 2.6 and 0.6
percentage points, respectively. In all other countries the EESSC rate stayed
constant or fluctuated in the small range between 0.1 and 0.5 percentage points.
Regarding the employers’ share in SSC, Table 2.13 shows that Belgium, France,
and Greece featured a continuous decrease in the ERSSC rates while in Luxem-
bourg the ERSSC rate was increased by 0.8 percentage points in 2011. In all
other countries the ERSSC rates stayed constant or fluctuated in the small range
25Data source: OECD Tax Statistics (database).
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
AT 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.0
BE 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
FI 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.1 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.3 8.8
FR 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.8 14.1 14.2 14.3
DE 20.7 20.6 20.5 20.9 20.7 20.4 20.4 20.5 20.7
EL 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.2 16.5 16.5 16.0 15.5 15.8
IE 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
IT 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
LU 12.1 12.2 12.2 13.1 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.8 12.8
NL 17.4 15.2 15.5 15.3 15.2 18.9 17.3 13.1 13.5
PT 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
ES 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Table 2.12: Employees’ SSC rates in EA-12 countries from 2008 to 2016 (in percent)
between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points. France and Greece, however, decreased
the ERSSC rate significantly from 2012 up to 2016 in the amount of 7.4 and 3.7
percentage points, respectively.
Overall, there are 4 countries which systematically decreased either their EESSC
or ERSSC rate or both: the Netherlands, Finland, France, and Greece. Table
2.14 shows, however, that only the Netherlands, at the same time, significantly
increased their VAT rate. In the reaming three countries the VAT rate was
raised by 1 percentage point at the most. Consequently, there might be some
indication of fiscal devaluations in France, Greece, and Finland, but only regard-
ing the Netherlands there is substantial evidence of a fiscal devaluation which
is, however, relatively small compared to the remaining EA-12 countries.
The VAT rate applied on tradable and non-tradable goods
The IAS et al. (2013b) calculated for each of the COICOP (3 digit) categories
of goods and services an average VAT rate for private households in each of
the EU member states in 2011. To check if these results may be applicable to
the model otherwise calibrated to 2015 data, Table 2.14 shows changes in the
reduced as well as the standard rate of VAT between 2011 and 2015 for each
country regarded. It can be seen that while in Belgium, Germany, Austria, and
Portugal the VAT rates stayed constant, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, and the
Netherlands increased the standard rate of VAT, but only to a relatively small
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
AT 29.0 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 28.9 28.9
BE 30.4 30.1 30.0 30.2 30.2 29.9 29.8 29.7 28.7
FI 24.0 23.0 22.3 22.5 22.8 22.8 23.1 22.4 23.1
FR 43.8 43.8 44.0 44.0 44.0 40.2 38.3 37.9 36.6
DE 19.5 19.5 19.3 19.7 19.6 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3
EL 28.1 28.1 28.1 28.6 28.6 27.5 26.0 24.6 24.9
IE 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
IT 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 31.9
LU 11.1 11.5 11.5 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.2
NL 10.5 10.0 10.4 10.2 10.8 9.8 10.7 10.6 11.2
PT 23.8 23.8 23.8 23.8 23.8 23.8 23.8 23.8 23.8
ES 30.2 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9
Table 2.13: Employers’ SSC rates in EA-12 countries from 2008 to 2016 (in percent)
Reduced rates Standard rate
AT 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0
FI 1 1 1
FR 0 0 0.4
DE 0 0 0
EL 0 0 1
IE 0 0 2
IT 0 0 1
LU 0 2 2
NL 0 0 2
PT 0 0 0
ES 0 2 3
Table 2.14: Changes in VAT rates between 2011 and 2015 (in percentage points)
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extent in the range between 0.4 and 2 percentage points which should not bias
the results. Finland increased all three rates by one percentage point meaning
that there will be no bias by using 2011 instead of 2015 data as all rates inclined
by the same amount. Spain and Luxembourg, however, changed two of the rates
in the amount of between 2 and 3 percentage points. For this reason, these two
countries are excluded in computing the average VAT rates of the home country.
Scenario 1: The abolition of reduced VAT rates
The categories of goods and services for which reduced rates are assumed to be
abolished and replaced by the standard rate are the following:
CP0432 – Services for the maintenance and repair of the dwelling
CP0441 – Water supply
CP0442 – Refuse collection
CP0444 – Other services relating to the dwelling
CP0451 – Electricity
CP0452 – Gas
CP0454 – Solid fuels
CP0455 – Heat energy
It can be seen that all subcategories belong to the 2-digit category “Housing,
water, electricity, gas and other fuels”. Average tax rates on all other categories
are assumed to stay constant at their initial values calculated by the IAS et al.
(2013a) as described above. Since data on consumption expenditure is available
at a 3-digit COICOP classification only, however, I assume that each of the
4-digit subcategories belonging to a 3-digit category has the same size.
Scenario 2: The increase in the standard rate of VAT
I assume that the standard rate of VAT is raised by 3.1 percentage points while
reduced rates remain unchanged. This means that in each category only goods
and services subject to the standard rate are affected by the VAT increase while
for goods and services to which reduced rates may be applied there is no change
in taxation. As consumption data is only available for the COICOP 3-digit
classification while the Council of the European Union allows the application of
reduced rates referring to more specific categories, I approximate the share of
goods and services subject to the standard rate in each category. Here, I use
the relation of the average VAT rate for each COICOP 3-digit category to the
initial (2011) standard rate of VAT as weight for each category.
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3. Optimal Fiscal Policy under
Private Debt Deleveraging26
3.1 Introduction
The impact of the global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of
searching for novel policy measures as it has both disabled conventional mone-
tary policy by driving interest rates almost to the zero lower bound (ZLB) and,
at the same time, stated a situation featuring the pressing need for economy-
stabilizing interventions. Beyond that, the foundation of the European currency
union restrains monetary policy from taking a country-specific stabilization-
role. Mainly two alternative measures possibly able to assume this role have
been considered so far: Macroprudential tools aimed at financial stability – such
as countercyclical capital requirements – and an optimal fiscal policy. While
the former has been investigated in a rich set of different frameworks (see e.g.
Schwanebeck and Palek (2006b), Levine and Lima (2015), and Quint and Ra-
banal (2013)), there is a surprisingly small literature on evaluating optimal fiscal
policy measures in times of financial crises. And, more particularly, there is a
even smaller literature regarding a crisis in the private debt sector. This seems
to be of special interest, however, as private-debt-to-GDP ratios increased sub-
stantially between 1999 and 2009 in the US as well as in the Euro Area while a
pronounced private debt deleveraging process can be observed ever since 2009.
This paper closes this gap by investigating and comparing constrained opti-
mal fiscal policy reactions to a private debt deleveraging shock in a model with
heterogeneous agents where monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. Instead
of modeling the financial sector explicitly, I use the shortcut proposed by Be-
nigno et al. (2014) who define a private debt deleveraging shock as a decrease
in the perceived risk-free debt level between savers and borrowers. This decline
increases the spread between the interest rate savers obtain and the interest
rate borrowers pay and, consequently, makes borrowing more costly. This way,
26A slightly different version of the chapter has been published in the “Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control” Vol. 97 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2018.09.003
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a private debt deleveraging process is simulated which allows to examine the
success a constrained-optimal fiscal policy may have in eliminating the related
welfare losses. Several issues are explored in this context: First, the effects of
a deleveraging shock in the private sector are examined. Second, the effective-
ness of optimal fiscal policy in reducing deleveraging-related welfare losses in a
situation where monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB is investigated. Fi-
nally, the role of government spending as well as of the specific monetary policy
conducted is examined.
The paper is related to various strands of literature: First, there is a literature
on optimal fiscal policy during a financial crisis. Niemann and Pichler (2016)
explore optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy in times of a belief-driven
sovereign debt crisis with endogenous default. In contrast to the present paper,
they abstract from private debt but regard a sovereign bond crisis. Eggertson
(2001) explores optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a liquidity trap in a New-
Keynesian model and Bilbiie et al. (2014) explore optimal government spending
at the ZLB in a closed model. The current paper differs from these approaches
by regarding distortionary taxes and allowing for heterogeneous agents.27
Second, the present paper is related to the strand of literature exploring
optimal fiscal policy in models featuring some kind of heterogeneity as e.g. Evans
(2014), Shourideh (2012), and Panousi and Reis (2014) who explore optimal
capital taxation under idiosyncratic risk. Bilbiie et al. (2012) compare the effects
of a debt-financed tax cut with a tax-financed increase in government spending
in a model with savers and borrowers as in the present paper but focus on
exogenous tax cuts. Furthermore, the current paper builds on Benigno et al.
(2014) as it uses a model with savers and borrowers where the debt level decreases
endogenously due to an increase in the risk-free debt level. The focus differs,
however, as Benigno et al. (2014) regard optimal monetary policy while the
present paper explores fiscal policy in a situation where the monetary policy is
constrained by a zero lower bound. Moreover, there are a few papers modeling
agents to be heterogeneous regarding productivity in the context of optimal fiscal
policy as e.g. Bassetto (2014), Bhandari et al. (2016), Bhandari et al. (2017),
and Werning (2007). All of these papers do, however, consider lump-sum or
debt-financed income taxation as single instrument.
27Beyond that, there is a strand of literature exploring the effects of exogenous tax cuts
or increases in government spending at zero interest rates as for example Eggertson (2009),
Christiano et al. (2010), and Eggertson (2006). None of these papers does, however, consider
the optimal fiscal policy but they investigate the effects of exogenously given policy actions.
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Finally, the paper contributes to the small strand of literature regarding con-
sumption taxes in addition to income taxation. While the distinction between
capital and labor income taxes is examined in a wide range of different frame-
works (see e.g. Werning (2007), Fasolo (2014), Chari and Kehoe (1998), and
Le Grand and Ragot (2017)), consumption taxes have been considered quite
infrequently. One of the few exceptions is Vasilev (2016) who finds that con-
sumption taxes may play an important role in determining optimal fiscal policy
but, in contrast to the present paper, focuses on steady-state results and regards
homogenous agents.
The main contributions of the present paper are the following: First, it
is shown that a private debt deleveraging shock implies economy-wide welfare
losses. Second, while monetary policy being constrained by the ZLB implies
a sizable welfare loss if the economy is hit by a deleveraging shock, optimal
fiscal policy can be highly effective in this setup. Third, following the optimal
fiscal policy implies a prolonged stay at the ZLB. Moreover, the welfare gains
of having government spending as an additional instrument are found to be
small compared to the total welfare gains of applying an optimal instead of an
exogenous fiscal policy. Finally, if fiscal policy is set optimally, conducting an
optimal monetary policy need not necessarily imply welfare gains relative to
following a simple inflation-targeting policy depending on the fiscal instruments
used.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
the model as well as both the Ramsey and the Social planner’s maximization
problem is described. Section 3.3 contains the simulation results, first, for the
simple case of flexible prices and, following, for the case with price rigidity and
the presence of the ZLB. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 explore the role of government
spending and monetary policy. A sensitivity analysis can be found in Section
3.6 while Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Decentralized Equilibrium
The model consists of a closed economy populated by two types of households
– savers and borrowers. There is a mass s of savers and 1 − s of borrowers.
Monopolistically competitive firms produce a single good and the fiscal authority
has access to two types of distortionary taxes: a consumption tax and a wage
tax.
Households
Households seek to maximize the following increasing and concave utility
function which is twice continuously differentiable
Uh0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
(βh)t
{[
1− exp(−zCht )
]− (Lht )1+η
1 + η
}
, (3.1)
with h = s, b denoting savers and borrowers, respectively, and 0 < βh < 1. Cht
and Lht are consumption and labor per saver or borrower, respectively. Here,
η > 0 denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and z > 0 holds.
Borrowers have to pay a risk premium on debt, Φ(Dbt ), which takes the
following form
Φ(Dbt ) = 1 + φ exp
(
Dbt
D¯bt
− 1
)
− φ, (3.2)
where Dbt denotes per borrower debt given in real terms (meaning nominal debt
divided by the price level) and φ is a scaling factor determining the extent to
which the interest spread reacts to relative changes in the debt levels. Following
Benigno et al. (2014), D¯bt can be interpreted as the perceived risk-free debt level
meaning that if debt of borrowers is equal to this risk-free level (Dbt = D¯
b
t ) there
is no risk premium at all. For each Dbt > D¯
b
t borrowers will pay a positive risk
premium increasing in the level of debt. A deleveraging shock is defined as an
exogenous and permanent decrease in this risk-free debt level. This approach
differs from studies on deleveraging as e.g. Eggertson and Krugman (2012) since
it implies that the debt level decreases endogenously and, thus, adjusts over time
in response to a decrease in the risk-free debt level. Consequently, during the
transition process, the debt level can (and will) be different from the risk-free
debt level while the modeling assumption of Eggertson and Krugman (2012)
implies that the debt level always is equivalent to the borrowing constraint.
The risk premium can be seen as charged by a financial intermediary which
is owned by the savers and implies that the interest rate paid by borrowers is
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given by
1 + ibt = (1 + it)Φ(D
b
t ), (3.3)
where it denotes the nominal interest rate of savers.
Savers consume the consumption good Cst , supply labor L
s
t , and have access
to non-state-contingent private bonds. They have to pay a consumption tax τ ct
on goods and a wage tax τwt on their labor income. Furthermore, savers receive
lump-sum transfers T st , yield dividends from firms Divt, and collect the risk pre-
mium RPt paid by private borrowers (all written in real terms).
28 Consequently,
the per saver budget constraint for savers can be written in real terms as
Bst−1
Πt
+ (1− τwt )W st Lst =
Bst
1 + it
+ (1 + τ ct )C
s
t −Divt −RPt − T st , (3.4)
with
RPt =
(
1
1 + it
− 1
1 + ibt
)
Bst ,
where Bst are nominal bonds per saver divided by the price level and Πt ≡ PtPt−1 .
Maximizing (3.1) subject to (3.3) and (3.4) delivers the following Euler equa-
tion for bond holdings and labor supply equation for savers:
exp(−zCst ) = βsEt
{
exp(−zCst+1)(1 + it)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
}
(3.5)
and
(Lst)
η = W st z exp(−zCst )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
. (3.6)
For borrowers, the per borrower budget constraint reads
Dbt
1 + ibt
+ (1− τwt )W bt Lbt = (1 + τ ct )Cbt +
Dbt−1
Πt
−Divt − T bt . (3.7)
Maximizing (3.1) subject to (3.7) gives the Euler equation and labor supply for
borrowers as
exp(−zCbt ) = βbEt
{
exp(−zCbt+1)
1 + ibt
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
1−Dbt
Φ
′
t
Φt
]−1}
(3.8)
28Divt and RPt are assumed to depend on the average per capita levels of dividends and risk
premia, respectively, such that agents do not internalize the fact that their dividend and
risk premium income depends on their own levels of consumption and bond holdings.
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and
(Lbt)
η = W bt z exp(−zCbt )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
. (3.9)
Production
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms of unit mass
each producing a differentiated good facing Rotemberg-type adjustment costs
and being subject to the production function
Yt(j) = (L
s
t(j))
s(Lbt(j))
1−s,
with Yt(j) being per capita output of firm j where it is assumed that output
is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the two types of labor. The demand for the
individual good produced by firm j is given by
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Yt,
where Pt(j) is the price chosen by firm j and θ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated goods. It is assumed that firms pay a quadratic price
adjustment cost following Rotemberg (1982) which is given by
PACt(j) =
κ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
)2
Yt
with κ > 0. The respective Lagrangian for the firms’ optimization problem reads
Λ = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtuct
{
Pt(j)
Pt
Yt(j)− sW st Lst − (1− s)W bt Lbt − PACt(j)
−MCt(j)
[
Yt(j)− (Lst(j))s
(
Lbt(j)
)1−s]}
,
where uct = s exp(−zCst ) + (1− s) exp(−zCbt ). The respective first order condi-
tions with respect to Pt(j), L
s
t(j), and L
b
t(j) can be obtained to read
uct(1− θ)Yt(j) 1
Pt
− κ
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)
1
Pt−1(j)
uctYt
+βuct+1κ
(
Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)
− 1
)
Pt+1(j)
(Pt(j))2
Yt+1 +MCt(j)uctθ
1
Pt
Yt = 0,
W st = MCt(j)
(
Lbt(j)
Lst(j)
)1−s
,
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and
W bt = MCt(j)
(
Lst(j)
Lbt(j)
)s
.
Rearranging the first order conditions and using that in equilibrium all firms
choose the same price and labor inputs delivers
LstW
s
t = L
b
tW
b
t , (3.10)
W st = MCt
(
Lbt
Lst
)1−s
, (3.11)
and
1− κ(Πt − 1)Πt + βκuct+1
uct
(Πt+1 − 1) Πt+1Yt+1
Yt
= θ (1−MCt) . (3.12)
The aggregate production function is given by
Yt = (L
s
t)
s(Lbt)
1−s (3.13)
and dividends are given by
Divt = Yt − sW st Lst − (1− s)W bt Lbt − PACt. (3.14)
Monetary policy
The monetary authority is assumed to follow an inflation-targeting policy
but is constrained by the ZLB such that
Πt = Π¯ (3.15)
if it > 0 and it = 0 otherwise applies, where Π¯ is the target inflation rate.
Government
The government levies consumption and wage taxes and transfers lump-sum
payments to households such that the government budget reads
Tt = τ
c
t (sC
s
t + (1− s)Cbt ) + τwt WtLt, (3.16)
where Tt ≡ T st = T bt and WtLt ≡ W st Lst = W bt Lbt holds.
74
Equilibrium
The resource constraint for the consumption good gives
Yt = sC
s
t + (1− s)Cbt +
κ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt (3.17)
and equilibrium in the asset market requires
sBst = (1− s)Dbt .
By combining the budget constraint of borrowers (3.7), with equations (3.14),
(3.16), and (3.17), the evolution of debt can be expressed as
Dbt
1 + ibt−1
− D
b
t−1
Πt
= (1 + τ ct )s(C
b
t − Cst ). (3.18)
An exogenous policy equilibrium of the model is defined by a set of the 12
equations (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.15),
(3.17), and (3.18) determining the 12 variables Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Yt, W
s
t , W
b
t ,
MCt, D
b
t , Πt, i
b
t , it, given the fiscal instruments τ
c
t and τ
w
t and equation (3.2)
defining the risk premium.
3.2.2 Ramsey Planner and Social Planner
In this section, the constrained-optimal fiscal policy by means of a Ramsey
planner’s problem is considered. The Ramsey planner maximizes the discounted
weighted sum of the borrowers’ and savers’ utilities but is constrained by the pri-
vate sector’s behavior. Consequently, the Ramsey policy is defined as a sequence
of policies maximizing E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tUt with β ≡ sβs + (1− s)βb and
Ut ≡ s˜
[
1− exp(−zCst )−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
]
+(1−s˜)
[
1− exp(−zCbt )−
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
]
(3.19)
subject to (3.2), (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13),
(3.15), (3.17), and (3.18) with respect to Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Yt, W
s
t , W
b
t , MCt,
Dbt , Πt, i
b
t , it, Φt as well as one or two of the fiscal instruments τ
c
t and τ
w
t .
Here, s˜ is a parameter determining the relative weight of the savers’ utility
in the objective function. It is set to ensure that the initial steady state is
constrained-efficient as outlined in the following. Due to the complexity of the
model, I refrain from solving the Ramsey problem using the primal approach
but formulate the Ramsey planner to choose policy variables and allocation
simultaneously. A detailed description of the Ramsey problem as well as the
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solution method can be seen in Appendix A. The Ramsey planner’s problem
will be solved from a timeless perspective following Woodford (2003). Due to
this feature, the initial steady state must be regarded carefully. Welfare analysis
will only be meaningful if starting in the efficient steady state since any other
starting point implies the government having an incentive to deviate from its
initial policy. For this reason, the three different equilibria – exogenous policy,
Ramsey planner, and Social planner – will be considered in greater detail and
conditions will be obtained under which all three will start in the efficient steady
state.
The Social planner maximizes the weighted sum of utilities of savers and
borrowers given in equation (3.19) subject to the resource constraint (3.17) and
the aggregate production function (3.13) with respect to Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Yt, and
Πt. Rearranging the first order conditions gives the Social planner’s equilibrium
as29
Cst = C
b
t − ln
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
)
1
z
(3.20)
Lst = L
b
t
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
) 1
1+η
(3.21)
(
Lbt
)η
= z exp(−zCbt )
(
s
s˜
1− s˜
1− s
) s
η(1+η)
(3.22)
Πt = 1 (3.23)
together with (3.13) and (3.17). This shows that if s˜ = s is set, consumption
and labor will be distributed equally between savers and borrowers (Cst = C
b
t
and Lst = L
b
t) such that both groups would have the same utility level.
The Ramsey allocation is given by the same equations as the exogenous
policy equilibrium but extended by the Ramsey-FOC. The Ramsey allocation
will be equivalent to the exogenous policy equilibrium if the latter is efficient
since in this case fiscal authorities have no incentive to deviate from this allo-
cation. A comparison of the exogenous policy equilibrium defined in the last
section with the Social planner’s equilibrium conditions obtained above shows
that three conditions have to be fulfilled to ensure efficiency of the exogenous
policy equilibrium:30
1
(1 + τ ct )s
(
Dbt
1 + ibt
−Dbt−1
)
= ln
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
)
1
z
, (3.24)
29The derivation of the Social planner’s equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix B.
30A description of the derivation of the efficiency-conditions can be seen in Appendix C.
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τwt = 1−
θ
θ − 1(1 + τ
c
t ), (3.25)
and
Πt = 1. (3.26)
Concerning steady states, equation (3.24) shows that if s˜ = s held, the
Ramsey steady state could only be efficient if assets are in net zero supply. In the
Ramsey steady state, however, equation (3.15) determines steady-state inflation
to be Π¯ and (3.5) determines the nominal interest rate to be i = 1/βsΠ¯−1 such
that the steady-state version of (3.8) combined with (3.3) and the definition of
the risk premium (3.2) determine the steady-state level of debt to be equal to
the risk-free debt level (Db = D¯b) which is calibrated to be non-zero.31
To ensure that the initial steady state, nevertheless, is constrained-efficient
even if Db = D¯b 6= 0 holds, I follow Benigno and Nistico (2013) and assume
that the weight used in the social welfare function are biased in that s˜ 6= s
holds. This means that the Social planner does not use the share of savers as
weight in the social welfare function. More precisely, s˜ is set to be 0.3931 as this
exactly ensures that the initial steady state is constrained-efficient. This leads
to a political bias in the amount of s˜ − s = 0.0031. This bias is taken as given
during all simulation scenarios, such that each policy reaction to a deleveraging
shock explored in the following is computed using s˜ = 0.3931 as weight in the
social welfare function.
In contrast, by setting s˜ = s, efficiency would (by means of equations (3.20)
and (3.21)) require that Cb = Cs and Lb = Ls hold. This, however, states an
allocation which cannot be reached by the Ramsey planner as he is subject to
the individuals’ decision making – who differ their in discount factors (βs 6= βb)
– and cannot transfer funds between agents.
Furthermore, I choose the inflation target to be one (Π¯ = 1) to eliminate
steady-state price-setting inefficiencies and ensure that the third efficiency con-
dition (3.26) is fulfilled in steady state. In each exogenous policy scenario, I set
the consumption tax rate to be zero (τ c = 0), the wage tax to match (3.25)
and use s˜ = 0.3931. This way, it is ensured that all policies start in the same
(constrained-efficient) steady state.
31I set βs/βb = 1/(1− φ) to ensure that Db = D¯b holds in steady state.
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3.3 Simulation
3.3.1 The Case of Flexible Prices
To explore the mechanisms of a deleveraging shock as well as of the Ramsey-
optimal policy reactions, I will start by considering the case with flexible prices
and without the existence of the ZLB as an illustrative example, meaning κ is
set to be zero. The assumption of output being a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of
the two labor types implies that combining equations (3.6), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11),
(3.13), and (3.17), with flexible prices, output can be written as
Y ηt exp(zYt) = z
θ − 1
θ
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
. (3.27)
This shows that under flexible prices (for each τ ct 6= −1) output is uniquely
defined as a function of the two tax rates and otherwise independent of financial
variables as well as of consumption.
βs 0.996 Discount factor of savers
βb 0.95 Discount factor of borrowers
D¯b/Y 1 Initial debt-to-GDP ratio
s 0.39 Share of savers
φ 0.025 Debt elastic risk-premium parameter
η 0.5 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
z 2.5 Weight of consumption in utility
Π¯ 1 Inflation target
Table 3.1: Parametrization
As the paper builds on a simple model and focuses on a qualitative evalu-
ation, I abstract from calibrating the parameters but choose a parametrization
roughly in line with related literature. Here, I set φ to be 0.025 where φ deter-
mines the impact of a variation in the relative debt level on the interest spread.
Furthermore, I set βs = 0.996 and βb = (1−φ)βs = 0.95 to ensure that Db = D¯b
holds in steady state which implies an annual interest rate of roughly 1.6%. I
follow Justiano et al. (2015) and define the share of savers, s, to be 0.39. The in-
flation target Π¯ is set to be one implying that there is no monopolistic distortion
as long as the ZLB does not bind such that inflation equals the target inflation.
The inverse of the labor supply elasticity, η, is set to be 0.5 and the weight of
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Figure 3.1: Deleveraging under an exogenous fiscal policy. For consumption and out-
put percentage changes are given. The interest rate is measured in percent. “Spread”
is defined as the difference between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in per-
centage points. For debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent.
consumption in utility, z, is set to be 2.5. Regarding the initial risk-free debt
level as well as the size of the deleveraging shock, I set D¯b to match an initial
steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio of 100% and calibrate the deleveraging shock
to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by 20 percentage points. Table 3.1 gives an
overview about the parameter values.
Exogenous policy
As a starting point, Figure 3.1 gives the effects of a deleveraging shock on
consumption, output, interest rates, and the debt level under an exogenous
policy which means that both tax instruments are held constant at their initial
steady-state values (τwt = −0.2 and τ ct = 0).32 Starting with the effects on the
borrowers’ behavior, the reduction in the perceived risk-free debt level induces
the interest spread to rise. As a consequence, borrowers reduce consumption and
start to pay down their debt. This, in turn, reduces the savers’ nominal interest
rate such that savers have an incentive to both reduce their bond holdings and
increase consumption. Over time, the reduction in the debt level induces the
32The model is solved by applying a Newton-type method via Dynare which solves the non-
linear system of simultaneous equations containing the equilibrium conditions including, in
case of the constrained-optimal policy, the Ramsey FOCs.
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spread to decline and return to zero as the debt level reaches the new risk-
free debt level. Output remains constant since equation (3.27) showed that it
exclusively depends on the two tax instruments which are fixed in this scenario.
In the long-run, consumption of borrowers remains slightly higher and con-
sumption of savers is somewhat smaller than in the initial steady state (more
precisely, consumption of savers is decreased by 0.12% in the long-run and con-
sumption of borrowers increases by 0.08%). This is due to the fact that the
steady-state version of the evolution of debt (3.18) determines the borrowers’
consumption as a function of interest payments on outstanding debt and output.
As outlined above, output remains constant and interest rates convert to their
initial steady-state level, but the debt level declines permanently. Consequently,
consumption of borrowers is higher in the low-debt-level steady state than in
the high-debt-level steady state. Starting from an initially efficient steady state,
this implies that the new consumption levels are inefficient (since the efficient
allocation is independent of the debt level). For this reason, in the following,
utility losses will be considered in greater detail.
Figure 3.2: Period-by-period consumption-equivalent utility losses (in percent) of a
deleveraging shock under an exogenous policy in the simple model with flexible prices.
Figure 3.2 gives period-by-period consumption-equivalent utility losses of
being exposed to a deleveraging shock relative to staying in the steady state
for both groups of agents separately as well as on an aggregate.33 It can be
seen that during the deleveraging process savers feature a utility gain of about
8.80% of initial steady-state consumption at its peak while borrowers loose in the
amount of about 5.46%. On an economy-wide level, the utility loss amounts to
about 0.16% at the maximum. In the long-run, however, the effects are reversed:
Savers feature a small utility loss of about 0.23% while borrowers are slightly
better off than in the initial steady state with a permanent utility gain of about
33Regarding aggregate utility losses, the social welfare measure given in equation (3.19) is
used. The definition of all utility measures can be seen in detail in Appendix D.
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0.15%. Again, this is due to the fact that with a lower debt level, steady-state
payments on outstanding debt will be lower than with a high debt level which
results in a higher consumption level of borrowers.
Regarding cumulative effects, lifetime utility losses can be computed defined
as the percentage share of initial steady-state consumption an agent would be
willing to give up in the initial period in order to be indifferent between the
corresponding constant steady-state-level stream of consumption and labor and
the stream of consumption and labor that will result if a deleveraging shock hits
the economy. It can be observed that both agents loose from being exposed to
a deleveraging shock in the amount of 7.68% in the case of savers and 20.49% of
initial steady-state consumption in the case of borrowers. Even on an aggregate
level, the economy as a whole features a utility loss in the amount of 0.46%.
These results state the benchmark for a comparison with outcomes of optimal
fiscal policy measures as is explored in the following.
Ramsey-optimal policy
I start with considering a Ramsey-optimal policy where the Ramsey planner
has access to both wage and consumption taxes. In the baseline case of flexible
prices and without the existence of the ZLB, the efficiency conditions (3.24),
(3.25), and (3.26) obtained in the last section can be fulfilled simultaneously
which means that the Ramsey-optimal policy is equivalent to the efficient policy.
To obtain the optimal policy reaction of the Ramsey planner to a deleveraging
shock, it should be regarded that the efficient allocation given by equations
(3.20) to (3.23) is independent of the debt level as well as of interest rates. This
means that the efficient allocation will not be affected by the deleveraging shock.
Consumption and labor will remain constant. Under the Ramsey policy, this
implies that the Euler equations of borrowers and savers collapse to
1
βb
=
(1 + it)Φt
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(
1−Dbt
Φ
′
t
Φt
)−1
(3.28)
and
1
βs
=
1 + it
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
. (3.29)
Combining both conditions and recalling the interest spread function (3.2) shows
that the debt level must be equal to the risk-free debt level in each period. This
means that the debt level has to adjust immediately in response to a decrease
in the risk-free debt level. Applying this condition and plugging in equations
(3.26) and (3.29), the efficiency condition (3.24) can be rewritten to give the
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optimal fiscal policy rule for consumption taxes as
1 + τ ct =
βsD¯bt
D¯bt−1
1+τct−1
+ s
z
ln
(
1−s˜
1−s
s
s˜
) (3.30)
and equation (3.25) gives the optimal wage tax as
τwt = 1−
θ
θ − 1(1 + τ
c
t ). (3.31)
In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the effects of a deleveraging shock under the Ramsey-
optimal policy with wage and consumption taxes in comparison with the case
of an exogenously given policy considered before are depicted.
It can be observed that following the optimal rules given by (3.30) and (3.31)
implies raising wage taxes and decreasing consumption taxes. The intuition be-
hind this reaction becomes clear by considering after-tax inflation dynamics:
While the pre-tax inflation rate is assumed to stay at its target value, the de-
crease in consumption taxes implies that in the period in which the deleveraging
shock materializes, consumption tomorrow will be expected to be less expensive
than consumption today. Or, put differently, after-tax inflation is expected to
Figure 3.3: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with wage and consumption
taxes in the simple model with flexible prices. For consumption and output percent-
age changes are given. Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. “Spread”
is defined as the difference between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in per-
centage points. For debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent. Solid
line: Exogenous policy. Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
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Figure 3.4: Period-by-period consumption-equivalent utility losses of a deleveraging
shock under a Ramsey policy with wage and consumption taxes as well as under the
exogenous policy. Solid line: Exogenous policy. Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
decrease which implies that repaying debt tomorrow will be more costly than
repaying debt today. Consequently, borrowers will decrease bond holdings to-
day. The Ramsey planner sets the decrease in consumption taxes to ensure that
the reduction in bond holdings will be the same as the reduction in the risk-
free debt level. Consequently, there is a one-time shift from the high debt level
to the low debt level implying that the spread remains zero. Figure 3.3 shows
that this deleveraging mechanism implies that borrowers are willing to pay less
for borrowing such that the interest rate decreases. From the savers’ perspec-
tive, lending becomes more attractive since lending one consumption unit today
will result in a payoff of more than one consumption unit tomorrow such that
savers will request lower interest rates. Consequently, the decrease in consump-
tion taxes induces a reduction in the nominal interest rate while consumption
remains constant.
This mechanism is comparable with the results obtained in Eggertson and
Krugman (2012) in that the effects of a deleveraging shock crucially depend
on the reaction of inflation or, more precisely, inflation expectations. It differs,
however, in that in the current paper expected (after-tax) deflation is required
to obtain an immediate adjustment of the debt level as described above. Eg-
gertson and Krugman (2012), in contrast, find an increase in inflation reducing
the burden of deleveraging due to the fact that the debt-limit is given in real
terms. This difference is due to the difference in the modeling of deleveraging:
In Eggertson and Krugman (2012), the debt level (plus interest payments) is
assumed to adjust within a single period implying that, per construction, it
always is equal to the debt limit. In the current paper, in contrast, the debt
level adjusts endogenously and over time and, as a result, may differ from the
risk-free debt level during the transition process.
Equation (3.27) shows that setting wage taxes as given in (3.25) ensures that
83
Figure 3.5: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with consumption taxes in the
simple model with flexible prices. For consumption and output percentage changes
are given. Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. “Spread” is defined as
the difference between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in percentage points.
For debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent. Solid line: Exogenous
policy. Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
production – and, thus, labor – is held constant as required to obtain efficiency.
Overall, it can be stated that if the Ramsey planner has access to both wage
and consumption taxes, he can completely offset the real effects of a deleveraging
shock such eliminating any welfare losses. This is different in case of a Ramsey
planner relying on one single distortionary tax instrument as is shown in the
following.
Regarding the case of consumption taxes being the only distortionary tax
instrument available – implying that tax revenues will be rebated via lump-sum
transfers – Figure 3.5 gives the effects of a deleveraging shock as considered
before. Here, considering the two efficiency conditions it becomes apparent
that the low-debt-level steady state cannot be efficient. As before, condition
(3.24) determines the optimal level of consumption taxes. Condition (3.25),
however, shows that choosing this optimal level of consumption taxes implies an
inefficiently low level of wage taxes. This, by means of equation (3.27), implies
that production decreases which cannot be efficient. Consequently, the Ramsey
planner refrains from decreasing the consumption tax by 20 percentage points
but chooses a much higher level in the amount of 2.6% on impact and -0.11%
at its minimum after 9 periods. Again considering (after-tax) inflation reactions
shows that the effects can be separated in two steps: On impact, expected higher
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Figure 3.6: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with wage taxes in the simple
model with flexible prices. For consumption and output percentage changes are given.
Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. “Spread” is defined as the difference
between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in percentage points. For debt,
the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent. Solid line: Exogenous policy.
Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
consumption taxes cause borrowers to decrease their bond holdings slightly more
slowly since they expect after-tax inflation – which is just the opposite of the
mechanism described above in case of two tax instruments being available. Ever
since the second period, on the contrary, the expected decrease in consumption
taxes implies just the opposite behavior. Borrowers deleverage somewhat faster
due to an expected decrease in after-tax inflation.
In case of a Ramsey planner having access to wage taxes as single distor-
tionary instrument, condition (3.24) cannot be fulfilled in the low-debt-level
steady state as consumption taxes cannot be adjusted in response to the de-
crease in the risk-free debt level. Figure 3.6 shows that the Ramsey-optimal
policy implies decreasing wage taxes on impact in the amount of about 5.9 per-
centage points and choosing a slightly positive tax rate in the subsequent periods
in the amount of 0.47% at the maximum after 7 periods. Since after-tax infla-
tion is equivalent to pre-tax inflation – which is constant – the mechanism works
through the income-channel. Wage taxes are reduced such that borrowers de-
crease their debt level somewhat faster than in the case of an exogenous policy
meaning that the interest spread increases to a lesser extent.
Utility effects
Table 3.2 gives the lifetime utility losses defined as the percentage share of
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initial steady-state consumption an agent would be willing to give up in order to
be indifferent between the corresponding constant steady-state-level stream of
consumption and labor and the stream of consumption and labor that will result
if a deleveraging shock hits the economy. It can be seen that a Ramsey-optimal
policy with wage and consumption taxes is able to completely offset the effects
of a deleveraging shock. Even if a Ramsey planner has access to only one tax
instrument, the economy-wide utility loss can be reduced noticeably. It can be
observed, however, that this has the drawback of increasing the savers’ losses.
Finally, it can be observed that, in this simple setup, using wage taxes is more
effective than relying on consumption taxes: With wage taxes, the economy-wide
utility loss can be reduced from about 0.46% to 0.38% while with consumption
taxes it still amounts to about 0.44%.
Exogenous τw and τ c τ c τw
Total 0.4611 0.0000 0.4423 0.3780
Savers 7.68 0.00 9.34 14.54
Borrowers 20.49 0.00 19.65 16.80
Table 3.2: Lifetime consumption-equivalent utility losses (in percent) of a deleveraging
shock under an exogenous and different Ramsey-optimal policies in the simple model
with flexible prices.
3.3.2 Sticky Prices and the Zero Lower Bound
After exploring the mechanisms of a deleveraging shock, this section inves-
tigates optimal fiscal policy with sticky prices in the presence of a ZLB on the
nominal interest rate. For this purpose, the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated intermediate goods, θ, is set to be 6 and the price adjustment cost
parameter, κ, is set to be 54 which is equivalent to a degree of Calvo-price-
stickiness of 75%.
Impulse responses
Figure 3.7 shows the effects of a deleveraging shock for the case of a Ramsey
planner having access to wage as well as consumption taxes in comparison to an
exogenous policy for the model with sticky prices and the existence of the ZLB.
The effects under an exogenous policy are very similar to the case of flexible
prices. The main difference consists in the fact that the nominal interest rate
cannot become negative any more but instead remains at the ZLB for 7 periods.
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Figure 3.7: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with wage and consump-
tion taxes in the model with sticky prices and the ZLB. For consumption percentage
changes are given. Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. “Spread” is
defined as the difference between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in percent-
age points. For debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent. Solid line:
Exogenous policy. Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
The Ramsey-optimal reaction, in contrast, differs from the simple example
considered before.34 Now, the Ramsey planner pursues two goals: On the one
hand, the Ramsey planner – as before – tries to eliminate the inefficiency induced
by the rise in the interest spread and seeks to accelerate the deleveraging process.
On the other hand, the Ramsey planner now aims at holding inflation at its
target value to eliminate the inefficiency implied by the wedge between output
and consumption. In contrast to the simple case considered before, the inflation
rate will not necessarily stay at its target value – as was ensured by the inflation-
targeting policy in the simple model without the ZLB – but will deviate from
its target value if the ZLB becomes binding. The Ramsey planner chooses the
optimal mix of consumption and wage taxes such that output increases (instead
of decreasing under an exogenous policy) which prevents inflation from falling
and, at the same time, accelerates the deleveraging process by causing (after-tax)
deflationary tendencies in the initial period. The optimal policy reaction here
34To prevent explosive dynamics of the two tax rates, in this case of both distortionary taxes
being available at the same time, a small tax collection cost is assumed for the wage tax
such that in this case the government budget reads Tt = τ
c
t (sC
s
t + (1 − s)Cbt ) + τwt WtLt −
φτw(τ
w
t − τw,eff ). This value is small enough (φτw = 0.1) to ensure that the results regarding
utility losses are not affected by this assumption.
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Figure 3.8: Period-by-period consumption-equivalent utility losses (in percent) of a
deleveraging shock under the Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and consumption
taxes in the model with sticky prices and the ZLB. Solid line: Exogenous policy.
Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
consists in decreasing consumption taxes if the ZLB is not binding and increasing
consumption taxes while the ZLB binds. The opposite can be observed for the
optimal wage tax. It should be noted that this policy implies staying at the ZLB
for a longer period than under the exogenously given policy.
Figure 3.8 shows that this optimal policy reaction is highly effective in elim-
inating economy-wide utility losses. The total utility loss is reduced from 0.53%
under an exogenous policy to 0.18% at its peak under the Ramsey-optimal pol-
icy. Regarding agent-specific utility effects, the same effects can be observed as
in the simple model: Savers gain during the deleveraging process but feature
a small loss in the long-run while for borrowers the opposite holds true. As
before, this long-run effect is due to a lower level of outstanding debt and, as a
consequence thereof, a lower steady-state level of interest rate payments.
In the cases of a Ramsey planner relying on one distortionary tax instrument
only – as depicted in Figures 3.9 and 3.10 – the mechanism is similar to the case
of two tax instruments being available. Again, the consumption tax is negative
if the ZLB is not binding and positive during the period in which the ZLB binds
(and vice versa for the wage tax). Both optimal policy reactions prevent infla-
tion from falling and, such, reduce the inefficiency wedge between consumption
and output. Furthermore, both policies imply a faster deleveraging process. A
difference consists in the duration of a binding ZLB: with consumption taxes,
the interest rate leaves the ZLB after 10 periods, while with wage taxes the ZLB
binds for 11 periods and with both instrument the ZLB lasts for 15 periods.
Utility effects
Considering lifetime utility losses – as given in Table 3.3 – shows that the
difference between wage and consumption taxes is much smaller than in the
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Figure 3.9: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with consumption taxes in
the model with sticky prices and the ZLB. For consumption percentage changes are
given. Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. “Spread” is defined as the
difference between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in percentage points.
For debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent. Solid line: Exogenous
policy. Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
Figure 3.10: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with wage taxes in the
model with sticky prices and the ZLB. For consumption percentage changes are given.
Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. “Spread” is defined as the difference
between the interest rates of borrowers and savers in percentage points. For debt,
the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dt/Yt) is given in percent. Solid line: Exogenous policy.
Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
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simple model. A Ramsey policy including consumption taxes reduces the total
economy-wide utility loss from 1.0971% to 0.5339% while the optimal policy
using wage taxes implies a utility loss of 0.5370%. The ranking of the two
tax instruments, however, is reversed: with sticky prices and the existence of
the ZLB, consumption taxes are slightly more effective in reducing economy-
wide utility losses than wage taxes. The distributive effects, in contrast, remain
unchanged. Each Ramsey-optimal policy implies larger utility losses for savers
while the utility loss of borrowers is decreased. Remarkably, in this set-up, savers
actually gain from being exposed to a deleveraging shock under the exogenously
given policy.
Exogenous τw and τ c τ c τw
Total 1.0971 0.5205 0.5339 0.5370
Savers -1.69 7.13 6.26 6.12
Borrowers 25.33 20.83 21.29 21.34
Table 3.3: Lifetime consumption-equivalent utility losses (in percent) of a deleveraging
shock under an exogenous and different Ramsey-optimal policies in the model with
sticky prices and the ZLB.
It should be noted that all utility effects considered so far are found to be
agent-specific, meaning that each policy action implies a utility gain for one
group of agents and at the same time a utility loss for the other group of agents.
This would be different in case of a Ramsey planner choosing the level of (utility-
enhancing) government spending in addition to taxes. In this case, there will be
two types of policy actions: actions which have the same utility effect on both
savers and borrowers (via changes in government spending) and actions which
will favor one of the two groups while adversely affecting the other group (via
changes in the interest rates). In the next section, it is examined in which way
this additional feature influences the constrained-optimal fiscal policy reaction
by allowing for endogenous utility-enhancing government spending in addition
to choosing the optimal tax rates.
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3.4 The Role of Government Spending
The model is now extended by utility-enhancing government spending which
is chosen endogenously as one of the fiscal instruments of the Ramsey planner.
Utility is now given by
Uht = Et
∞∑
t=0
(βh)t
{[
1− exp(−zCht )
]− (Lht )1+η
1 + η
}
+ v
(Gt)
1−γ
1− γ
where Gt denotes government spending per capita, v > 0 is a parameter deter-
mining the weight of government spending in utility, and γ > 0 is the respective
elasticity.35 The government budget is now given by
Gt = τ
c
t (sC
s
t + (1− s)Cbt ) + τwt WtLt − Tt (3.32)
and the aggregate resource constraint reads
Yt = sC
s
t + (1− s)Cbt +Gt +
κ
2
(Πt − 1)Yt. (3.33)
The Ramsey policy is defined as a sequence of policies maximizing Et
∑∞
t=0 β
tUt
with
Ut ≡ s˜
[
1− exp(−zCst )−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
]
+(1− s˜)
[
1− exp(−zCbt )−
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
]
+ v
(Gt)
1−γ
1− γ
subject to (3.2), (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13),
(3.15), (3.18), (3.32), and (3.33) with respect to Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Yt, W
s
t , W
b
t ,
MCt, D
b
t , Πt, i
b
t , it, Φt, and Gt as well as one or several of the fiscal instruments
τ ct , τ
w
t , and Tt.
The Social planner’s equilibrium is now given by equations (3.20) to (3.23)
as before but extended by
v(Gt)
−γ =
s˜
s
z exp (−zCst ) . (3.34)
Figure 3.11 shows the effects of a deleveraging shock if lump-sum financed
government spending is the only instrument available to the Ramsey planner in
35For simulation exercises both parameters are set to be 0.5 which implies a government-
spending-to-GDP ratio of 44%.
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Figure 3.11: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with lump-sum-financed
government spending. For consumption percentage changes are given. Interest rates
are measured in percent. For government spending, the government-spending-to-GDP
ratio measured as deviation from steady state in percentage points is plotted. Solid
line: Exogenous policy. Dashed line: Ramsey policy.
comparison to the exogenously given policy.36 Here, the key mechanism behind
the Ramsey planner’s reaction is the increase in government spending boosting
output which prevents inflation from falling. As a consequence, inflation diverts
only slightly from its target value which means that the inefficiency wedge be-
tween consumption and output is diminished to a large extent. Consequently,
output, consumption, and government spending are higher than under an ex-
ogenous policy where the relative increase in consumption is amplified by the
prolonged stay at the ZLB.
Figure 3.12 shows the implied effects of a deleveraging shock for the scenario
with two distortionary taxes being available in addition to government spend-
ing. It can be observed that, on impact, the Ramsey-optimal policy consists in
increasing consumption taxes and reducing wage taxes in combination with in-
creasing government spending. In the long-run, tax rates convert to their initial
values. This behavior reflects the trade-off between accelerating the deleveraging
process, holding inflation constant, and obtaining an optimal level of government
spending. Again, the ZLB binds much longer than under an exogenous policy
featuring a zero nominal interest rate for 17 periods.
To consider utility effects of the different policies for the case with government
spending, Table 3.4 gives lifetime consumption-equivalent utility losses as defined
before. First, it can be seen that with government spending a deleveraging
shock implies much larger utility losses under an exogenous policy. This is due
to the fact that the increase in saver’s consumption implies that the optimal
government spending level increases – as shown by equation (3.34). Under an
exogenous policy, however, government spending is fixed such implying utility
36To allow for a welfare comparison, as explained before, lump-sum taxes are set to ensure
efficiency of the initial steady state in all cases which, now, includes setting government
spending at its efficient level.
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Figure 3.12: Deleveraging under the optimal fiscal policy with consumption and wage
taxes and government spending. For consumption percentage changes are given.
Interest rates and taxes are measured in percent. For government spending, the
government-spending-to-GDP ratio measured as deviation from steady state in per-
centage points is plotted. Solid line: Exogenous policy. Dashed line: Ramsey
policy.
losses during the transition process as well as in the final steady state. Second,
it can be seen that the existence of government spending changes the ranking of
the two distortionary taxes: while in the model without government spending
setting consumption taxes optimally implied smaller utility losses than relying on
wage taxes, in the extended model with government spending the opposite holds
true. Here, the difference between the effectiveness of the two tax instruments
is much more pronounced with wage taxes reducing the total utility loss from
1.48% to 0.79% while with consumption taxes the utility loss still amounts to
1.31%.
Lump-sum taxes No lump-sum taxes
Exog. τ c τw no τ both τ c τw
T 1.4803 0.7866 0.7829 0.7992 0.7440 1.3110 0.7904
S -1.33 8.73 8.70 8.51 13.28 1.40 8.64
B 35.34 30.47 30.45 30.58 28.49 34.10 30.50
Table 3.4: Lifetime consumption-equivalent utility losses (in percent) of a deleveraging
shock under different policies with government spending
Finally, Table 3.5 gives the percentage share of the utility effect evoked by
endogenously choosing the level of government spending in the total utility effect
of applying a Ramsey-optimal instead of an exogenously given policy in the face
of a deleveraging shock. It can be seen that the effect of government spending is
negligible small. Less than 0.9% of the total utility gain of applying a Ramsey-
optimal policy are due to variations in government spending.
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τ c τw
Total 0.2162 0.1434
Savers 0.8946 0.6979
Borrowers 0.8214 0.6135
Table 3.5: Share of government-spending-induced utility gains in total utility effects
of Ramsey-optimal fiscal policies (in percent)
3.5 The Role of Monetary Policy
As outlined before, considering sticky prices via Rotemberg-costs implies
that inflation dynamics state an important inefficiency by enlarging the wedge
between consumption and output and are crucial in determining utility losses
of a deleveraging shock. For this reason, in this section the role of monetary
policy for the effectiveness of optimal fiscal policy is explored more in detail. As
a starting point, Table 3.6 gives economy-wide consumption-equivalent utility
losses of a deleveraging shock under an exogenously given fiscal policy but for
four different cases of monetary policy:37 The case of a simple inflation-targeting
monetary policy under the existence of a ZLB as before and the case of inflation-
targeting without the existence of a ZLB, on the one hand, and a scenario of
monetary policy being set optimally, again with and without the existence of a
ZLB, on the other hand.
Inflation targeting Optimal monetary policy
ZLB no ZLB ZLB no ZLB
No Gt 1.0971 0.4611 0.5451 0.3957
Gt 1.4803 0.6737 0.8006 0.5624
Table 3.6: Total lifetime consumption-equivalent utility losses of a deleveraging shock
under an exogenously given fiscal policy for different monetary policies in the full
model with sticky prices (in percent).
It can be seen that monetary policy being constrained by the ZLB implies
sizable utility losses. While in consequence of a deleveraging shock the economy
as a whole features a utility loss of 0.5624% under an optimal monetary policy
without the existence of a (binding) ZLB, the loss amounts to 0.8006% if the
37A description of the implementation of the different scenarios can be found in Appendix E.
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monetary authority is constrained by the ZLB. Moreover, it can be observed
– as was to be expected – that following an inflation-targeting policy implies
larger utility losses than following an optimal monetary policy.
To examine the difference between applying the optimal fiscal policy in an
inflation-targeting set-up as before and the case of conducting optimal fiscal and
monetary policy at the same time, Table 3.7 gives utility losses for a wide set of
different fiscal polices for the case of conducting optimal monetary policy. Here,
three observations stand out: First, it can be seen that applying the optimal
fiscal policy with wage and consumption taxes as well as government spending
implies reducing the utility loss of a deleveraging shock in the face of the ZLB
from 0.8006% to 0.7379%. This means that conducting optimal fiscal policy in
a situation where the monetary policy is set optimally but constrained by the
ZLB can eliminate 26.32% of the utility loss of being at the ZLB. Second, a
comparison with the results obtained in the last sections shows that applying an
inflation-targeting policy instead of optimal monetary policy need not necessarily
imply utility losses depending on the fiscal instruments available. It can be seen
that in case of a Ramsey planner having access to wage taxes, the utility losses
are independent of the specific monetary policy conducted. Third, it can be seen
that the main results remain otherwise unchanged. Irrespective of the monetary
policy conducted, applying the optimal fiscal policy implies increasing the loss
of savers where the optimal policy reaction implies a prolonged stay at the ZLB.
With Tt With Gt With Gt and Tt
τ c τw both τ c τw τ c τw no τ
T 0.5323 0.5370 0.7379 0.7973 0.7890 0.7844 0.7829 0.7977
S 6.31 6.12 14.51 8.45 8.66 8.79 8.70 8.52
B 21.26 21.34 27.97 30.59 30.49 30.44 30.45 30.56
Table 3.7: Lifetime consumption-equivalent utility losses of a deleveraging shock for
different fiscal policies under optimal monetary policy in the model with sticky prices
and the ZLB (in percent). “With Tt” refers to the model without government spending
but with lump-sum financed distortionary taxes. “With Gt” refers to the model with
government spending but without lump-sum taxes being available while “With Gt
and Tt” relates to the model with government spending where a distortionary tax and
lump-sum taxes are available.
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3.6 Robustness
In this section, the robustness of the results to altering the parametrization
is checked. If the elasticity of the risk premium to the debt level, φ, is set
to larger (smaller) values, the utility losses of a deleveraging shock under an
exogenously given policy as well as under Ramsey-optimal policies are larger
(smaller). Otherwise, the results are robust to variations in φ. Furthermore, the
results are robust to setting the discount factors (βs and βb) to smaller values
but this implies that the ZLB binds for a shorter period since a smaller discount
factor implies starting at a higher nominal interest rate. Varying the weight of
consumption in utility, z, as well as the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, η,
implies utility losses being quantitatively different while all results remain qual-
itatively unchanged. Finally, utility losses decrease with an increasing share of
savers as debt is measured per borrower which means that if debt per borrower
decreases, this has a smaller effect on savers if there are relatively more savers.
For the same reason, a larger share of savers implies a shorter period at the ZLB.
Robustness can be obtained, however, by recalibrating the decrease in debt ad-
equately. The only parameter influencing the results regarding the distributive
effects of Ramsey-optimal policy is the Rotemberg price-adjustment cost param-
eter κ. Here, for low values of κ (κ ≈< 10), applying a Ramsey-optimal policy
instead of an exogenous policy implies reducing savers’ losses while increasing
the losses of borrowers. All other results, however, remain unchanged.
3.7 Conclusions
In the course of this paper, Ramsey-optimal policy reactions to a private debt
deleveraging shock were examined in a closed economy populated by savers and
borrowers in a situation where monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB on
the nominal interest rate. The results show that a deleveraging shock has large
effects on economic variables and implies economy-wide utility losses. Further-
more, monetary policy being constrained by the ZLB implies sizable utility losses
if the economy is hit by a deleveraging shock. Here, applying an optimal fiscal
policy can eliminate roughly one quarter of these utility losses of being at the
ZLB where the optimal policy reaction features a prolonged stay at the ZLB.
Furthermore, conducting a Ramsey-optimal policy implies enlarging the utility
loss of savers. Whether consumption or wage taxes are more effective in reduc-
ing utility losses of a deleveraging shock depends on the presence of government
spending as well as of the specific monetary policy conducted. Moreover, it is
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shown that having government spending as an additional instrument implies only
small welfare gains relative to applying an optimal instead of an exogenous fiscal
policy. Finally, the results indicate that if fiscal policy is set optimally, setting
monetary policy optimally instead of following a simple inflation-targeting pol-
icy need not necessarily imply welfare gains depending on the fiscal instruments
available.
While this paper is an attempt to investigate optimal fiscal policy reactions to
a private debt deleveraging shock in the face of a ZLB on the nominal interest
rate, it would be interesting for further research to expand the model to an
open economy or even monetary-union framework which enables to study the
difficulties of being a small member of a monetary union as well as the gains and
losses of cooperation between countries. Furthermore, the introduction of wage
rigidities may be a realistic feature and especially interesting in the presence
of wage taxes. Finally, while this paper uses a shortcut to model a financial
crisis without explicitly modeling a financial sector, adding a more elaborated
financial sector or taxes on financial activity may provide interesting results.
97
3.8 Appendices
3.8.A Ramsey Problem and Solution
Ramsey problem:
maxEt
∑∞
t=0 β
tUt with β ≡ sβs + (1− s)βb and
Ut ≡ s˜
[
1− exp(−zCst )−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
]
+ (1− s˜)
[
1− exp(−zCbt )−
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
]
subject to
Φ(Dbt ) = 1 + φ exp
(
Dbt
D¯bt
− 1
)
− φ (λ. 1)
exp(−zCst ) = βs exp(−zCst+1)
1 + it
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(λ. 2)
exp(−zCbt ) = βb exp(−zCbt+1)
(1 + it)Φt
Πt+1
[
1−Dbt
Φ
′
t
Φt
]−1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
(λ. 3)
(Lst)
η = zW st exp(−zCst )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
(λ. 4)
(Lbt)
η = zW bt exp(−zCbt )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
(λ. 5)
Yt = (L
s
t)
s(Lbt)
1−s (λ. 6)
W st L
s
t = W
b
t L
b
t (λ. 7)
MCt = W
s
t
(
Lst
Lbt
)1−s
(λ. 8)
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θ(1−MCt)− 1 + κ(Πt − 1)Πt = βκuct+1
uct
(Πt+1 − 1)Πt+1Yt+1
Yt
(λ. 9)
Yt = sC
s
t + (1− s)Cbt +
κ
2
(Πt − 1)2Yt (λ. 10)
Dbt
(1 + it)Φt
− D
b
t−1
Πt
= (1 + τ ct )
[
Cbt − Cst
]
s (λ. 11)
τ ct (sC
s
t + (1− s)Cbt ) + τwt W bt Lbt − φτwτwt = Tt (λ. 12)
Πt = Π¯ if it ≥ 0 (λ. 13)
it = 0 else (λ. 14)
where uct = s exp(−zCst ) + (1− s) exp(−zCbt ).
First order conditions:
z exp(−zCst )s˜− λ2tz exp(−zCst ) + λ2t−1
βs
β
z exp(−zCst )
1 + it−1
Πt
1 + τ ct−1
1 + τ ct
+λ4tz
2W st exp(−zCst )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
+ λ9tβκ(Πt+1 − 1)Πt+1Yt+1
Yt
uct+1
u2ct
zs exp(−zCst )
−λ9t−1κ(Πt − 1)Πt Yt
Yt−1
sz exp(−zCst )
uct−1
− λ10ts+ λ11ts(1 + τ ct )
+λ13tsτ
c
t = 0 (
δΛt
δCst
)
z(1− s˜) exp(−zCbt )− λ3tz exp(−zCbt )
+λ3t−1
βb
β
z exp(−zCbt )
1 + it−1
Πt
1 + τ ct−1
1 + τ ct
[
Φt−1 − φD
b
t−1
D¯bt−1
exp
(
Dbt−1
D¯bt−1
− 1
)]−1
+λ5tz
2W bt exp(−zCbt )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
+λ9tβκ(Πt+1 − 1)Πt+1Yt+1
Yt
uct+1
u2ct
z(1− s) exp(−zCbt )
−λ9t−1κ(Πt − 1)Πt Yt
Yt−1
(1− s)z exp(−zCbt )
uct−1
−λ10t(1− s)− λ11t(1 + τ ct )s+ λ13t(1− s)τ ct = 0 ( δΛtδCbt )
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−s˜(Lst)η + λ4tη(Lst)η−1 − λ6ts
(
Lbt
Lst
)1−s
+ λ7tW
s
t
−λ8t(1− s)W st (Lst)−s(Lbt)s−1 = 0 ( δΛtδLst )
−(1− s˜)(Lbt)η + λ5tη(Lbt)η−1 − λ6t(1− s)
(
Lst
Lbt
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− λ7tW bt
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)
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Solution:
I solve the complete model by using a Newton-type algorithm via Dynare
(by way of using the “simul”-command). This means all equations (equilibrium
conditions (λ. 1) to (λ. 12) plus the Ramsey FOCs plus the restriction on the
monetary policy defined in the following) are given in the model-block of the
mod.file such that using Dynare involves solving all equilibrium equations as
well as the Ramsey FOCs simultaneously.
Monetary policy is restricted by the following feature: The monetary author-
ity follows an inflation-targeting policy if the nominal interest rate is above zero
which means in this case Πt = Π¯ holds while the nominal interest is determined
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by the agents’ decisions. If, on the contrary, the nominal interest rate is at the
zero lower bound, the monetary authority cannot follow an inflation-targeting
strategy but sets it = 0. In this case, the inflation rate has to adjust via the
Euler equations. To implement this issue, I solve the model under perfect fore-
sight meaning all shocks are perfectly anticipated such that the deleveraging
shock is modeled as a deterministic shock. This ensures that the exact solution
to the model can be found via the “simul”-command by taking nonlinearities
into account. Consequently, occasionally binding constraints can easily be imple-
mented e.g. by use of “max”-operators or “if”-commands. More specifically, the
occasionally binding inflation-targeting policy can be implemented by replacing
equation (λ. 13) with
(it ≤ 0)λ13t + (it > 0)(Πt − Π¯) = 0 (3.A.1)
in the model-block of the Dynare mod.-file. The respective FOC with respect
to Πt reads
λ2t−1
βs
β
exp(−zCst )
1 + it−1
Π2t
1 + τ ct−1
1 + τ ct
+λ3t−1
βb
β
exp(−zCbt )
1 + it−1
Π2t
1 + τ ct−1
1 + τ ct
[
Φt−1 − φD
b
t−1
D¯bt−1
exp
(
Dbt−1
D¯bt−1
− 1
)]−1
−λ9tκ(2Πt − 1) + λ9t−1κ uct
uct−1
Yt
Yt−1
(2Πt − 1)
−λ10tκ(Πt − 1)Yt + λ11tD
b
t−1
Π2t
+ λ13t = 0. (3.A.2)
This shows that if it ≤ 0, (3.A. 1) gives λ13t = 0. Consequently, (3.A. 2) gives
the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to Πt without the existence of
an inflation-targeting policy such that Πt can be chosen constrained-optimal.
On the contrary, if it > 0, equation (3.A. 1) determines Πt = Π¯ while not
determining λ13t such that equation (3.A. 2) gives λ13t residually as it is the
only equation including λ13t. Consequently, the inflation rate cannot be chosen
constrained-optimal but is given and fixed at its target value.
Furthermore, applying a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate im-
plies that the complementary slackness condition λ14tit = 0 as well as λ14t ≥ 0
must hold. To implement this feature, instead of using the FOC with respect
to it, the following two equations are added to the model-block in the Dynare
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mod.file:
λ14t = max
(
0,
δΛt
δit
− λ14t
)
and
(it ≤ 0)it + (it > 0)
(
δΛt
δit
− λ14t
)
= 0, (3.A.3)
where
δΛt
δit
= λ2tβ
s exp(−zCst+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
+λ3tβ
b exp(−zCbt+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
Φt − φD
b
t
D¯bt
exp
(
Dbt
D¯bt
− 1
)]−1
+λ11t
Dbt
Φt
1
(1 + it)2
+ λ14t.
The first equation is not needed to solve the Ramsey-optimal equilibrium since
it only determines λ14t which is otherwise not present in the model equations.
3.8.B Social Planner Equilibrium
Lagrangian:
Λt = s˜
[
1− exp (−zCst )−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
]
+ (1− s˜)
[
1− exp (−tCbt )− (Lbt)1+η1 + η
]
+λ1t
[
Yt − (Lst)s
(
Lbt
)1−s]
+ λ2t
[
Yt − sCst − (1− s)Cbt −
κ
2
(Πt − 1)2Yt
]
w.r.t. Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Yt, Πt
First order conditions:
δΛt
δCst
: s˜ z exp(−zCst ) = s λ2t (3.B.1)
δΛt
δCbt
: (1− s˜) z exp(−zCbt ) = (1− s) λ2t (3.B.2)
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δΛt
δLst
: −s˜(Lst)η = λ1ts
(
Lbt
Lst
)1−s
(3.B.3)
δΛt
δLbt
: −(1− s˜)(Lbt)η = λ1t(1− s)
(
Lst
Lbt
)s
(3.B.4)
δΛt
δYt
: λ1t + λ2t
(
1− κ
2
(Πt − 1)2
)
= 0 (3.B.5)
δΛt
δΠt
: −λ2tκ(Πt − 1)Yt = 0. (3.B.6)
Solution:
For any solution with Yt > 0, equation (3.B. 6) requires Πt = 1 (λ2t = 0
would imply that there is no solution to (3.B.1)).
Combining equations (3.B.1) and (3.B.2) delivers
Cst = C
b
t − ln
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
)
1
z
(3.B.7)
and combining equations (3.B.3) with (3.B.4) gives
Lst = L
b
t
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
) 1
1+η
. (3.B.8)
Rearranging equation (3.B.3) and plugging in (3.B.5) and (3.B.2) delivers
(
Lbt
)η
= z exp(−zCbt )
(
s
s˜
1− s˜
1− s
) s
1+η (
1− κ
2
(Πt − 1)2
)
. (3.B.9)
Using Πt = 1 and combining the production function with the resource con-
straint gives
(Lst)
s(Lbt)
1−s = sCst + (1− s)Cbt +Gt. (3.B.10)
Consequently, the Social planner’s equilibrium is defined by the set of equations
(3.B. 7), (3.B. 8), (3.B. 9), and (3.B. 10) defining Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , and L
b
t as well as
Πt = 1 and Yt = (L
s
t)
s(Lbt)
1−s.
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3.8.C Efficiency of the Exogenous Policy Equilibrium
The exogenous policy equilibrium can be described by the following set of equa-
tions defining Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , W
s
t , W
b
t , Πt, it, and D
b
t :
exp(−zCst ) = βsEt
{
exp(−zCst+1)(1 + it)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
}
(3.C.1)
exp(−zCbt ) = βbEt
{
exp(−zCbt+1)
1 + ibt
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
1−Dbt
Φ
′
t
Φt
]−1}
(3.C.2)
(Lst)
η = W st z exp(−zCst )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
(3.C.3)
(Lbt)
η = W bt z exp(−zCbt )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
(3.C.4)
LstW
s
t = L
b
tW
b
t (3.C.5)
sCst + (1− s)Cbt = (Lst)s(Lbt)1−s
[
1− κ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
(3.C.6)
Dbt
1 + ibt
− D
b
t−1
Πt
= (1 + τ ct )
[
Cbt − (Lst)s(Lbt)1−s
(
1− κ
2
(Πt − 1)2
)]
(3.C.7)
βκ
uct+1
uct
(Πt+1 − 1) Πt+1 (L
s
t+1)
s(Lbt+1)
1−s
(Lst)
s(Lbt)
1−s
= θ
(
1−W st
(
Lst
Lbt
)1−s)
− 1 + κ(Πt − 1)Πt (3.C.8)
together with a monetary policy specification and given the tax instruments τwt
and τ ct as well as the definition of the interest spread (3.2).
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Combining equations (3.C.6) with (3.C.7) delivers
Dbt
1 + ibt
− D
b
t−1
Πt
= (1 + τ ct )
[
Cbt − sCst − (1− s)Cbt
]
⇔ Cst = Cbt −
Dbt
1+ibt
− Dbt−1
Πt
s(1 + τ ct )
. (3.C.9)
Comparing (3.C. 9) with the Social planner’s conditions (3.B. 7) and Πt = 1
shows that efficiency of the exogenous policy equilibrium requires
Dbt
1+ibt
−Dbt−1
s(1 + τ ct )
= ln
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
)
1
z
⇔ τ ct = z
Dbt
1+ibt
−Dbt−1
s ln
(
1−s˜
1−s
s
s˜
) − 1. (3.C.10)
Moreover, equations (3.B.7) to (3.B.10) show that the efficient allocation of real
variables is independent of the deleveraging shock and, thus, constant over time.
Efficiency of the exogenous policy allocation, as a consequence, requires that the
Euler equations (3.C.1) and (3.C.2) become
1 = βs
1 + it
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
and
1 = βb
1 + ibt
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
1−Dbt
Φ
′
t
Φt
]−1
.
Combining both equations gives
Φt
(
1−Dbt
Φ
′
t
Φt
)−1
=
βs
βb
.
This shows that – recalling that βb is calibrated to ensure βs/βb = 1/(1− φ) –
Dbt = D¯
b
t must hold implying Φt = 1 and Φ
′
t = φ/D¯
b
t . Consequently, the debt
level must be equal to the risk-free debt level in each period to ensure efficiency
of the exogenous policy equilibrium. Using this finding together with the Social
planner’s condition Πt = 1, the optimal rule for consumption taxes (3.C.10) can
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be written as
1 + τ ct =
βsD¯bt
D¯bt−1
1+τct−1
+ s
z
ln
(
1−s˜
1−s
s
s˜
) . (3.C.11)
Plugging in equations (3.C.3) and (3.C.4) into (3.C.5) gives
(Lst)
1+η exp(zCst ) = (L
b
t)
1+η exp(zCbt ) (3.C.12)
which, together with (3.C.9), can be written as
(
Lst
Lbt
)1+η
= exp
z Dbt1+ibt−1 − D
b
t−1
Πt
s(1 + τ ct )
 . (3.C.13)
This shows that if the efficiency condition (3.C. 11) holds, equation (3.C. 13)
delivers the efficient allocation given in (3.B.8):
Lst = L
b
t
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
) 1
1+η
. (3.C.14)
Finally, to obtain the optimal rule for the wage tax, using the efficiency condition
Πt = 1 to replace Πt in equation (3.C.8), W
s
t evolves as
W st =
θ − 1
θ
(
Lbt
Lst
)1−s
which means equation (3.C.5) gives W bt as
W bt =
θ − 1
θ
(
Lbt
Lst
)−s
.
Plugging in this expression for W bt into (3.C.4) delivers
θ − 1
θ
(
Lst
Lbt
)s
= (Lbt)
η 1
z
exp(zCbt )
1 + τ ct
1− τwt
. (3.C.15)
Combining equation (3.C.14) with (3.C.15) then delivers
θ − 1
θ
(Lbt)
−s(Lbt)
s
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
) s
1+η
= (Lbt)
η 1
z
exp(zCbt )
1 + τ ct
1− τwt
⇔ (Lbt)η =
θ − 1
θ
(
1− s˜
1− s
s
s˜
) s
1+η
z exp(−zCbt )
1− τwt
1 + τ ct
.
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Comparing this equation with the efficient allocation (3.B.9) shows that
τwt = 1−
θ
θ − 1(1 + τ
c
t ) (3.C.16)
must hold. Overall, tax rates must be set to follow (3.C.11) and (3.C.16) and
Πt = 1 must hold to ensure efficiency of the exogenous policy equilibrium.
3.8.D Utility Measures
Period-by-period utility losses for the economy as a whole (ξt) are defined such
that
U
(
Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t
)
= U
(
(1− ξt)Csss, (1− ξt)Cbss, Lsss, Lbss
)
⇔ s˜
(
[1− exp(−zCst )]−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− s˜)
([
1− exp(−zCbt )
]− (Lbt)1+η
1 + η
)
= s˜
(
[1− exp(−z(1− ξt)Csss)]−
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
)
+(1− s˜)
([
1− exp(−z(1− ξt)Cbss)
]− (Lbss)1+η
1 + η
)
holds, where Xt denotes the value of the respective variable in period t while
Xss denotes the respective steady-state value. Utility losses for savers (ξ
s
t ) are
defined such that
U (Cst , L
s
t) = U ((1− ξst )Csss, Lsss)
⇔ [1− exp(−zCst )]−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
= [1− exp(−z(1− ξst )Csss)]−
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
applies and for borrowers, the period-by-period utility loss (ξbt ) is defined such
that
U
(
Cbt , L
b
t
)
= U
(
(1− ξbt )Cbss, Lbss
)
⇔ [1− exp(−zCbt )]− (Lbt)1+η1 + η = [1− exp(−z(1− ξbt )Cbss)]− (Lbss)1+η1 + η
is fulfilled.
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Lifetime utility losses are defined as ξ, ξs, and ξb such that
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtUt = s˜
(
[1− exp(−z(1− ξ)Csss)]−
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
)
+(1− s˜)
([
1− exp(−z(1− ξ)Cbss)
]− (Lsss)1+η
1 + η
)
+
∞∑
t=1
βtUss,
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
[1− exp(−zCst )]−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
= [1− exp(−z(1− ξs)Csss)]−
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
+
∞∑
t=1
βtU sss,
and
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
([
1− exp(−zCbt )
]− (Lbt)1+η
1 + η
)
=
[
1− exp(−z(1− ξb)Cbss)
]− (Lbss)1+η
1 + η
+
∞∑
t=1
βtU sss
are fulfilled where
Ut = s˜
(
[1− exp(−zCst )]−
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− s˜)
([
1− exp(−zCbt )
]− (Lbt)1+η
1 + η
)
.
3.8.E Optimal Monetary Policy
With respect to the Ramsey problem defined in Appendix A, the different mon-
etary policy scenarios can be implemented by replacing equations (3.A.1), (3.A.
2), and (3.A.3) in the Dynare mod-file with the following set of equations:
• Inflation targeting without the ZLB:
Πt = Π¯
λ14t = 0
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−λ2tβs exp(−zCst+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
− λ11tD
b
t
Φt
1
(1 + it)2
−λ3tβb exp(−zCbt+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
Φt − φD
b
t
D¯bt
exp
(
Dbt
D¯bt
− 1
)]−1
• Optimal monetary policy without the ZLB:
λ13t = 0
λ14t = 0
−λ2tβs exp(−zCst+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
− λ11tD
b
t
Φt
1
(1 + it)2
−λ3tβb exp(−zCbt+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
Φt − φD
b
t
D¯bt
exp
(
Dbt
D¯bt
− 1
)]−1
• Optimal monetary policy under the existence of the ZLB:
λ13t = 0
λ14t = max
(
0,
δΛt
δit
− λ14t
)
(it ≤ 0)it + (it > 0)
(
δΛt
δit
− λ14t
)
= 0
where
δΛt
δit
= λ2tβ
s exp(−zCst+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
+λ3tβ
b exp(−zCbt+1)
1
Πt+1
1 + τ ct
1 + τ ct+1
[
Φt − φD
b
t
D¯bt
exp
(
Dbt
D¯bt
− 1
)]−1
+λ11t
Dbt
Φt
1
(1 + it)2
+ λ14t
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4. Optimal Fiscal Policy with
Heterogeneous Agents: The
Role of Nominal Rigidities and
the Social Welfare Function
4.1 Introduction
In almost all advanced countries, distributional issues seem to be quite an as
important goal for policy makers as pursuing economy-wide welfare maximiza-
tion. In dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature, however,
most models are based on the assumption of a representative agent such com-
pletely excluding distributive effects. In this framework, obviously, there is no
need for discussing an appropriate social welfare function since maximizing to-
tal welfare is equivalent to maximizing individual welfare. But even in models
including heterogeneous agents, optimal fiscal policy is generally modeled from
a utilitarian perspective meaning a Ramsey planner maximizes economy-wide
welfare defined by the sum of individual utilities. With heterogeneous agents
this does not coincide with maximizing utility of an individual agent. Focusing
on welfare-maximizing policies alone may cover important distributional effects.
And in this context, the question of choosing a social welfare function arises
where the possible choices range from applying a utilitarian concept of maxi-
mizing the sum of individual utilities to following the Rawlsian proposition of
maximizing the utility of the poorest agent only. While recent DSGE literature
excessively explores optimal policy measures during financial crises, distribu-
tional matters of these policy reactions have rarely been investigated and the
possibility of choosing any other social welfare function than a purely utilitarian
definition is all but neglected.
This paper builds on the literature on (constrained-) optimal fiscal policy
reactions to financial shocks but explores the distributional effects as well as
their determinants in a model with patient and impatient households where an
interest spread shock occurs. The focus, here, it twofold: On the one hand,
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the effectiveness of optimal wage income taxation versus the effectiveness of
interest income taxation is considered and welfare gains from being able to use
different tax rates on both types of income are computed. On the other hand,
the different effects of these tax measures on the disparity between groups are
considered by investigating which group gains and which looses from applying a
Ramsey-optimal policy. Within this context, the influence of the degree of price
as well as wage rigidity is investigated. Finally, while the main part of the paper
follows the common utilitarian assumption of the social welfare function being
the sum of individual utilities, I compare the results to the case of a Ramsey
planner using a social welfare concept in the spirit of Rawls where the weight
the planner puts on the utility of one of the two groups of agents is the higher
the lower their respective welfare level.
The present paper is related to existing literature in several aspects. To
begin with, there is a literature exploring the distributional issues of optimal
capital taxation under idiosyncratic risk as for example Evans (2014), Shourideh
(2012), and Panousi and Reis (2014). Each of them focuses on capital taxation
and does not explore the determinants of the distributional effects. Dyrda and
Pedroni (2017) explore welfare effects of a Ramsey-optimal policy consisting in
choosing government debt and income taxes in a real incomplete market economy
where heterogeneity evolves either by differences in productivity or in the initial
wealth distribution. They calibrate the model to US data and find that changing
fiscal policy to follow a Ramsey-optimal policy would decrease inequality in the
US relative to the current policy. The present paper is closely related to their
paper as it focuses on distributional effects and regards heterogeneous agents but
differs in various ways as it features a more elaborated fiscal sector, explicitly
investigates the effect of nominal rigidities, and explores fiscal policy reactions
following a spread shock in contrast to Dyrda and Pedroni (2017) exploring the
shift from non-optimal to optimal policy without the occurrence of additional
shocks. In addition, the present paper builds on Ivens (2018b) who explores
optimal fiscal policy reactions to a private debt deleveraging shock in a model
with savers and borrowers. It differs, however, as it incorporates interest income
taxes and explicitly regards the importance of wage and price rigidities while
Ivens (2018b) focuses on the presence of a ZLB in a model with flexible wages
where the only nominal rigidity evolves by the presence of Rotemberg-type price
adjustment costs. Beyond that, the present paper extends the analysis to the
case of a Ramsey planner maximizing a Rawlsian social welfare function.
Moreover, the current paper is related to the small strand of literature stress-
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ing the role of price rigidity for optimal fiscal policy. Siu (2004) computes
optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a cash-in-advance model and finds that
the presence of sticky prices has substantial influence on the optimal income
tax rate. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006a) explore optimal policy in a closed
economy with price and wage rigidity and find price stickiness to be the most
important distortion influencing policy making. Furthermore, Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) compute optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a closed econ-
omy with money and state that under a specific calibration of the degree of
price stickiness policy makers find it more important to obtain price stability
than to smooth income taxes. None of these papers, though, does allow for
heterogeneous agents.
Finally, there is a very limited number of papers regarding the possibility of
departing from the utilitarian concept of computing (constrained-) optimal pol-
icy. Areosa et al. (2017) compute optimal monetary policy by using a Rawlsian
social welfare function – meaning weighting the utility of one group of agents
only – in a textbook New-Keynesian model. They find that the inflation and in-
terest rate differences between the two scenarios of using the Rawlsian versus the
utilitarian social welfare function crucially depend on the kind of shock regarded.
While in case of a monetary shock, the optimal response does not significantly
depend on the social welfare function applied, there are huge differences in case
of a fiscal shock. Swarbick (2012) explores optimal fiscal policy in a model with
rule-of-thumb agents and investigates the effect of setting different weights to
the utilities of the two groups of agents. The planner’s weights are, however,
exogenously chosen and, in contrast to the present paper, do not depend on the
agents’ utility levels.
The current paper contributes to this literature in the following ways: In the
first part, regarding the effectiveness of two types of income taxes, it is shown
that taxing interest income is a more effective measure in reducing spread shock
induced welfare losses than wage taxation. Here, the welfare gains from be-
ing able to levy different tax rates on the two types of income are sizable. In
the second part, relating to distributional effects, it is found that applying a
Ramsey-optimal policy based on the common utilitarian social welfare function
may increase the disparity between groups depending on the income tax base
used. It is shown that these distributive effects crucially depend on the rela-
tion between the degrees of wage and price rigidity. While a higher degree of
wage stickiness than of price stickiness implies decreasing the disparity between
groups, prices being sufficiently more sticky than wages involves enlarging the
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wedge between savers and borrowers. Finally, the results are compared to the
case of a Ramsey planner maximizing a Rawlsian social welfare function where
the weight the planner sets on individual utilities is increasing with a decreas-
ing relative utility level. It is shown that while in this case disparities between
groups can completely be eliminated, this takes place at the cost of a huge de-
crease in the savers’ welfare as well as at the cost of noticeably more fluctuations
in real variables and tax rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
the model is described and the constrained-optimal fiscal policy is obtained.
Section 4.3 contains the simulation of a spread shock for different policies and the
respective results regarding effectiveness and distributional effects. In Section
4.4, the role of price and wage rigidity is investigated. Section 4.5 contains the
exploration of an alternative social welfare measure while a robustness analysis
can be found in Section 4.6. Section 4.7. concludes.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Model Description
I consider a closed economy featuring two types of households, namely pa-
tient and impatient households, both having the same utility function deriving
utility from consumption, leisure, and government spending but differing in their
discount factors. Consequently, in equilibrium, patient households will be savers
while impatient households will be borrowers. Prices and wages are set on a stag-
gered basis following Calvo. The government spends on the consumption good
and levies two types of income taxes: labor income and interest income taxes.
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate following a simple Taylor
rule.
Households
Households maximize the following increasing and concave utility function
which is twice continuously differentiable
Uht = Et
∞∑
t=0
(
βh
)t{(Cht )1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lht )
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
}
. (4.1)
Here h = s, b denotes patient (savers) and impatient households (borrowers),
respectively, where p is the share of patient households while impatient house-
holds are of mass 1− p. 0 < βh < 1 holds and Cht and Lht are consumption and
labor per saver or borrower, respectively. Gt denotes real per capita government
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spending. η > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ρ > 0
as well as γ > 0 holds, and ν > 0 gives the weight of government spending in
utility.
Assets markets are incomplete in that borrowers have to pay a risk premium
on real debt Dbt such that the interest rate borrowers have to pay is given by
1 + ibt = (1 + it)ϑt exp
(
κ(Dbt − D¯)
)
. (4.2)
Here, it is the savers’ nominal interest rate, κ is a scaling factor determining the
extent to which the interest spread reacts to changes in the debt level, and D¯ is
the steady-state level of debt. ϑt denotes an interest spread shock which follows
the shock process
ϑt = ρ
Dϑt−1 + 1− ρD + Dt (4.3)
where 0 < ρD < 1 holds and Dt is an i.i.d. shock.
The budget constraint for savers can be written in real terms as
(1 + (1− τ it )it−1)
Bst−1
Πt
+ (1− τwt )W st Lst = Bst + Cst + T st −RPt −Divt (4.4)
with
Divt = Yt − pW st Lst − (1− p)W bt Lbt (4.5)
denoting per capita dividends from firms and
RPt = p(i
b
t−1 − it−1)
Bst−1
Πt
denoting the per-capita risk premium payments assumed to be charged by a
financial intermediary which is owned by savers and borrowers. Πt is inflation,
Yt is output, and T
s
t and B
s
t denote lump-sum taxes and bond holdings per saver,
respectively. τwt indicates wage taxes and τ
i
t denotes taxes on interest income.
Maximizing (4.1) subject to (4.4) delivers the following Euler equation for
savers:38
(Cst )
−ρ = βsEt
{
(Cst+1)
−ρ(1 + (1− τ it+1)it)
1
Πt+1
}
. (4.6)
38It is assumed that agents do not internalize the effects of their choice on dividend payments
and on payments from the risk premium. Borrowers do, however, internalize the effect of
their choice on the interest spread. While this modeling assumption is chosen to avoid an
additional distortion evoked by the fact that borrowers do not internalize the effect on the
interest spread which should not be the focus of the analysis conducted here, the results
remain qualitatively the same without assuming internalization.
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For borrowers, the per borrower budget constraint reads
Dbt + (1− τwt )W bt Lbt = Cbt +
(1 + ibt−1)D
b
t−1
Πt
+ T bt −Divt −RPt − T eff, (4.7)
where T bt denotes lump-sum taxes per borrower. T
eff is a constant subsidy to
borrowers set to guarantee steady-state efficiency of the decentralized steady
state following Ferrero et al. (2018) as is explained in the next section. The
Euler equation for borrowers is given by
(Cbt )
−ρ = βbEt
{
(Cbt+1)
−ρ1 + i
b
t
Πt+1
(1 + κDbt )
}
. (4.8)
Labor supply
Households are assumed to supply differentiated labor services Lht (i) at wage
W ht (i) with h ∈ {s, b} to a group-specific labor agency. There is one labor agency
for each group of households – savers and borrowers – combining differentiated
labor inputs to a homogenous group-specific aggregate subject to the production
functions
Lst =
[
1
p
∫ p
0
Lst(i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
(4.9)
in case of the savers’ labor agency and
Lbt =
[
1
1− p
∫ 1−p
1
Lbt(i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
(4.10)
in case of the borrowers’ labor agency. Here, Lst(i) and L
b
t(i) denote labor sup-
plied by individual i belonging to the group of savers or borrowers, respectively.
For the savers’ labor agency, taking wages as given, cost minimization implies
min
Lst (i)
W st L
s
t =
∫ p
0
1
p
W st (i)L
s
t(i) di
such that the first order condition with respect to labor reads
W st
[
1
p
∫ p
0
Lst(i)
σ−1
σ di
] 1
σ−1
(Lst(i))
− 1
σ = W st (i).
Rearranging delivers
Lst(i) = L
s
t
(
W st (i)
W st
)−σ
. (4.11)
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The zero profit condition implies that
W st L
s
t =
1
p
∫ p
0
W st (i)L
s
t(i) di (4.12)
which can be rearranged by substituting Lst(i) with (4.11) to deliver
W st =
[∫ p
0
(W st (i))
1−σ di
] 1
1−σ
. (4.13)
Each household can adjust its wage in any given period with probability (1−ξw).
In case of adjustment, it chooses W˜ st (i). Consequently, equation (4.13) delivers
W st =
[
ξw
(
W st−1
)1−σ
+ (1− ξw)
(
W˜ st (i)
)1−σ] 11−σ
(4.14)
which can be rearranged to read
W˜ st (i)
W st
=
1− ξw
(
W st
W st−1
)σ−1
1− ξw

1
1−σ
. (4.15)
This shows that in case of adjustment each household belonging to the group of
savers chooses the same wage such that the index i can be dropped. Equivalently,
for borrowers, the following equations can be derived:
Lbt(i) = L
b
t
(
W bt (i)
W bt
)−σ
(4.16)
and
W˜ bt (i)
W bt
=
1− ξw
(
W bt
W bt−1
)σ−1
1− ξw

1
1−σ
. (4.17)
Wage setting
In setting its nominal wage W˜ st (i), each saver maximizes
Et
∞∑
c=0
(βsξw)
c
{
(1− τwt+c)W˜ st (i)Lst+c(i)
(
Cst+c(i)
)−ρ
Pt+c
−
(
Lst+c(i)
)1+η
1 + η
}
.
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The first order condition with respect to W˜ st (i) reads
∞∑
c=0
(βsξw)
c
{
(1− σ)(1− τwt+c)
(
W˜ st (i)
)−σ
Lst+c
(
W st+c
)σ (Cst+c)−ρ
Pt+c
}
+
∞∑
c=0
(βsξw)
c
{
σ
(
W˜ st (i)
)−σ−1
Lst+c
(
W st+c
)σ (
Lst+c(i)
)η}
= 0.
Rearranging delivers
(
W˜ st (i)
W st
)1+ση
=
σ
σ−1Et
∑∞
c=0 (β
sξw)
c (Lst+c)1+η (W st+cW st )σ(1+η)
Et
∑∞
c=0 (β
sξw)
c Lst+c (C
s
t+c)
−ρ (1−τwt+c)W st+c
Pt+c
(
W st+c
W st
)σ−1 . (4.18)
Combining (4.18) with (4.15) and using a recursive formulation, the wage setting
equations for savers can be written as
gs1t
gs2t
=
1− ξw
(
W st−1
W st
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
(4.19)
gs1t =
σ
σ − 1 (L
s
t)
1+η + βsξwEt
{(
W st+1
W st
)σ(1+η)
gs1 t+1
}
(4.20)
gs2t = (C
s
t )
−ρ (1− τwt )W st Lst + βsξwEt
{(
W st+1
W st
)σ−1
gs2 t+1
}
. (4.21)
Equivalently, the wage setting equations for borrowers can be obtained to read
gb1t
gb2t
=
1− ξw
(
W bt−1
W bt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
(4.22)
gb1t =
σ
σ − 1
(
Lbt
)1+η
+ βbξwEt
{(
W bt+1
W bt
)σ(1+η)
gb1 t+1
}
(4.23)
gb2t =
(
Cbt
)−ρ
(1− τwt )W bt Lbt + βbξwEt
{(
W bt+1
W bt
)σ−1
gb2 t+1
}
. (4.24)
Production
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods
producers indexed by j and a representative final goods producer operating
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under perfect competition. The final goods producer combines differentiated
intermediate goods yt(j) purchased from firms to a homogeneous aggregate good
subject to the technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(j)
σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
, (4.25)
with σ > 1 denoting the constant elasticity of substitution between differen-
tiated goods and Yt being per capita aggregate output. The associated cost
minimization problem is given by
min
yt(j)
PtYt ≡
∫ 1
0
pt(j)yt(j)dj
subject to the technology (4.25) such that the per capita demand for an indi-
vidual good of firm j is
yt(j) =
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
Yt. (4.26)
Intermediate goods firms produce output using labor supplied by the two
labor agencies subject to the production function
yt(j) = pL
s
t(j) + (1− p)Lbt(j). (4.27)
They choose their labor inputs to minimize costs by taking wages as given.
Consequently, cost minimization implies
min
Lst ,L
b
t
WtLt ≡ pW st Lst + (1− p)W bt Lbt
s.t. pLst + (1− p)Lbt = const.
The first order conditions with respect to Lst and L
b
t can be rearranged to read
W st = W
b
t ≡ Wt (4.28)
such that equations (4.15) and (4.17) can be rewritten to give
W˜t(i)
Wt
=
1− ξw
(
Wt
Wt−1
)σ−1
1− ξw

1
1−σ
. (4.29)
This means, on an aggregate level, savers and borrowers obtain the same wage.
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Prices are set on a staggered basis following Calvo, where in each period a
fraction (1− ξ) of firms is able to reset its prices facing the optimal price setting
problem
max
p˜t(j)
Et
∞∑
c=0
(ξpβ)
c Qt+c
Qt
[p˜t(j)−Wt+c] yt+c(j)
subject to the demand for the specific good (4.26), where β ≡ pβs + (1 − p)βb
and
Qt+c ≡ p(Cst+c)−ρ + (1− p)(Cbt+c)−ρ.
After some manipulations, the first order condition can be written as
p˜t(j)
Pt
=
σ
σ − 1
Et
∑∞
c=0(ξβ)
cQt+c
Wt+c
Pt+c
Yt+c
(
Pt+c
Pt
)σ
Et
∑∞
c=0(ξβ)
cQt+cYt+c
(
Pt+c
Pt
)σ−1 . (4.30)
The assumption of zero profits for the final goods producer gives the aggregate
price index as
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(j)
1−σdj
] 1
1−σ
,
which can be written, due to the assumption of staggered price setting, as
Pt =
[
ξP 1−σt−1 + (1− ξ)p˜t(j)1−σ
] 1
1−σ .
Rearranging delivers the following relationship between the optimal relative reset
price and the inflation rate
p˜t(j)
Pt
=
(
1− ξΠ1−σt
1− ξ
) 1
1−σ
, (4.31)
with Πt = Pt/Pt−1. Combining the first order conditions of firms (4.30) with
equation (4.31) and using a recursive formulation following Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006), the price Philips curve can be expressed as
f1t
f2t
=
(
1− ξpΠσ−1t
1− ξp
) 1
1−σ
, (4.32)
f1t =
σ
σ − 1
[
p(Cst )
−ρ + (1− p)(Cbt )−ρ
]
YtWt + βξpEt
{
Πσt+1f1t+1
}
, (4.33)
f2t =
[
p(Cst )
−ρ + (1− p)(Cbt )−ρ
]
Yt + βξpEt
{
Πσ−1t+1 f2t+1
}
. (4.34)
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Monetary policy
There is a central bank setting the nominal interest rate following a simple
Taylor rule such that
1 + it = Π
µ
t (1 + i¯) (4.35)
where i¯ is the steady-state value of the interest rate of savers and µ > 1 is a
policy parameter determining the extent to which the central bank reacts to
changes in inflation.
Government
The government spends on the consumption good, levies two types of income
taxes, namely wage taxes and interest taxes, and (in some specifications) has
access to lump-sum taxes such that the government budget reads
Gt + (1− p)T eff = τwt Wt(pLst + (1− p)Lbt) + τ it
Dbt−1
Πt
(1− p)it−1 + Tt (4.36)
where per-capita lump-sum taxes are the same for both savers and borrowers
such that
Tt ≡ T st = T bt . (4.37)
Aggregation and Equilibrium
By regarding the production side, the unweighted integral of per capita out-
put can be written as∫ 1
0
yt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
pLst(j) + (1− p)Lbt(j)dj.
Alternatively, by using the demand function (4.26), the integral of per capita
output can be expressed as∫ 1
0
yt(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
Ytdj ≡ ∆tYt,
where
∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
dj.
Combining both expressions delivers the aggregate production function
Yt∆t = pL
s
t + (1− p)Lbt . (4.38)
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), the index of price dispersion can be
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rewritten as
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−σ
dj
= (1− ξp)
∞∑
i=c
(ξp)
i
(
p˜t−i(j)
Pt
)−σ
= (1− ξp)
(
p˜t(j)
Pt
)−σ
+ ξp (Πt)
σ ∆t−1,
which, by use of (4.31), can be expressed as
∆t = (1− ξp)
(
1− ξpΠσ−1t
1− ξp
) σ
σ−1
+ ξpΠ
σ
t ∆t−1. (4.39)
Furthermore, the resource constraint for the consumption good gives
Yt = pC
s
t + (1− p)Cbt +Gt (4.40)
and equilibrium in the asset market requires
pBst = (1− p)Dbt . (4.41)
Finally, by combining the budget constraint of borrowers, (4.7), with equa-
tions (4.5), (4.36), (4.37), and (4.41), the evolution of debt can be expressed
as
Dbt −
Dbt−1
Πt
[
(1 + it−1) + p(ibt−1 − it−1)− (1− p)τ it it−1
]
= p [(Cbt − Cst ) + (1− τwt )Wt(Lst − Lbt)− T eff].
(4.42)
An exogenous policy equilibrium of the model is defined by time-paths of
the 18 variables Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Gt, Yt, Wt, D
b
t , Πt, i
b
t , it, ∆t, f1t, f2t, g
s
1t, g
s
2t,
gb1t, g
b
2t determined by the set of equations given by (4.2), (4.6), (4.8), (4.19),
(4.20), (4.21), (4.22), (4.23), (4.24), (4.32), (4.33), (4.34), (4.35), (4.36), (4.38),
(4.39), (4.40), and (4.42) given the fiscal instruments τwt , τ
i
t , and Tt as well as
the interest spread shock process (4.3).
4.2.2 Ramsey Planner and Efficiency
A constrained-optimal policy is defined as a Ramsey planner maximizing the
discounted weighted sum of borrowers’ and savers’ utilities subject to the private
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sector’s behavior which means he maximizes Et
∑∞
t=0 β
tUt with
Ut = p
(
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− p)
(
(Cbt )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ (4.43)
subject to (4.2), (4.6), (4.8), (4.19), (4.20), (4.21), (4.22), (4.23), (4.24), (4.32),
(4.33), (4.34), (4.35), (4.36), (4.38), (4.39), (4.40), and (4.42) with respect to
Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Gt, Yt, Wt, D
b
t , Πt, i
b
t , ∆t, f1t, f2t, g
s
1t, g
s
2t, g
b
1t, g
b
2t as well as one
or several of the fiscal instruments τwt , τ
i
t , and Tt where it is assumed that the
weight the Ramsey planner puts on the utility of savers is equal to the share of
savers.39
The Social planner chooses Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , and Gt to maximize Et
∑∞
t=0 β
tUt
where Ut is given by (4.43) subject to
pCst + (1− p)Cbt +Gt = pLst + (1− p)Lbt .
Rearranging gives the Social planner’s (efficient) equilibrium as
Lb,eff =
(
1 + (1/v)−
1
γ
) ρ
η+ρ
(4.44)
Cb,eff =
(
1 + (1/v)−
1
γ
) −η
η+ρ
(4.45)
Geff = (1/v)−
1
γ
(
1 + (1/v)−
1
γ
) −ρη
γ(η+ρ)
(4.46)
Ls,eff = Lb,eff (4.47)(
Ls,eff
)η
=
(
Cs,eff
)−ρ
. (4.48)
The Ramsey planner’s problem will be solved from a timeless perspective
following Woodford (2003) which means that a welfare comparison between dif-
ferent policies requires starting in the efficient steady state. Any other starting
point would imply that the government has an incentive to deviate from its
initial policy which would not be compatible with the concept of the “timeless
perspective”.
The Ramsey allocation, however, generally will not coincide with the effi-
39As the complexity of the model rules out the possibility of formulating the Ramsey problem
via the primal form, I solve the problem by regarding a Ramsey planner choosing both
allocation and policy variables. A detailed description of the Ramsey planner’s equilibrium
as well as of the solution method can be found in Appendix A.
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cient allocation for the following reasons: For one thing, the model features two
sources of nominal rigidities, namely price and wage stickiness. For another
thing, asset markets are assumed to be incomplete. While the Ramsey planner
can eliminate the inefficiency induced by price and wage dispersion – at least if
lump-sum taxation and wage taxes are available – he cannot completely offset
the inefficiency evoked by the incomplete financial markets as he cannot transfer
funds from savers to borrowers but is constrained by the households’ behavior.
Finally, the definition of government spending being utility enhancing means
that the first-best allocation can only be obtained if lump-sum taxes are set to
such a level that the efficient level of government spending can be completely fi-
nanced by lump-sum taxes. Equivalence of the Ramsey planner’s and the Social
planner’s allocation can only be obtained if all of these obstacles are eliminated.
Moreover, the Ramsey steady state will be equivalent to the exogenous policy
steady state if the latter is efficient since in this case fiscal authorities have no
incentive to deviate from this allocation. Consequently, conditions will be ob-
tained under which the exogenous policy steady state will be efficient such that
all three policies – exogenous, Ramsey planner’s, and Social planner’s – will
start in the same (efficient) steady state.
Staring with the exogenous policy steady state, the steady-state versions of
equations (4.2), (4.6), and (4.8) give
1
βs
=
1 + (1− τ i)i
Π
and
1
βb
=
(1 + i) exp(κ(Dbt − D¯))
Π
(1 + κDb),
which, together with the steady-state version of the Taylor-rule, determine i, Π,
and Db for given values of τ i. I calibrate
βb =
[
1 +
1− βs
βs
1
1− τ i
]−1
1
1 + κD¯
and
i¯ =
(
1
βs
− 1
)
1
1− τ i
to ensure that Π = 1, i = i¯, and Db = D¯ hold, implying i = ib. In steady state,
the wage-setting equations collapse to
(Ls)η =
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
(Cs)−ρ (1− τw) (4.49)
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and
(Lb)η =
(
σ − 1
σ
)2 (
Cb
)−ρ
(1− τw) (4.50)
and the price-setting equations deliver W = σ−1
σ
and ∆ = 1. Consequently, the
steady-state version of the evolution of debt (4.42) reads
i¯D¯
τ i(1− p)− 1
p
= (Cb − Cs) + (1− τw) σ − 1
σ
(
Ls − Lb)− T eff (4.51)
and the government budget reads
G+ (1− p)T eff = τwσ − 1
σ
Y + τ iD¯(1− p)i+ T. (4.52)
A comparison of the exogenous policy equations (4.49), (4.51), and (4.52) with
the efficient allocation (4.46), (4.47), and (4.48) shows that three conditions have
to be fulfilled to ensure efficiency of the exogenous policy steady state:40 First,
the wage tax has to be set to satisfy
τw = 1−
(
σ
σ − 1
)2
. (4.53)
Second, as the efficient allocation requires Ls = Lb, the evolution of debt implies
that T eff must be set to ensure
T eff =
D¯
p
(
1
βs
− 1
)
(4.54)
while the steady-state value of the interest tax is set to be zero (τ i = 0). Finally,
to ensure an efficient level of government spending, lump-sum taxes T must be
set to finance the efficient level of government spending (4.46) as well as both the
lump-sum payments to borrowers (T eff) and the wage subsidy given by (4.53)
implying
T = Geff + (1− p)T eff + 2σ − 1
σ(σ − 1)L
s,eff. (4.55)
In the following, an exogenous policy equilibrium is defined as a decentralized
equilibrium as defined above where wage taxes are set to fulfill (4.53), govern-
ment spending is set to Geff, and lump-sum subsidies and taxes are set to follow
(4.54) and (4.55) but all instruments are held constant at these initial values.
To abstract from government budget effects caused by variations in wage in-
40A detailed description can be found in Appendix B.
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come (meaning τw remains constant but the tax base Wt(pL
s
t + (1−p)Lbt) varies
in response to a shock), I assume that these revenue changes are equated via
a different non-specified source of lump-sum taxes. This means that all fiscal
instruments (income tax, wage tax, and government spending) remain constant
in case of an exogenously given policy even in the presence of a spread shock.
For Ramsey-optimal policies this assumption implies that wage taxes τwt can
be divided into a flexible part (τw,Rt , chosen by the Ramsey planner) and the con-
stant steady-state value (τw). The respective flexible revenue part (τw,Rt Wt(pL
s
t+
(1−p)Lbt)) is part of the government budget and has to be rebated (or financed)
with one of the other fiscal instrument available to the Ramsey planner. The
constant part (τwWt(pL
s
t + (1− p)Lbt)) is assumed to be financed via some kind
of non-specified lump-sum taxes. The same holds true for government spending
(Gt = G + G
R
t ). In case of a Ramsey planner having access to e.g. government
spending and wage taxes but not being able to levy lump-sum taxes this assump-
tion means that the amount of government spending a Ramsey planner chooses
above (beyond) the efficient level of government spending must be financed (re-
bated) with wage tax revenues being above (beyond) the efficient steady-state
value (GRt = τ
w,R
t Wt(pL
s
t + (1− p)Lbt)). On the contrary, if the Ramsey planner
is defined to have access to lump-sum taxes, this means that he may finance the
flexible part of government spending with lump-sum taxes (GRt = Tt) or rebate
the flexible part of wage or interest taxes via lump-sum subsidies (τw,Rt = −Tt).
The terminology “a Ramsey planner having access to lump-sum taxes” used in
the following such refers to the fact that lump-sum taxes are an instrument to
the Ramsey planner while the scenario “without lump-sum taxes” means that
lump-sum taxes are used only to equate the fluctuations in the tax revenues of
the constant part of wage taxes but cannot be chosen by the Ramsey planner.
This way, it is ensured that there are no effects contained emerging by the fact
that the government is forced to balance its budget in response to a shock due
to the assumption of constant wage subsidies since – for simplicity – there is no
government debt regarded in the model.
4.3 Simulation
4.3.1 An Illustrative Example
To explore the mechanisms of an interest spread shock as well as the effects
of optimal fiscal policy, I start with considering a simple version of the model by
assuming that the monetary authority is able to follow a strict inflation-targeting
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policy where the target value is one. Consequently, the Taylor rule is replaced by
Πt = Π¯ = 1. This largely simplifies the model as it completely offsets the effects
of nominal rigidities and would be equal to the real version of the model. This
can be seen by regarding the wage- and price-setting equations: With Πt = 1,
equations (4.32) to (4.34) collapse to Wt = (σ − 1)/σ. Consequently, there is
no price dispersion and wages are constant. This, in turn, means that the wage
setting equations (4.19) to (4.24) collapse to
(Lst)
η =
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
(Cst )
−ρ (1− τwt ) (4.56)
and (
Lbt
)η
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)2 (
Cbt
)−ρ
(1− τwt ), (4.57)
which is equivalent to the labor supply equations obtained under perfectly com-
petitive labor markets up to a constant. This implies that, under inflation-
targeting, the exogenous policy equilibrium can be defined by a set of the labor
supply equations (4.56) and (4.57) as well as the six equations
(Cst )
−ρ = βs(Cst+1)
−ρ (1 + (1− τ it+1)it) (4.58)
(Cbt )
−ρ = βb(Cbt+1)
−ρ(1 + ibt)(1 + κD
b
t ). (4.59)
pLst + (1− p)Lbt = pCst + (1− p)Cbt +Gt (4.60)
Gt + (1− p)T eff = Tt + τwt
σ − 1
σ
(pLst + (1− p)Lbt) + τ itDbt−1it−1(1− p) (4.61)
Dbt −Dbt−1
[
(1 + it) + p(i
b
t−1 − it−1)− (1− p)τ it it−1
]
= p
[
(Cbt − Cst ) + (1− τwt )
σ − 1
σ
(Lst − Lbt) + T eff
] (4.62)
1 + ibt = (1 + it)ϑt exp(κ(D
b
t − D¯)) (4.63)
determining the 8 variables Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Gt, D
b
t , it, and i
b
t given the fiscal
instruments τwt , τ
i
t , and Tt.
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Parameter choice
I start with exploring the effects of an interest spread shock under an exoge-
nously given policy. For this purpose, I set D¯b to match an initial steady-state
41Expectations operators are dropped since the model is solved under perfect foresight.
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βs 0.98 Discount factor of savers
βb 0.94 Discount factor of borrowers
κ 0.03 Debt elastic risk premium parameter
D¯b/Y 1 Initial debt-to-GDP ratio
ρ 1.5 Intertemp. elasticity of substitution in consumption
γ 1.5 Intertemp. elasticity of substitution in gov. spending
η 1.5 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
v 0.4 Weight of government spending in utility
p 0.5 Share of patient households
ρD 0.9 Persistence parameter of the spread shock
Π¯ 1 Inflation target
Table 4.1: Parametrization of the illustrative model
debt-to-GDP ratio of 100% and define the share of patient households, p, to
be 0.5. The savers’ discount factor is set to be βs = 0.98 to match an annual
interest rate of 8% where the relatively high value roughly matches the Euro
area average of interest rates for consumer credit between 2000 and 2008 and
represents the assumption of starting in the pre-crisis period when the interest
spread hits the economy. Furthermore, I set κ to be 0.03. While the value
is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, a robustness test shows that varying this value
does change the results only quantitatively. As described above, the discount
factor of borrowers is chosen to ensure that the steady-state level of debt will
be equal to D¯ requiring βb = 1
βs(1+κD¯)
such that βb = 0.94. The weight of
government spending in utility, v, is set to match a steady-state government-
spending-to-GDP ratio of 35%. The inverse of the labor supply elasticity, η, the
intertemporal elasticity in consumption, ρ, as well as the elasticity of government
spending, γ, are set to be 1.5. The persistence parameter of the credit shock,
ρD, is defined to be 0.9. Table 4.1 gives an overview about the parameter values.
Spread shock under an exogenously given policy
Figure 4.1 gives the responses of real variables as well as interest rates and
the debt-to-GDP ratio to an interest spread shock calibrated to decrease the
debt-to-GDP ratio by 5 percentage points at the maximum under an exogenous
fiscal policy, meaning all fiscal instruments (government spending, wage tax, and
income tax) are held constant at their initial steady-state levels as described
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Figure 4.1: Impulse responses to an interest spread shock in the illustrative model
under an exogenous policy. For real variables percentage changes are given. Inter-
est rates, the interest spread, as well as in the debt-to-GDP ratio are measured in
percentage points. For government spending, the ratio of government spending to
consumption of savers in percent is given.
above. It can be seen that, on impact, the interest spread shock increases the
spread by 3.79 percentage points implying an increase in the borrowers’ interest
rate by about 2.03 percentage points such that borrowers decrease consumption
and start to pay down their debt. As a consequence, the interest rate for savers
decreases which means that savers find it optimal to increase consumption. Out-
put remains constant as the increase in savers’ consumption equates the decrease
in borrowers’ consumption while government spending remains constant. Over
time, the reduction in the debt level as well as the abating effect of the spread
shock induces the spread to return to zero. Consequently, consumption of bor-
rowers increases and consumption of borrowers decreases over time. It should be
highlighted that, due to the lower debt level, consumption of borrowers increases
above its initial steady-state level after 8 periods before it reverts back to its
steady-state level in the long-run while for savers the opposite holds true. This
feature indicates that the effects of an interest spread shock on the two groups
of agents are twofold: In the short-run, savers gain while borrowers loose from
being hit by a spread shock. Over time, however, the effect reverts.
Furthermore, the Figure gives the relation of government spending to con-
sumption of savers. Equations (4.44) to (4.48) showed that efficiency requires a
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Figure 4.2: Period-by-period utility losses (in percent) of an interest spread shock in
the illustrative model under an exogenous policy.
positive and constant government-spending-to-consumption ratio given by
(Cst )
−ρ = ν(Gt)−γ.
Under the exogenous policy, however, it can be seen that the ratio diverts from
this optimal ratio as consumption of savers increases while government spending
is held constant. Consequently, the exogenous policy features an inefficient level
of government spending. This shows that the utility effects of an interest spread
shock are twofold: On the one hand, agent specific effects via changes in the
interest rates imply increasing the utility of one group of agents while implying
a utility loss for the other group. On the other hand, government spending
diverging from the optimal level implies a common (negative) effect for both
agents.
To look at these utility effects more in detail, Figure 4.2 shows the period-
by-period consumption-equivalent utility losses for the economy as a whole as
well as for savers and borrowers separately.42 Here, three observations stand
out: First, while the utility loss is quite small for the economy as a whole –
amounting to 0.0184% at the maximum – the individual effects for savers and
borrowers are sizable. Second, in the short-run, savers gain from being hit by
a spread shock in the amount of 2.53% while borrowers loose in the amount of
2.47%. And, finally, this effect reverses over time where the gains and losses are
relatively small, however.
To gauge the overall effect of a spread shock on the two agents, lifetime
utility losses meaning the share of steady-state consumption an agents is willing
42Meaning the percentage share of steady-state consumption an agent is willing to give up
in period t to be indifferent between staying in steady state and receiving the utility level
resulting in period t if the economy is hit by a spread shock in the initial period. The
definitions of all utility measures can be seen in detail in Appendix D.
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to give up in the initial period to be indifferent between a constant stream of
steady-state consumption, labor, and government-spending and the series of the
respective real variables resulting from the economy being hit by an interest
spread shock can be computed. Here, the utility loss for the economy as a whole
is relatively small amounting to about 0.0364%. Savers, in contrast, gain in the
amount of 3.0019% while borrowers loose in the amount of 2.9421% of steady-
state consumption. Hence, it can be stated that an interest spread shock drives
a wedge between the utilities of borrowers and savers and induces utility losses
for the economy as a whole. For this reason, Ramsey-optimal policy reactions
to a spread shock will be considered aiming at reducing the total utility loss and
the effects of these measures on the two groups of agents will be explored.
Ramsey-optimal policy
Equations (4.44) to (4.48) showed that, in the efficient equilibrium, all real
variables are independent of the spread shock ϑt and such constant over time
meaning Cst = C
b
t = const and L
s
t = L
b
t = const. Plugging in these conditions,
the Euler equation for savers, the Euler equation for borrowers as well as the
evolution of debt give:
1
βs
= 1 + (1− τ it+1)it, (4.64)
1
βb
= (1 + it)ϑt exp(κ(D
b
t − D¯))(1 + κDbt ), (4.65)
Dbt−1
[
(1− p)(1 + it−1(1− τ it )) + p(1 + it−1)ϑt−1 exp
(
κ
(
Dbt−1 − D¯
))]
= Dbt + pT
eff. (4.66)
The labor supply equations together with the efficiency condition (4.48) can be
written as
τwt = 1−
(
σ
σ − 1
)2
(4.67)
and the government budget becomes
Gt + (1− p)T eff = Tt + Ls,effσ − 1
σ
τwt + τ
i
tD
b
t−1it−1(1− p). (4.68)
This shows that the interest income tax τ it can be set to ensure efficiency of the
decentralized equilibrium if lump-sum taxes are available to ensure the efficient
level of government spending as well as the efficient constant wage subsidies.43
43The detailed derivation can be seen in Appendix C.
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Rearranging equations (4.64) to (4.68) gives the optimal rule for the interest
income tax rate as
τ it = 1−
1− βs
βs
[
1
βsϑt−1
− 1
]−1
,
while the debt level remains fixed at its steady-state level (Dbt = D¯) and the
interest rate follows
it =
1
βsϑt
− 1.
Here, three observations can be highlighted: First, under inflation-targeting, the
Ramsey policy is efficient if lump-sum taxes as well as taxes on interest income
are available. Second, in this case, the Ramsey policy consists in choosing the
interest income tax such that all real variables as well as the debt level are held
constant while the interest rate of savers adjusts. Third, if there are no lump-
sum taxes available or the Ramsey planner relies on wage taxes only, the efficient
allocation cannot be obtained.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the responses of the debt level and interest rates as well
as the optimal tax rate under the Ramsey-optimal policy in comparison with the
case of an exogenously given policy. It can be seen that the key mechanism of the
Ramsey-optimal policy lies in holding the interest rate of borrowers constant,
meaning completely eliminating the effect of the interest spread on borrowers.
Consequently, the interest rate of savers has to fall to equate the increase in the
interest spread. For this purpose, the Ramsey planner decreases the interest
tax. The combination of the decrease in the tax rate and the decrease in the
interest rate implies that the savers’ consumption decision is not affected by the
interest spread shock. All real variables can be held constant at their efficient
levels.
Figure 4.3: Ramsey-optimal policy reaction to an interest spread shock in the illus-
trative model with wage taxes, interest taxes, government spending, and lump-sum
taxes. All variables are measured in percentage points. Blue solid line: Exogenous
policy. Red dashed line: Ramsey policy.
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Figure 4.4: Ramsey-optimal policy reaction to an interest spread shock in the illus-
trative model with wage taxes, interest taxes, and government spending but without
lump-sum taxes. For real variables percentage changes are given. The nominal in-
terest rates as well as tax rates are measured in percentage points. For government
spending, the ratio of government spending to consumption of savers in percent is
given. Blue solid line: Exogenous policy. Red dashed line: Ramsey policy.
This is different in case of a Ramsey planner completely relying on distor-
tionary tax instruments but not having access to lump-sum taxes as can be seen
in Figure 4.4. In this case, government spending must be financed by the sum of
interest income and wage income tax revenues. This contrasts with the optimal
reaction shown above consisting in decreasing interest taxes while holding wage
taxes and government spending constant. Efficiency can, thus, not be obtained
any more. The Figure shows that the constrained-optimal policy reaction im-
plies increasing interest taxes on impact and decreasing interest taxes after the
first period while for wage taxes the opposite holds true. This way, the borrow-
ers’ interest rate decreases only on impact and is slightly above its steady-state
value after the first period. Consequently, the impact of the interest spread
shock on borrowers is largely diminished. The same holds true for savers as the
decrease in the savers’ interest rate is equated by the decrease (after the first
period) in interest taxes. Government spending diverts only slightly from its
efficient level.
Consequently, utility gains and losses can be all but eliminated as is depicted
in Figure 4.5. It can be seen that applying the Ramsey-optimal policy decreases
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the gains of savers as well as the losses of borrowers and almost completely
offsets the total economy-wide utility loss. While a Ramsey-optimal policy, con-
sequently, may be highly effective in eliminating economy-wide utility losses, it
implies discriminating against one of the two groups of agents. Under inflation-
targeting, however, this implies decreasing the disparity between groups by elim-
inating the wedge an interest spread shock drives between the utilities of patient
and impatient households. In the following, it is explored if and how this result
changes if allowing for nominal rigidities.
Figure 4.5: Utility losses (in percent) of an interest spread shock in the illustrative
model with wage taxes, interest taxes, and government spending but without lump-
sum taxes. Blue solid line: Exogenous policy. Red dashed line: Ramsey policy.
4.3.2 The General Case
After having clarified the mechanisms, in the following a spread shock is
simulated in the full version of the model meaning the monetary authority follows
a Taylor rule instead of being able to apply inflation-targeting.44 Regarding the
parameters determining the degree of nominal rigidities, I set both the degree
of price and of wage stickiness to be ξp = ξw = 0.75. Furthermore, the elasticity
of substitution between differentiated labor inputs and between differentiated
goods, σ, is assumed to be 6. Finally, I set the response parameter of the
interest rate to inflation, µ, to be 2.
I focus on the case of a Ramsey planner having access to lump-sum taxes
as well as one or two types of distortionary taxes in addition to government
spending. Figure 4.6 illustrates the responses of main variables to a spread
44Especially in the context of a country being a member of a monetary union, inflation-
targeting does not seem to be a realistic feature as the monetary authority sets the interest
rate for the union as a whole and, such, presumably will not aim at holding inflation constant
in one specific country.
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Figure 4.6: Impulse responses to an interest spread shock under a Ramsey-optimal
policy with wage, interest, and lump-sum taxes as well as government spending. For
real variables percentage changes are given. Interest rates, the interest spread, tax
rates, as well as the debt-to-GDP ratio are measured in percentage points. For gov-
ernment spending, the ratio of government spending to consumption of savers is given
in percent. The debt level is measured as percentage share of debt in steady-state
output. Blue solid line: Exogenous policy. Red dashed line: Ramsey policy.
shock for the case of a Ramsey planner having access to both wage and in-
terest taxes in comparison with the case of an exogenously given policy.45 As
regards the exogenous policy scenario, it can be seen that with the monetary
authority following a simple Taylor rule, the savers’ nominal interest rate falls
only slightly such that the interest rate of borrowers increases much more than
under inflation-targeting. Consequently, consumption of savers remains almost
constant while consumption of borrowers falls much more than under inflation-
targeting. This, in turn, implies a drop in output. The economy-wide lifetime
loss of a spread shock is much higher in this scenario than under strict inflation-
targeting amounting to 0.0913 % instead of 0.0364 % as before.
Turning to the constrained-optimal policy, the Ramsey planner has to deal
with different sources of inefficiency: First, the drop in output implies an ineffi-
ciency due to price dispersion. Second, the change in consumption implies that
the optimal level of government spending adjusts. And third, the increase in
the interest spread causes an inefficient distribution of consumption and labor
between savers and borrowers. In contrast to the case of inflation-targeting,
however, the Ramsey planner cannot obtain the efficient allocation since the
monetary authority following a Taylor rule prevents the possibility of holding
45I restrict both income tax rates to lie in the range between -100% and 100%. This does,
however, not influence the result that efficiency cannot be obtained in this case: Even if tax
rates could be raised unboundedly, efficiency could not be obtained.
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inflation constant and, at the same time, decreasing the nominal interest rate –
as was the optimal response of the Ramsey planner in the simple case before.
Consequently, the Ramsey planner faces a trade-off. Figure 4.6 shows that, in
this case, the constrained-optimal policy consists in increasing interest taxes on
impact to boost consumption of savers which prevents output from falling such
eliminating the inefficiency evoked by price dispersion to a large extent. This
measure, however, implies increasing the interest rate of borrowers as well as
allowing a larger deviation of government spending from its efficient level.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 illustrate the responses of main variables if the Ramsey
planner has access to only one distortionary tax instrument at a time. It can
be seen that while for both tax instruments the constrained-optimal response
consists in increasing taxes, the interest tax is increased much more than the
wage tax. This is due to the tax base being much smaller in case of the interest
tax. Tax income amounts to only 2.5% of wage income in the model. Both
policies, nevertheless, aim at preventing output from falling such reducing the
inefficiency induced by price dispersion. In case of interest taxes being available,
this output effect is combined with a larger decrease in the debt level such
implying a somewhat lower interest rate for borrowers than under the exogenous
policy. In contrast, the policy reaction with wage taxes implies a smaller decrease
Figure 4.7: Impulse responses to an interest spread shock under the Ramsey-optimal
policy with wage and lump-sum taxes as well as government spending. For real vari-
ables percentage changes are given. Interest rates, the interest spread, tax rates, as
well as the debt-to-GDP ratio are measured in percentage points. For government
spending, the ratio of government spending to consumption of savers is given in per-
cent. The debt level is measured as percentage share of the debt level in steady-state
output. Blue solid line: Exogenous policy. Red dashed line: Ramsey policy.
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Figure 4.8: Impulse responses to an interest spread shock under the Ramsey-optimal
policy with interest income and lump-sum taxes as well as government spending.
For real variables percentage changes are given. Interest rates, the interest spread,
tax rates, as well as the debt-to-GDP ratio are measured in percentage points. For
government spending, the ratio of government spending to consumption of savers is
given in percent. The debt level is measured as percentage share of debt in steady-state
output. Blue solid line: Exogenous policy. Red dashed line: Ramsey policy.
in the debt level and, consequently, a slightly higher interest rate for borrowers.46
As this shows that especially the effect on the borrowers’ interest rate differs
between policies, in the next step, the effects on the two groups of agents will
be considered in addition to economy-wide effects of optimal policy.
For this purpose, policy gains are computed where a policy gain is defined as
the share of steady-state consumption an agent is willing to give up in the initial
period to be indifferent between the exogenous policy induced stream of con-
sumption, labor, and government spending and the respective series under the
Ramsey-optimal policy. A positive policy gain, consequently, implies that the
agent is better off under the Ramsey-optimal policy than under the exogenous
policy.47
Table 4.2 gives policy gains for a huge set of different Ramsey policies. Here,
several observations stand out: First, the gains from applying a constrained-
optimal fiscal policy can be sizable. In case of both income taxes as well as
46The result of the interest tax being increased by 100 percentage points is due to the constraint
of both tax rates lying between -100% and 100%. Without imposing this upper bound, the
interest income tax would be increased by 850% in the first period while being slightly
negative in the subsequent periods. Even without the upper bound, the efficient allocation
cannot be reached, however.
47While for the economy as a whole, each Ramsey-optimal policy must imply policy gains
relative to the exogenous policy, this does not necessarily hold for an individual agent. The
detailed definition of policy gains can be seen in Appendix D.
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Total Savers Borrowers
Lump-sum taxes
(1) τwt and τ
i
t 0.0783 -10.4805 12.6215
(2) τwt 0.0173 -0.0629 0.0975
(3) τ it no restriction 0.0765 -10.9053 13.2213
(4) τ it ≤ 1 0.0309 -2.1226 2.2563
(5) τ it ≤ 0.17 0.0197 -0.9008 0.9531
(6) τ it = τ
w
t 0.0147 -0.2817 0.3124
No lump-sum taxes
(7) τwt and τ
i
t 0.0752 -10.8637 13.1586
(8) τwt 0.0078 -0.0938 0.1095
(9) τ it 0.0185 -0.8933 0.9429
(10) τ it = τ
w
t 0.0075 -0.0955 0.1106
Table 4.2: Policy gains of Ramsey-optimal policies (in percent)
lump-sum taxes being available, the policy gain amounts to 0.0783% (as can be
seen in line 1) which indicates – compared to the total utility loss of a spread
shock of about 0.0913% – that optimal fiscal policy does imply a substantial
gain for the economy as a whole. Second, using interest income taxes implies
larger gains than using wage taxes even if an upper bound on the interest tax
of 100% is imposed as can be seen in line 4. It should be noted, however, that
this measure implies increasing the interest tax much more than the wage tax.
But even if the interest tax is constrained to be smaller than 17% – which is the
amount to which the wage tax is increased in case of conducting the Ramsey
policy with wage and lump-sum taxes – the policy gain is somewhat larger than
in case of wage taxation as can be seen in line 5. This indicates that a tax
on interest income is more effective in eliminating welfare losses of an interest
spread shock than a tax on wage income. Third, a government using the same
tax rate for both sources of income – as is the case e.g. in Germany at least for
all taxable persons with a maximum tax rate on labor income of less than 25%
– implies huge welfare losses. As can be seen in line 6, if the fiscal authority
does not differentiate between wage income and interest income, the policy gain
of applying a Ramsey-optimal policy amounts to 0.0147 % only. All results are
qualitatively the same if there are no lump-sum taxes available as can be seen
in lines 7-10. The difference consists in the fact that without lump-sum taxes,
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all policy gains are smaller than their respective counterparts with lump-sum
taxes.
Finally, regarding the agent-specific level, all policies imply policy gains for
borrowers and at the same time policy losses for savers. As a spread shock
originally implied utility losses for borrowers and gains for savers and, such,
drives a (inefficient) wedge between the utilities of the two agents, applying
a Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy decreases the disparity between groups. This
feature, however, depends on the degree of nominal rigidities as will be shown
in the next section.
4.4 The Role of Nominal Rigidities
In this section, the role of nominal rigidities in shaping the distributional
effects of fiscal policy is examined. For this purpose, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show
policy gains of a Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and lump-sum taxes in ad-
dition to government spending for different degrees of price and wage rigidity.
In Figure 4.9, the wage rigidity is held constant at ξw = 0, ξw = 0.5, and
ξw = 0.75, respectively, while the degree of price rigidity is varied. The opposite
holds true for Figure 4.10. And here it becomes apparent that the distributive
effect of optimal fiscal policy obtained so far (fiscal policy reducing the disparity
between groups) crucially depends on the degree of nominal rigidities – at least
in case of wage income taxes. Two cases can be distinguished: On the one hand,
if prices are perfectly flexible, applying a constrained-optimal fiscal policy with
wage taxes implies decreasing the disparity between groups independent of the
degree of wage rigidity. This can be seen by considering the first row of Figure
4.10 and the points at the extreme left of each panel in Figure 4.9. In this case,
borrowers feature a policy gain and savers incur a policy loss for each degree of
wage rigidity which implies that the spread shock induced wedge between the
utilities of agents is diminished by conducting a constrained-optimal fiscal pol-
icy. The same holds true for all parameter combinations where wages are more
sticky than prices as is indicated by the gray areas in the two figures. On the
contrary, if prices are sufficiently more rigid than wages, each Ramsey-optimal
policy implies enlarging the wedge between savers and borrowers. This shows
that the distributive effects of optimal fiscal policy with wage taxes crucially
depend on the relative degrees of wage and price rigidity.
The reason for this result can be found by regarding the three different ob-
jectives a Ramsey planner is dedicated to and the emphasis he sets on each of
these targets: Choosing the optimal level of government spending, eliminating
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Figure 4.9: Agent-specific policy gains (in percent) for different degrees of price rigidity
under Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and lump-sum taxes as well as government
spending. Gray areas indicate parameter spaces where the degree of wage rigidity
is larger than the degree of price rigidity.
price dispersion, and eliminating wage dispersion. Setting government spending
at its efficient level improves welfare for savers and borrowers at the same time
and to the same amount. Reducing wage distortions implies utility gains for
both agents as the spread shock implies a nominal wage deflation such that the
Ramsey policy results in higher nominal wages. The effects are quantitatively
different for savers and borrowers, however, since labor supply differs between
groups. Eliminating price distortions, on the contrary, implies eliminating de-
flationary tendencies which has a negative effect on borrowers via the Taylor
rule since this implies that the nominal interest rate – and, as a consequence
thereof, the borrowers’ interest rate – does not decrease as much as in the case
of an exogenous policy. For relatively low levels of price rigidity, the Ramsey
planner puts little weight on counteracting price dispersion but much weight on
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Figure 4.10: Agent-specific policy gains (in percent) for different degrees of wage rigid-
ity under Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and lump-sum taxes as well as government
spending. Gray areas indicate parameter spaces where the degree of wage rigidity
is larger than the degree of price rigidity.
mitigating the inefficiencies caused by wage rigidity such that borrowers gain
from conducting the optimal policy while savers loose.
Figure 4.11 illustrates an interesting feature of optimal fiscal policy related
to nominal rigidities by again showing policy gains but focusing on the small
range of price rigidities between ξp = 0.56 and ξp = 0.58 for ξw = 0.5. For
each value of the degree of wage rigidity, there is a value of the degree of price
rigidity such that the Ramsey planner weights all objectives in such a relation
that gains and losses mitigate for savers meaning that the optimal policy does
not affect their utility level. The Figure shows that for ξw = 0.5 the respective
degree of price rigidity is ξp = 0.5645. And there is a degree of price rigidity at
which the Ramsey policy does not affect the utility of borrowers (ξp = 0.5735
in case of ξw = 0.5). Only in the negligibly small range between these values
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Figure 4.11: Agent-specific policy gains (in percent) for different degrees of price
rigidity between 0.56 ≤ ξp ≤ 0.58 under Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and lump-
sum taxes as well as government spending.
(0.5645 < ξp < 0.5735), both agents gain from being subject to the optimal
policy. More specifically, at the point ξp = 0.5690 and ξw = 0.5 both agents
gain in the same amount. In any other case, conducting an optimal fiscal policy
with wage taxes implies discriminating against one of the two groups.
This is different in case of interest taxes. As interest taxes are levied on
bond holdings and exclusively paid by savers, a Ramsey policy with interest
taxes will always discriminate against savers. This is due to the fact that both
eliminating price and wage dispersion implies increasing interest taxes which
states a substantial utility loss for savers while leaving borrowers unaffected.
Finally, Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show total gains of a Ramsey policy with
wage taxes for different degrees of rigidities. Here, a crucial finding should be
highlighted: While the size of economy-wide utility losses depends on the relative
degrees of rigidities, exactly the combination of rigidities implying the largest
economy-wide policy gain involves enlarging the disparity between groups. More
Figure 4.12: Economy-wide policy gains (in percent) for different degrees of price
rigidity under Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and lump-sum taxes as well as gov-
ernment spending.
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Figure 4.13: Economy-wide policy gains (in percent) for different degrees of wage
rigidity under Ramsey-optimal policy with wage and lump-sum taxes as well as gov-
ernment spending.
specifically, the largest policy gain can be obtained in case of perfectly flexible
wages when prices are relatively rigid while constrained-optimal policy is nearly
effectless in case of flexible prices and wages. The economy-wide policy gain
increases with an increasing degree of wage rigidity if prices are more flexible
than wages and vice versa.
4.5 An Alternative Social Welfare Measure
The results obtained so far showed that the common way of modeling a
Ramsey planner as maximizing the sum of individual utilities implies significant
distributive issues. For this reason, I compare the results with the case of using
a social welfare function in the spirit of Rawls. More specifically, I assume that
the weight the Ramsey planner sets on the utility of one of the two groups of
agents increases with a decreasing relative utility level of the respective group.
For the sake of computability, I refrain from choosing a purely Rawlsian social
welfare function by means of maximizing the utility of the poorest group only
as this required the use of a discontinuous function. Instead, I define the weight
of patient households to be a continuous function of the difference between the
utilities of the two groups taking the following form
pRawlst = 1−
1
1 + exp(k(U st − U bt ))
. (4.69)
I set the scaling factor k to a very high value (k = 1000) to approximate the
Rawlsian proposition of a social welfare function. Using this specific form implies
that the planner weights both groups equally if their utility levels are equal. In
contrast, if the utility level of the patient households is sufficiently higher than
the utility of impatient households, the planner neglects the presence of patient
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Figure 4.14: Weight of savers in the social welfare function. Red dashed line:
Ramsey policy with utilitarian welfare measure. Black dotted line: Ramsey policy
with Rawlsian welfare measure.
households but maximizes the utility of impatient households only. The opposite
holds true for the case of the utility of impatient households being sufficiently
larger than the utility of patient households. Technically, the Ramsey planner
problem is now given by
maxEt
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
pRawlst U
s
t + (1− pRawlst )U bt
}
(4.70)
where the respective set of conditions the planner is subject to is extended by
equation (4.69) and the FOCs are extended by the derivative of the Lagrangian
with respect to pRawlst .
48 During the whole section, I focus on the case of wage
taxes (in addition to government spending and lump-sum taxes) since the results
obtained in the last section indicated that distributive issues seem to be of special
interest in this context.
To illustrate the effects of assuming this specific form of the social welfare
function on the weight a Ramsey planner puts on the individual group, Figure
4.14 gives pRawlst for the first 20 periods following an interest spread shock for two
different scenarios: The red dashed line can be interpreted as a counterfactual
simulation in the sense that it gives the pRawlst that would evolve if the Ramsey
planner follows a utilitarian definition of social welfare as regarded in the last
sections. This means the utility levels obtained in the utilitarian scenario with
constant weights p and (1 − p) are taken and pRawlst is computed residually for
these values. It can be seen that due to the high chosen value of k, the weight-
function approximates the Rawlsian proposition quite well. With the exception
48The respective FOCs can be seen in Appendix E.
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Figure 4.15: Difference between the utilities of savers and borrowers (in levels) for
different social welfare measures where the Ramsey planner has access to wage and
lump-sum taxes as well as government spending. Blue solid line: Exogenous policy.
Red dashed line: Ramsey policy with utilitarianism. Black dotted line: Ramsey
policy with Rawlsian welfare measure.
of three periods, the weight of savers is either one or zero. This implies that
during the first 8 periods after the shock hits – the time at which savers’ utility
level is higher than the borrowers’ – the Rawlsian Ramsey planner would neglect
the presence of savers and maximize the welfare of borrowers. After the eleventh
period, on the contrary, the planner would exclusively maximize the welfare
of savers. The black dotted line gives pRawlst if the Ramsey planner actually
internalizes the dependence of the savers’ weight on the utility differences and,
consequently, maximizes the Rawlsian form of the social welfare function given
in equation (4.70). Here, it can be observed that the savers’ weight remains
roughly at 0.5.49 This seems to be surprising as the Rawlsian proposition claims
just the opposite. It must be regarded, however, that the pRawlst plotted are the
outcome of the Ramsey planner’s maximization problem. More specifically, the
dependence of the savers’ weight on the savers’ utility level causes the Ramsey
planner to minimize utility differences between groups. This, in turn, implies
that he puts the same weight on the utilities of patient and impatient households
as can be seen by regarding equation (4.69).
This feature is depicted in Figure 4.15. The Figure gives the difference be-
tween the savers’ and borrowers’ utilities for three different policy scenarios: the
exogenous policy case, the case of a Ramsey planner being based on a utilitar-
49In spite of the high value of k, it can be seen that pRawlst is not exactly 0.5 in the Rawlsian
scenario. This is due to the fact that the utility differences between the two groups are
negligibly small in the Rawlsian framework as can be seen in Figure 4.15. As the weight
function used features the highest deviations from a purely Rawlsian concept in the region
around zero, this implies that for these small values of the utility differences, pRawlst diverges
somewhat from 0.5.
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ian social welfare function, and the case of a Ramsey planner maximizing social
welfare in a Rawlsian sense. It can be seen that the Ramsey planner following
a Rawlsian principle results in utility levels being all but equal for savers and
borrowers. Regarding the common definition of a utilitarian Ramsey planner,
the effects differ over time. On impact, a Ramsey policy in a utilitarian sense
diminishes utility differences relative to an exogenously given policy while in the
medium-run the opposite can be observed. In the long-run, both policies yield
almost identical utility differences.
Figure 4.16: Utility losses (in percent) of an interest spread shock for different social
welfare measures under a Taylor-rule where the Ramsey planner has access to wage
and lump-sum taxes as well as government spending. Red dashed line: Ramsey
policy with utilitarianism. Black dotted line: Ramsey policy with Rawlsian welfare
measure.
To explore the different utility effects more in detail, Figure 4.16 gives period-
by-period utility losses of being subject to an interest spread shock under a
Ramsey-optimal policy in a Rawlsian sense compared to the baseline scenario of
a utilitarian welfare function. They are given both for the two groups of agents
separately and on an aggregate level where the total utility losses are computed,
once, based on the Rawlsian social welfare function and, additionally, for the
counterfactual case. This means the utility levels obtained under the Rawlsian
maximization are used to compute the utility loss taking the utilitarian welfare
function as a basis. On an individual level, it can be seen that in the Rawlsian
case utility gains and losses are largely diminished. Consequently, using the
Rawlsian welfare measure, total utility losses are quite small. Taking the sum
of individual utilities as basis, however, shows that following the Rawlsian max-
imization principle implies huge utility losses in a utilitarian sense. The sum of
individual utility losses amounts to almost 0.15% at the maximum after 10 pe-
riods. Furthermore, it can be seen that borrowers are better of in the Rawlsian
framework during the first 8 periods while they prefer the utilitarian concept
in the long-run. The opposite can be observed for savers’ utilities. Computing
lifetime policy gains as defined in the last section but for the case of switching
from a utilitarian concept of a Ramsey policy to a Rawlsian framework shows
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that savers loose from applying the Rawlsian welfare function instead of the
utilitarian in the amount 5.79% of steady-state consumption while borrowers
gain in the amount of 3.64%.
After having considered the different utility effects of the two concepts of a
social welfare function, Figure 4.17 illustrates the different effects on the optimal
time-path of the wage tax as well as the implied effects on interest rates, the
debt level, and real variables. Starting with the constrained-optimal choice of
wage taxes, it can be seen that the tax rate is changed much more in the Rawl-
sian framework than in the baseline utilitarian framework. This huge increase
in wage taxes induces nominal wages to increase while at the same time reduc-
ing net wages – both effects being stronger than in the utilitarian framework.
The wage increase, in turn, implies higher inflation which – by means of the
Taylor rule – increases the savers’ nominal interest rate. As a consequence, the
borrowers’ interest rate increases more than in the utilitarian scenario. Here,
for both agents diverging effects can be observed: For savers, the increase in
the interest rate implies a positive income gain tending to increase consumption
and decrease labor. But at the same time it implies higher opportunity costs of
consuming goods as well as leisure such tending to decrease consumption and
increase labor and bond holdings. In total, it can be seen that savers’ con-
Figure 4.17: Impulse responses to an interest spread shock under the Ramsey-optimal
policy for different social welfare measures with wage and lump-sum taxes as well as
government spending under a Taylor-rule. For real variables percentage changes are
given. Interest rates, the interest spread, tax rates, as well as the debt-to-GDP ratio
are measured in percentage points. For government spending, the ratio of government
spending to consumption of savers is given in percent. The debt level is measured
as percentage share of the debt in steady-state output. Red dashed line: Ramsey
policy with utilitarianism. Black dotted line: Ramsey policy with Rawlsian welfare
measure.
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sumption as well as labor increase more than in the utilitarian scenario. For
borrowers, the increase in the interest rate states a negative income effect such
tendentially reducing consumption and increasing labor. The decrease in net
wages, however, prevails such that taken as a whole, borrowers’ consumption
as well as labor decrease more than in the utilitarian framework. Over time,
these effects diverge as the wage tax is decreased and even results in wage sub-
sidies after the sixths period. Altogether, it can be seen that the changes in real
variables are much more pronounced in the Rawlsian framework than in case of
a Ramsey planner in a utilitarian sense, especially implying noticeably higher
output fluctuations. Interestingly, the debt level actually increases at least in
the medium-run. These results show that applying a Ramsey-optimal policy
based on the Rawlsian principle implies real effects being entirely different from
the effects of a Ramsey policy in a utilitarian sense.
4.6 Robustness
In this section, robustness of the results to altering the parametrization is
checked. Regarding the parameters of the risk premium function, setting κ to
smaller (larger) values indicates larger (smaller) effects of a spread shock on
the debt level. By setting the size of the decrease in the risk-free debt level
adequately to obtain the same debt-to-GDP reduction as in case of the baseline
parametrization, however, results can be obtained being almost the same as
in the baseline scenario. If the initial level of debt is set to a larger (smaller)
value, a spread shock implies smaller (larger) welfare losses while fiscal policy
becomes less (more) effective in reducing these losses. The results concerning
distributional effects as well as the relative effectiveness of the two income tax
measures remain unchanged.
Next, the discount factor is set to be β = 0.99.50 This implies smaller effects
of a spread shock on the borrowers’ interest rate since it is the product of the
risk premium and the savers’ nominal interest rate. If the shock is computed
to induce a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio of about 5 percentage points as
before, however, the results remain virtually unchanged.
Setting η, ρ, and γ to values smaller than one does not change the results
qualitatively. Using a larger elasticity of substitution for consumption than
for government spending (ρ = 1.5 and γ = 0.5) implies smaller utility losses
50The target nominal interest rate i¯ is recalibrated adequately to obtain a steady-state inflation
rate of one (¯i = 1/β).
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and a less effective fiscal policy. This is due to the fact that this parameter
choice induces a smaller steady-state government-spending-to-output ratio. If
v is recalibrated adequately to obtain the same spending-output ratio as under
the baseline parametrization, the results are almost the same as in the baseline
scenario.
Finally, the role of the share of savers is investigated. Starting with the total
utility effects, utility losses of a spread shock increase with a decreasing share of
savers. This is due to the fact that savers gain from a spread shock while bor-
rowers loose. Concerning distributional effects, the results remain qualitatively
unchanged. The individual effects on the two groups of agents become larger
with a decreasing share of savers.
4.7 Conclusions
In the course of this paper, the effectiveness of two different types of optimal
income taxation in the face of an interest spread shock as well as their distri-
butional effects and the dependence on the degree of nominal rigidities were
investigated. Here, the analysis is twofold: First, regarding the relative effec-
tiveness of different kinds of income taxation, it is found that the most effective
form of income taxation consists in taxing interest income. Furthermore, being
able to levy different rates on different types of income implies sizable welfare
gains. Second, regarding distributive effects, setting tax rates optimally may in-
crease the disparity between groups depending on the tax measure used. While
a constrained-optimal fiscal policy using interest taxes reduces the disparity be-
tween groups, using wage taxes may involve increasing the wedge between savers
and borrowers. Here, the distributional effects of wage taxation are found to de-
pend crucially on the relative degrees of price and wage stickiness. With the
degree of wage rigidity being larger than the degree of price rigidity, applying a
constrained-optimal fiscal policy implies reducing disparities. If prices are suffi-
ciently more sticky than wages, however, a constrained-optimal policy increases
the wedge between savers and borrowers. Finally, the results are compared to
the case of basing the Ramsey policy on a social welfare function in a Rawl-
sian sense and it is found that while this way disparities between groups can
completely be eliminated, this takes place at the cost of savers which feature
huge welfare losses as well as at the cost of much higher output fluctuations.
Overall, the results highlight the importance of regarding distributive effects of
fiscal policy and of raising the question of choosing an appropriate social welfare
function if allowing for heterogeneous agents.
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4.8 Appendices
4.8.A Ramsey Problem and Solution
Maximization problem:
maxEt
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
p
[
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
]
+ (1− p)
[(
Cbt
)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(
Lbt
)1+η
1 + η
]
+ ν
G1−γt
1− γ
}
subject to
1 + ibt = (1 + it)ϑt exp
(
κ(Dbt − D¯)
)
(λ. 1)
(Cst )
−ρ = βsEt
{
(Cst+1)
−ρ(1 + (1− τ it+1)it)
1
Πt+1
}
(λ. 2)
(Cbt )
−ρ = βbEt
{
(Cbt+1)
−ρ1 + i
b
t
Πt+1
(1 + κDbt )
}
(λ. 3)
Yt = pC
s
t + (1− p)Cbt +Gt (λ. 4)
Gt + T
eff = τwt Wt(pL
s
t + (1− p)Lbt) + τ it
Dbt−1
Πt
(1− p)it−1 + Tt (λ. 5)
Dbt −
Dbt−1
Πt
[
(1 + it−1) + p(ibt−1 − it−1)− (1− p)τ it it−1
]
= p [(Cbt − Cst ) + (1− τwt )Wt(Lst − Lbt)− T eff]. (λ. 6)
gs1t
gs2t
=
1− ξw
(
Wt−1
Wt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
(λ. 7)
gs1t =
σ
σ − 1 (L
s
t)
1+η + βsξwEt
{(
Wt+1
Wt
)σ(1+η)
gs1 t+1
}
(λ. 8)
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gs2t = (C
s
t )
−ρ (1− τwt )W st Lst + βsξwEt
{(
Wt+1
Wt
)σ−1
gs2 t+1
}
(λ. 9)
gb1t
gb2t
=
1− ξw
(
Wt−1
Wt
)1−σ
1− ξw

1+ησ
1−σ
(λ. 10)
gb1t =
σ
σ − 1
(
Lbt
)1+η
+ βbξwEt
{(
Wt+1
Wt
)σ(1+η)
gb1 t+1
}
(λ. 11)
gb2t =
(
Cbt
)−ρ
(1− τwt )W bt Lbt + βbξwEt
{(
Wt+1
Wt
)σ−1
gb2 t+1
}
(λ. 12)
f1t
f2t
=
(
1− ξp (Πt)σ−1
1− ξp
) 1
1−σ
(λ. 13)
f1t =
σ
σ − 1
[
s(Cst )
−ρ + (1− s)(Cbt )−ρ
]
YtWt + βξpEt {(Πt+1)σf1t+1} (λ. 14)
f2t =
[
s(Cst )
−ρ + (1− s)(Cbt )−ρ
]
Yt + βξpEt
{
(Πt+1)
σ−1f2t+1
}
(λ. 15)
Yt∆t = pL
s
t + (1− p)Lbt (λ. 16)
∆t = (1− ξp)
(
1− ξp (Πt)σ−1
1− ξp
) σ
σ−1
+ ξp (Πt)
σ ∆t−1 (λ. 17)
1 + it = (Πt)
µ (1 + i¯) (λ. 18)
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If the income tax rate is restricted to be smaller than 100%, the Ramsey problem
is extended by
τ it ≤ 1. (λ. 19)
(I drop the restrictions τ it ≥ −1 as well as −1 ≤ τwt ≤ 1 since both are always
fulfilled in each simulation scenario.)
If only one tax rate can be applied to both types of income, the Ramsey problem
is extended by
τ it = τ
w
t . (λ. 20)
First order conditions:
p(Cst )
−ρ − λ2tρ(Cst )−ρ−1 + λ2t−1
βs
β
ρ(Cst )
−ρ−1 1 + (1− τ it )it−1
Πt
− λ4t
p+ λ6t p+ λ9t ρ(C
s
t )
−ρ−1(1− τwt )WtLst
+λ14t
σ
σ − 1 p ρ(C
s
t )
−ρ−1WtYt + λ15t p ρ(Cst )
−ρ−1Yt = 0 ( δΛtδCst )
(1− p)(Cbt )−ρ − λ3tρ(Cbt )−ρ−1 + λ3t−1
βb
β
ρ(Cbt )
−ρ−1 1 + i
b
t−1
Πt
(1 + κDbt−1)
−λ4t(1− p)− λ6tp+ λ12tρ(Cbt )−ρ−1(1− τwt )WtLbt
+λ14t
σ
σ − 1(1− p)ρ(C
b
t )
−ρ−1Yt = 0 ( δΛtδCbt
)
−p(Lst)η − λ5tτwt Wtp− λ8t
σ
σ − 1(1 + η)(L
s
t)
η
−λ9t(Cst )−ρ(1− τwt )Wt − λ16tp = 0 ( δΛtδLst )
−(1− p)(Lbt)η − λ5tτwt Wt(1− p)− λ6tp(1− τwt )Wt
−λ11t σ
σ − 1(1 + η)(L
b
t)
η − λ12t(Cbt )−ρ(1− τwt )Wt − λ16t(1− p) = 0 ( δΛtδLbt )
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σ − 1
[
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)
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In case of restricting the interest tax to be smaller than 100%, the complemen-
tary slackness condition implies λ20t τ
i
t = 0 and λ20t ≥ 0 must hold. I solve the
complete model (meaning equilibrium conditions plus Ramsey FOCs) by us-
ing a Newton-type algorithm via Dynare which involves solving all equilibrium
equations as well as the Ramsey FOCs simultaneously. Furthermore, I solve the
model under perfect foresight such that the exact solution to the model can be
found via the Dynare “simul”-command by taking nonlinearities into account.
Consequently, the restriction on the interest tax can easily be implemented by
use of “if”-commands. More precisely, the restriction on the interest tax implies
adding the equations
λ20t = max(0,
δΛt
δit
− λ20t)
and
(τ it < 1)
(
δΛt
δit
− λ20t
)
+ (τ it ≥ 1)(τ it − 1) = 0
to the model-block in the mod.-file, where
δΛt
δit
= λ2t−1
βs
β
(Cst )
−ρ it−1
Πt
− λ5tD
b
t−1
Πt
(1− p)it−1 + λ6tD
b
t−1
Πt
it−1(1− p) + λ20t.
4.8.B Steady-State Efficiency
In steady state, the exogenous policy equilibrium equations collapse to
1
βs
=
1 + (1− τ i)i
Π
(4.B.1)
1
βb
=
(1 + i) exp(κ(Db − D¯))
Π
(1 + κ Db) (4.B.2)
G+ (1− p)T eff = τwσ − 1
σ
(pLs + (1− p)Lb) + τ iD
b
Π
(1− p)i+ T (4.B.3)
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−1
p
Db
Π
[
(1 + i) + p(ib − i)− (1− p)τ ii− 1]
= (Cb − Cs) + (1− τwt )
σ − 1
σ
(Ls − Lb)− T eff (4.B.4)
(Ls)η =
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
(Cs)−ρ (1− τw) (4.B.5)
(Lb)η =
(
σ − 1
σ
)2 (
Cb
)−ρ
(1− τw) (4.B.6)
pLs + (1− p)Lb = pCs + (1− p)Cb +G (4.B.7)
1 + i = Πµ(1 + i¯) (4.B.8)
Combining (4.B.8) and (4.B.1) delivers
1
βs
=
1 + (1− τ i)(Πµ(1 + i¯)− 1)
Π
.
I calibrate i¯ to ensure Π = 1 which implies setting
i¯ =
(
1
βs
− 1
)
1
1− τ i .
Plugging in (4.B.1) into (4.B.2) gives
1
βb
=
[
1 +
1− βs
βs
1
1− τ i
]
exp(κ(Db − D¯))(1 + κDb).
I calibrate βb to ensure that Db = D¯ holds in steady state implying
βb =
[
1 +
1− βs
βs
1
1− τ i
]−1
1
1 + κD¯
.
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Consequently, equation (4.B.4) can be written as
−D¯
p
[
(1 + i) + p(ib − i)− (1− p)τ ii− 1]
= (Cb − Cs) + (1− τwt )
σ − 1
σ
(Ls − Lb)− T eff. (4.B.9)
In the Social planner’s (efficient) equilibrium, Ls = Lb and Cs = Cb holds.
Applying this condition, equation (4.B.9) gives
T eff =
D¯
p
i(1− (1− p)τ i).
This gives the efficient level of lump-sum subsidies to borrowers in dependence of
the chosen steady-state value of interest taxes, meaning the value of lump-sum
subsidies borrowers have to obtain to ensure that borrowers and savers feature
the same steady-state level of consumption and labor and, as a consequence, the
same utility-level. Here, I choose the steady-state interest tax to be zero which
implies
T eff =
D¯
p
i. (4.B.10)
Furthermore, in the Social planner’s equilibrium, (Ls)η = (Cs)−ρ holds. A
comparison with equation (4.B.5) shows that efficiency of the exogenous policy
steady state, thus, requires
τw = 1−
(
σ
σ − 1
)2
. (4.B.11)
Plugging in equations (4.B.10), (4.B.11), and the Social planner’s level of gov-
ernment spending into (4.B. 3) shows that lump-sum taxes have to be equal
to the sum of wage subsidies, lump-sum subsidies payed to borrowers, and the
optimal level of government spending. This gives
T = Geff +
D¯
p
i(1− p) + 2σ − 1
σ(σ − 1)L
s,eff. (4.B.12)
Setting the initial steady-state values of the tax instruments following (4.B.10)
to (4.B.12) together with τ i = 0 ensures efficiency of the exogenous policy steady
state which is, consequently, identical to the Ramsey policy steady state.
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4.8.C Efficiency Under Inflation-Targeting
Efficiency requires Lst = L
b
t and C
s
t = C
b
t independent of the spread shock.
Plugging in these conditions as well as Πt = Π¯ = 1 into the inflation-targeting
equilibrium equations (4.56) to (4.63), the Euler equation for savers (4.58) can
be written as
1
βs
= 1 + (1− τ it+1)it (4.C.1)
and the Euler equation for borrowers (4.59) gives
1
βb
=
(1 + it)ϑt exp(κ(D
b
t − D¯))
Π
(1 + κ Dbt ). (4.C.2)
Furthermore, with Lst = L
b
t and C
s
t = C
b
t as well as plugging in the definition of
the borrowers’ interest rate (4.2), the evolution of debt reads
Dbt −Dbt−1 [(1− p)(1 + it−1)
+p(1 + it−1)ϑt−1 exp(κ(Dbt−1 − D¯))− (1− p)τ it it−1 − 1
]
= −pT eff. (4.C.3)
Comparing the Social planner’s allocation (4.48) with the exogenous policy equi-
librium equation (4.56) shows that
τwt = 1−
(
σ
σ − 1
)2
=
1− 2σ
(σ − 1)2 (4.C.4)
must hold to ensure efficiency of the exogenous policy equilibrium. The optimal
policy rule for τ it can be found by rearranging (4.C.2) to give
τ it+1 = 1−
1− βs
βs
[
1
βb
1
ϑt exp(κ(Dbt − D¯))(1 + κDbt )
− 1
]−1
. (4.C.5)
Replacing τ it in equation (4.C.1) with (4.C.5) delivers
it =
1
βb
1
ϑt exp(κ(Dbt − D¯))(1 + κDbt )
− 1. (4.C.6)
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Plugging in both equations (4.C. 5) and (4.C. 6) into (4.C. 3), the evolution of
debt can be written as
Dbt −Dbt−1
[
(1− p) 1
βb
1
ϑt−1 exp(κ(Dbt−1))(1 + κD
b
t−1)
+
p
βb(1 + κDbt−1)
− 1− p
βbϑt−1 exp(κ(Dbt−1 − D¯))(1 + κDbt−1)
+ (1− p) + (1− p)1− β
s
βs
]
= −pT eff
⇔ Dbt −Dbt−1
[
(1− p) 1
βs
+
p
βb
1
1 + κDbt−1
]
= −pT eff. (4.C.7)
Recalling that the discount factor of borrowers is set to be
βb =
[
1 +
1− βs
βs
1
1− τ i
]−1
1
1 + κD¯
,
equation (4.C. 7) shows that Dbt = D¯ must hold to ensure efficiency of the
exogenous policy equilibrium which means that the debt level has to remain
constant at its steady-state level. Applying this solution, equations (4.C.5) and
(4.C.6) give the optimal rule for the interest tax as
τ it = 1−
1− βs
βs
[
1
βs
1
ϑt−1
− 1
]−1
and the corresponding response of the interest rate as
it =
1
βs
1
ϑt
− 1.
4.8.D Utility Measures
Period-by-period utility losses are defined on an economy-wide level as ξt such
that
U
(
Cst , C
b
t , L
s
t , L
b
t , Gt
)
= U
(
(1− ξt)Csss, (1− ξt)Cbss, Lsss, Lbss, Gss
)
⇔
{
p
(
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− p)
(
(Cbt )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
}
=
((1− ξ)Csss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γss
1− γ
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holds, where Xt denotes the value of the respective variable in period t when
an interest spread shock hits the economy in period 1 while Xss denotes the
respective steady-state value. Here, it is used that savers and borrowers feature
the same steady-state level of consumption and leisure such that Csss = C
b
ss and
Lsss = L
b
ss. Utility losses for savers are defined as ξ
s
t such that
U (Cst , L
s
t , Gt) = U ((1− ξst )Csss, Lsss, Gss)
⇔ (C
s
t )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ =
((1− ξst )Csss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
holds and for borrowers, the utility loss is given by ξbt such that
U
(
Cbt , L
b
t , Gt
)
= U
(
(1− ξbt )Cbss, Lbss, Gss
)
⇔ (C
b
t )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ =
((1− ξbt )Cbss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
applies. Regarding lifetime utility losses, the respective measures are defined as
ξ, ξs, and ξb such that
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
p
(
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− p)
(
(Cbt )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
}
=
((1− ξ)Csss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γss
1− γ +
∞∑
t=1
βtUss,
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βs)t
(
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
=
((1− ξs)Csss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γss
1− γ +
∞∑
t=1
(βs)t U sss,
and
Et
∞∑
t=0
(
βb
)t((Cbt )1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
=
((1− ξb)Cbss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γss
1− γ +
∞∑
t=1
(
βb
)t
U sss.
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hold. For computational issues, it is used that under each policy the economy
converts back to steady state after a finite number of periods which means that
the lifetime utility loss can be computed as
Et
c∑
t=0
βt
{
p
(
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− p)
(
(Cbt )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
)
+ v
G1−γt
1− γ
}
=
((1− ξ)Csss)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lsss)
1+η
1 + η
+ v
G1−γss
1− γ +
c∑
t=1
βtUss,
where it is ensured that c is chosen large enough to ensure that the steady state
is reached after c periods.
Regarding policy gains, the economy-wide policy gain ξpol is defined as
∞∑
t=0
βtURamt
(
Cs,Ramt , C
b,Ram
t , L
s,Ram
t , L
b,Ram
t , G
Ram
t
)
=
∞∑
t=1
βtUExogt
(
Cs,Exogt , C
b,Exog
t , L
s,Exog
t , L
b,Exog
t , G
Exog
t
)
+
(
(1− ξpol)Cs,eff)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(
Ls,eff
)1+η
1 + η
+ ν
(
Geff
)1−γ
1− γ
with U defined in (4.43) while the agent-specific policy gain ξpol,h is defined as
∞∑
t=0
(
βh
)t
(
Ch,Ramt
)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(
Lh,Ramt
)1+η
1 + η
+ ν
(
GRamt
)1−γ
1− γ

=
∞∑
t=1
(
βh
)t
(
Ch,exogt
)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(
Lh,exogt
)1+η
1 + η
+ ν
(Gexogt )
1−γ
1− γ

+
(
(1− ξpol,h)Cs,eff)1−ρ
1− ρ −
(
Ls,eff
)1+η
1 + η
+ ν
(
Geff
)1−γ
1− γ
with h = {s, b} and XRamt denoting variables under the Ramsey-optimal policy,
while Xexogt denotes the respective variable under an exogenously given policy.
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4.8.E Ramsey FOCs with Alternative Welfare Measure
Using the Rawlsian social welfare measure, the FOCs with respect to consump-
tion and labor read:
(1− pRawlst )(Cbt )−ρ − λ3tρ(Cbt )−ρ−1
+λ3t−1
βb
β
ρ(Cbt )
−ρ−1 1 + i
b
t−1
Πt
(1 + κDbt−1)
−λ4t(1− p)− λ6tp+ λ12tρ(Cbt )−ρ−1(1− τwt )WtLbt
+λ14t
σ
σ − 1(1− p)ρ(C
b
t )
−ρ−1Yt
+λ21t
(
Cbt
)−ρ
k
exp(−kdUt)
[1 + exp(−kdUt)]2
= 0 ( δΛt
δCbt
)
pRawlst (C
s
t )
−ρ − λ2tρ(Cst )−ρ−1 + λ2t−1
βs
β
ρ(Cst )
−ρ−1 1 + (1− τ it )it−1
Πt
−λ4t p+ λ6t p+ λ9t ρ(Cst )−ρ−1(1− τwt )WtLst
+λ14t
σ
σ − 1 p ρ(C
s
t )
−ρ−1WtYt + λ15t p ρ(Cst )
−ρ−1Yt
−λ21t (Cst )−ρ k
exp(−kdUt)
[1 + exp(−kdUt)]2
= 0 ( δΛt
δCst
)
−pRawlst (Lst)η − λ5tτwt Wtp− λ8t
σ
σ − 1(1 + η)(L
s
t)
η
−λ9t(Cst )−ρ(1− τwt )Wt − λ16tp+ λ21t (Lst)η k
exp(−kdUt)
[1 + exp(−kdUt)]2
= 0 ( δΛt
δLst
)
−(1− pRawlst )(Lbt)η − λ5tτwt Wt(1− p)− λ6tp(1− τwt )Wt
−λ11t σ
σ − 1(1 + η)(L
b
t)
η − λ12t(Cbt )−ρ(1− τwt )Wt
−λ16t(1− p)− λ21t
(
Lbt
)η
k
exp(−kdUt)
[1 + exp(−kdUt)]2
= 0 ( δΛt
δLbt
)
where dUt is defined as
dUt = U
s
t − U bt =
(Cst )
1−ρ
1− ρ −
(Lst)
1+η
1 + η
− (C
b
t )
1−ρ
1− ρ +
(Lbt)
1+η
1 + η
.
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Furthermore, the FOCs are extended by the derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to pRawlst which gives
dUt = λ21t.
The rest of the FOCs remains unchanged and can be seen in Appendix A.
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5. Concluding Remarks
In the course of this thesis, fiscal policy measures were investigated as a pos-
sibility to eliminate economic imbalances and diminish welfare losses of economic
disturbances. Starting with an exogenously given one-time tax shift considered
in Chapter 2, it was shown that a fiscal devaluation may be quite effective in re-
ducing trade balance deficits in a country being a member of a monetary union.
Here, the most effective form of a fiscal devaluation was found to consist of an
increase in the standard rate of value added tax and a decrease in the employees’
share in social security contributions.
Going one step further, the results in Chapter 3 indicate that if fiscal pol-
icy is set constrained-optimal, welfare losses of a financial shock in times of
a binding zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate can be reduced to a
large extent. Conducting a constrained-optimal fiscal policy in this setup may
eliminate roughly one quarter of the total welfare loss of monetary policy being
constrained by the zero lower bound. This measure, however, implies staying at
the zero lower bound for a longer period.
Regarding distributive effects, Chapter 4 showed that maximizing the sum
of individual utilities in a utilitarian sense may imply increasing the disparity
between agents depending on the tax base used. Interest taxes are found to be
more effective in eliminating welfare losses of a spread shock than wage taxes and,
at the same time, decrease the disparity between groups while the distributive
effects of wage taxes depend on the relative degrees of wage and price rigidity.
As these results indicate the importance of regarding distributive effects, an
alternative social welfare measure was regarded and found that using a Rawlsian
concept, the disparity between groups can be completely eliminated but only at
the cost of decreasing savers’ welfare.
Overall, the results highlight the important role fiscal policy may play in the
economy-stabilizing task and its potential effectiveness in diminishing shock-
induced welfare losses. For the purpose of being able to trace the mechanisms
as well as for the sake of computability, in this thesis, all essays focused on a
unilaterally conducted fiscal policy and partially limit the analysis to a closed
economy. Extending the research to multi-country models and dealing with the
issue of policy coordination between different countries as well as regarding the
possibility of counteractive policy measures of foreign countries seems to be an
interesting issue for further research.
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